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ABSTRACT
GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRY IN THE CASPIAN-CAUCASUS REGION AND THE 
DILEMMA OF INTERSTATE COOPERATION
Nurettin Altundeger 
Old Dominion University, 2007 
Director: Dr. Steve A. Yetiv
This dissertation develops a unique way of analyzing the interstate relationship in 
the Caspian region over the development of Caspian oil resources. Based on three 
different independent variables, this dissertation seeks to understand the main reasons 
behind the absence of interstate cooperation in the Caspian Sea region.
Among the variety of factors that might have affected the nature o f interstate 
relationships and cooperation in the region, national interest considerations among the 
littoral states and external powers involved in the affairs of the Caspian Sea region 
proved to be the most important factor(s) that explain the lack of cooperation in 
developing the Caspian oil industry. While competition for influence and resources 
impeded the establishment of an environment conducive to interstate cooperation, the rise 
of military conflicts and widespread wars also contributed to the deterioration of the 
international environment for the development of the Caspian oil industry. The lack of 
effective international institutions and the failure of the Caspian states to come up with a 
regime or a system of governance that would normalize interstate relationships in the 
region further reduced chances for a smoothly functioning oil industry in the region.
Although the advances made— after more than a decade— in the development of 
oil industry and transportation systems stands as a success, the current level of
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
development hardly satisfies the littoral states and those of external powers as well as oil 
companies.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN THE CAUCASUS
It has been more than a decade that the Caspian-Caucasus region has received 
considerable attention partly because of its vast oil resources.1 Although the existence of 
the rich hydrocarbon resources has been known for centuries, the breakup of the Soviet 
Union and the emergence of independent states around the region sparked a big 
competition among the regional and great powers of the world for the exploitation of the 
petroleum reserves. Major industrial countries including the United States saw it as an 
opportunity to diversify the importation of oil through the creation of multiple oil 
resources, so that the Middle Eastern monopoly and the potential for blackmailing
•5
problems would ease, if  not disappear. The intense struggle for the control of the 
resources in the Caspian region is often seen as a replay of the nineteenth century “Great 
Game” with the variation that the key players have changed.4 Tsarist Russia was 
succeeded by the Soviet Empire in 1917 and then Russia after 1991, and the role of the 
British Empire was taken over by the United States. The twentieth-century version of the
This Dissertation fo llow s the format requirements o f  The C hicago M anual o f  Style 14th E dition  by The 
University o f  Chicago Press.
1 The Caspian Sea is an enclosed body o f  water roughly 700 m iles from north to south and 250  m iles 
across, lying directly betw een the states o f  Central A sia  and the Transcaucasus. It is a salt-water body  
connected to the Black Sea by the V olga and D on rivers. After the collapse o f  the Soviet U nion, the 
Caspian Sea is adjoined by five states; Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Russia. On the 
issue o f  rising importance o f  the region in the international arena, see Gennady Chufrin, ed., The Security o f  
the C aspian Sea R egion  (N ew  York, Oxford: Oxford U niversity Press, 2001).
2 A ngeliki Spatharou, “G eopolitics o f  Caspian Oil: The R ole o f  the Integration o f  the Caspian R egion into 
World Econom y in M aintaining Stability in the Caucasus,” in The P o litics o f  C aspian  Oil, ed., Bulent 
G okay (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 20.
3 B y 2010 , the Caspian could represent 3 percent o f  global oil output and 5 percent o f  non-OPEC  
production. “Opening the Caspian Oil Tap,” Business Week, 24 Decem ber 2001 , 29.
4 M ichael P. Croissant and Bulent Aras, eds., O il an d  G eopolitics in the C aspian  Sea  R egion  (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 1999).
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Great Game has a number of players, including Russia, Turkey, Iran and the West. Not 
only governments are involved, but foreign and multinational corporations as well.5
Former Soviet republics in the Caspian region were optimistic about future 
developments in terms of the extraction of the petroleum resources, such that these 
petroleum reserves could serve as a medium for prosperity and economic well being after 
long years of subordination and underdevelopment. Although at the beginning, all the 
states in one way or another related to the region and its oil reserves were optimistic 
about the exploitation of the vast resources and their transportation to the world oil 
markets, the new developments and discoveries, as well as the policies of littoral states 
and involved parties, proved that it was not as easy as it looked. Even they realized that 
the exploitation of the Caspian oil is far more complicated than anyone contemplated at 
the beginning.6 The complexity of the region stems from the fact that the Caspian basin 
is one the most heterogeneous regions in the world in terms of ethnicity, language and
7  • ♦culture. The power vacuum after the erosion of Soviet power and unsettled disputes 
among the countries in the region further complicate the development of a stable military
o
and political environment.
Given the present politico-military environment in the Caspian basin, I will 
explore the underlying reasons for the lack of cooperation among the major players in the
5 M ehment Dikkaya, “Turk Cumhuriyetleri Enerji Kaynaklari: Y eni Buyuk Oyunun T em el D inam ikleri,” 
A kadem ik A rastirm alar D erg is i 1, no. 3 (N ovem ber/D ecem ber 1999).
6 Gary K. Bertsch et al, C rossroads an d  Conflict: Security an d  F oreign  P o licy  in the Caucasus an d  C entral 
A sia  (N ew  York: R outlege, 2000).
7 For more details on the social and cultural structure o f  the Caspian region, see Hrair R. Dekm ejian and 
Hovann H. Sim onian, T roubled Waters: The G eopolitics o f  the C aspian R egion  (London, N ew  York: St. 
Martin's Press, 2001).
8 Gokay, The P o litics o f  C aspian  Oil.
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region.9 Extraction and transportation of Caspian oil has the potential to provide 
economic development for the region and prosperity for the people, yet even after more 
than a decade, Caspian states could not develop and construct a viable physical and 
political environment for the development of the existing petroleum reserves. After 
gaining their independence, Caspian states have worked very hard to use the oil resources 
for their economic development.10 Since they did not have the technical and financial 
resources to develop their reserves, Caspian states turned to the major oil companies for 
help. International oil companies also wanted to work with the regional states and get 
their share of the Caspian oil reserves. Despite a desire of both regional states and oil 
companies, the extraction and transportation of Caspian oil to world markets could not be 
achieved in the way they wanted.11 In general, what we observe is a desire of regional 
states, western oil companies and the United States with respect to the extraction of 
Caspian oil and its transportation to the world markets. The main question I ask is: why 
have states not cooperated on the issue of developing Caspian oil despite the fact that 
regional states are willing to offer their oil resources in a speedy fashion to the world 
markets?
The finding of this work is that, despite the expectations of greater cooperation in 
the developing Caspian region oil, such cooperation did not come to pass. This raises an 
interesting question: why did cooperation fail when it could have benefited so many 
parties?
9 Major players in the Caspian Sea region include littoral states and som e external powers that are involved  
in the affairs o f  the Caspian region. A m ong them are Russia, the United States, Turkey and international 
oil com panies invested in the region.
10 Faruk Arslan, “Azerbaycan Ekonom isinde G ecis D onem i,” H azar Bilim  san a t ve  K ultur D erg is i 1 
(Spring 2000).
11 Cynthia Croissant, A zerbaijan , O il an d  G eopolitics  (Commack, N Y : N ova Science Publishers, 1998).
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Among a number of factors that have affected developments in the region, the 
race for domination and control of the region seriously hampered prospects for 
cooperation. While each state pursued policies that would guarantee their superior status 
in the region, they also tried to prevent others from gaining power. Therefore the main 
focus in regional affairs shifted to achievement of a higher status rather than involvement 
in activities that would economically improve the region. The discussions over the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea, and the direction of the main export pipelines, simply reflected 
the choices of the states in terms of achieving and maintaining a superior status in the 
region.
Turmoil and instability in the region could also be considered factors that had a 
great impact on regional cooperation over the development of the Caspian Sea oil 
resources. The wars in the region not only depleted the national resources that could 
have been used for economic development, but also made it almost impossible for 
neighboring states to cooperate on other issues. The wars in Chechnya and Nagorno- 
Karabakh have directly and indirectly affected the prospects for cooperation among the 
Caspian states.
Lack of institutionalization has been considered as another important factor 
affecting the interstate relationship in the region. As neoliberals assume, institutions can 
have positive a impact on the achievement of cooperation among the states in 
international arena. Absence of an institutional arrangement and the inability of existing 
organizations in the region to contribute positively to the developments in the region have 
made the cooperation among the Caspian states less likely.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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Having stated that cooperation in the region over the Caspian oil industry 
development has failed, we should indicate that there is a difference between 
achievement of cooperation in the region and the expectations prior to the start of the 
developments after 1991. At the very beginning, all parties were very optimistic about 
the future of the region and the possibility of oil development and the wealth that would 
accrue with the extraction of huge amounts of oil. Compared to expectations, the current 
level of cooperation among states could be labeled as a failure. However, partial success 
was achieved in several areas that have become important milestones in the Caspian oil 
development. The completion of Caspian Pipeline Consortium and Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline could be categorized as important successes in terms of achieving interstate 
cooperation over Caspian oil development. The difference should be viewed from the 
perspective of expectations during the 1990s, and the current level of success. The 
improvements made in the Caspian oil industry were only achieved after almost two 
decades of interstate interaction and long and difficult negotiations.
EXPLORING WHY COOPERATION HAS FAILED
We can hypothesize that cooperation in the Caspian region has been difficult 
because of the rivalry among the regional and external powers and competition over 
resources. The term “rivalry” is used here to explain the competition over the 
share/control of the natural resources. Geopolitical rivalry refers to the establishment of a 
zone of economic, political and military influence in the Transcaspian region. On the 
other hand, political rivalry is used to describe the disagreements among the internal and 
external players, which have prolonged the negotiations over the development of Caspian
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
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011 industry. Rivalry also differs from conflict in the sense that it does not involve 
military confrontation or armed conflict. Actors inside and outside the region see the 
region as their sphere of influence. Increasing assertiveness of Russia within the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) sphere, and the role of the United States as 
an influential actor in the region and its desire to protect its interests, have created 
economic, political and geopolitical rivalry among the actors.12 As Iran and Turkey 
joined in the game with their own policies and expectations as important players in the 
region, the situation in the region became more complicated with respect to the settlement
i -j
of the issues among the players. Within that framework, I will particularly focus on 
Turkey and Iran to identify their role and also their relationship vis-a-vis each other in the 
absence of cooperation in the region. Although we can identify major similarities 
between the policy objectives of these countries, some of the priorities and primary goals 
are totally different and most of the time, conflicting. Besides the external players, the 
choices and the inclinations of the littoral states also played their role in the big game and 
complicated the settlement of conflicting issues among the major actors.
The confusion over the legal status of the Caspian Sea and the persistent 
disagreement among the bordering states could be explained within the context of 
geopolitical rivalry and competition over resources that in the end present a great obstacle 
to the establishment of a fully developed regime, one that would set the rules for the use 
of the Caspian Sea and the exploitation of the resources among littoral states. The 
disagreements and the choices of the states with regard to the legal status of the Caspian 
Sea as a lake or a sea, reflect the political choices and economic interests of the littoral
12 Suat Ilhan, “Jeopolitik G elism eler ve Turk D unyasi,” A vrasya  E tudleri 2, no. 3 (Autumn 1995): 30.
13 Bayram Sinkaya, “Turkey-Iran G eopolitical Com petition over Central A sia and Caucasus: 1 9 8 9 -2 0 0 1 ,” 
M iddle E ast Technical U niversity  (January 2004): 77.
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states. The concepts of “delimitation” and “condominium” are used by different states to 
achieve their own objectives in the Caspian region. Delimitation suggests the division of 
the sea and sea shelves whereas condominium refers to the management of the whole 
Caspian Sea and its basin by the participation of the littoral states. Under condominium, 
each state technically would have equal voting power in the management of the Caspian 
Sea; however, powerful states are expected to exert more pressure on other states over the 
decisions to be made. For this reason, influential and dominant states such as Iran and 
Russia prefer condominium over delimitation, expecting that they could impose their 
orders in such an environment. The other less powerful states (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan) favor delimitation of the Caspian Sea.14
The emergence of a Russian monopoly clearly jeopardizes regional development 
and distribution of wealth among the peoples of the region. When we talk about the 
distribution of wealth and the sharing of resources, we need to highlight the issue of 
pervasive ambiguity with regard to the management and control of the Caspian Sea and 
its oil resources. The absence of a clear regime and rules that would lay out the 
foundation for the use of the Caspian Sea area among the bordering states is currently one 
of the biggest problems in the region.
A relative absence of international institutions might be considered (though this 
remains to be explored) as a factor that affects the degree of cooperation among actors. 
One of the outcomes of the lack of institutional establishments could be the perpetuation 
of an environment in which actors choose to compete with each other rather than 
cooperate. International Relations (IR) theorists, especially institutionalists, argue that the
14 W e must consider that the respective p olicies o f  the littoral states and the outsider powers have changed 
over time. The evolution o f  the policies o f  the states and the factors that caused the change w ill be 
explored in the com ing chapters.
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existence of international institutions could enhance the likelihood of international 
cooperation.15 Although some countries of Caucasus and Central Asia belong to CIS, it 
should not be considered an institution where members play an equal role. CIS was 
established with Russian pressure, mainly to re-establish Russian influence over the 
region after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. Management of the regional issues in 
fact becomes easier under an institutional framework, especially if the participation of the 
involved countries is important and consensus is necessary. The Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could be seen as an example in this context. 
Although institutions may not play much of a role in resolving issues immediately, their 
importance and contribution could increase over time, as can be seen in Europe and the 
number of organizations currently active in that continent. The absence of international 
institutions in the region is related to the fact that most countries in the region gained 
their independence just after the end of the Soviet Empire. Establishment of patterns of 
international relations and foreign policies could take some time in the region. Although 
the Caspian-Caucasus states are not expected to adapt to a new environment and develop 
institutions in a short period of time, establishment of some sort of institutions could help 
to develop friendly relations in coming years.
Another issue that could be analyzed within this context is the ambiguity 
pertaining to the legal status of the Caspian Sea as one of the factors that gave rise to the 
emergence of balance-of-power politics in the Caspian region. Since the interests of the 
littoral states on this issue do not coincide with each other, the rivalry over the control of 
resources paved way for the emergence of an alliance that created balance-of-power
15 See Oran R. Y oung, In ternational C ooperation  : B uilding R egim es fo r  N atura l R esources an d  the 
E nvironm ent (Ithaca: Cornell U niversity Press, 1989).
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politics, with Russia and Iran on one side and the other littoral states with the United 
States, Turkey and Western states on the other.16 The rise of groupings among states 
could be construed as complicating the settlement of the existing issues in the region.
One of the interesting aspects of the alliance between Russia and Iran is that Iran as a 
theocratic state chooses to stand by Russia rather than aligning with the other Islamic 
countries (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan). As we know, Iran’s stance in 
international politics is quite different since the Iranian Revolution. Iran considered 
religious themes as its guide in internal politics and foreign policy formulations. 
Resistance and fighting against the West have long dominated Iran’s political agenda. 
However, recently we have noticed that there is a shift in Iranian politics such that they 
are no longer primarily guided by religious motives. The agreement between Russia and 
Iran is as much a reflection of their national interests as the alliance among the other 
littoral states.
Another aspect of the geopolitical rivalry and competition over resources is the 
issue of pipelines, which has been a major source of conflict and competition among the 
states that have interests over the transportation of the Caspian oil through their territory. 
The transportation of Caspian oil through pipelines is of utmost importance for the oil 
producers in the region (other than Russia and Iran, since they already have an 
established system for their reserves and their own transportation system). For 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan the only outlet for carrying their petroleum to 
consumers is the pipelines. The choices of the Caspian states and other external players 
are driven mostly by their own economic and political interests. However, feasibility of
16 Seen as a natural process in international relations, the alliances among the states have changed over time 
as their interests m oved to other directions because o f  the new  developm ents in the region.
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the suggested routes, and their costs and safety, are very important for the construction 
and for the future transportation of the Caspian oil.
Second, other than the political and geopolitical rivalry as potential reasons for 
the lack of cooperation in the Caspian basin, wars and ethnic clashes have always been a 
serious source of instability and disturbance. The Caspian region is one of the most 
heterogeneous regions in the world, with multiple ethnic structures and highly complex 
formations. As Gokay mentions, “the Caspian-Caucasus is a region of complexities, rich 
in diversity of peoples, nations and language. Hardly anywhere can one find a territory of
1 7a comparable size as heterogeneous in terms of language, religion and culture.” The 
cultural, religious and ethnic diversity is one of the greatest factors perpetuating 
instability in the region, causing internal as well as international wars. From the time of 
the establishment of independent states after the collapse of the Soviet regime, the region 
has witnessed bloody conflicts and suffered from both internal and interstate wars. The 
ongoing war between Russia and Chechnya, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the internal 
clashes in Georgia, are examples of the potential for real conflict. More importantly, 
these conflicts have not been resolved among the actors despite the passage of years since 
their emergence.
In addition to the potential for conflict in the region, security and peace 
arrangements are so precarious that conflicts can be triggered by an outsider agent and 
can be used for political reasons. One of the greatest obstacles for the extraction of oil 
reserves and their utilization in the development of the economies of the regional 
countries could be the lack of political stability in the Caspian region. Establishment of a
17 Bulent Gokay, “The Background; History and Political Change,” in The P o litics o f  C aspian  O il (N ew  
York: Palgrave, 2001), 1.
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politically stable environment could help the development of friendly relationships 
among the countries of the Caspian region, which would contribute positively to the 
extraction and transportation of Caspian oil. Direct or indirect foreign investment requires 
a stable internal and international political system. In fact, foreign investment and 
financial support are essential to Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, since these 
countries do not have the necessary resources to develop their energy reserves. Under the 
current politico-military environment, is it possible for them to establish a well-working 
economic and political system that will be conducive to the extraction and importation of 
the hydrocarbon resources?
The absence of democracy and rule of law in the Caspian states, and the nature of 
the domestic politics of the littoral states, could be seen as important factors in 
determining the nature of the interstate relationship in the Caspian region.18 The absence 
of a rule of law and the lack of legitimacy on the part of the ruling elites, who could not 
gain public support, may have caused constant turmoil within this region. In addition, 
former Soviet republics do not have a democratic regime, and the absence of the rule of 
law is a fact of their governance. The regimes in these states are not quite stable. When 
we look just at the political change, for example, Azerbaijan, within one decade, had 
three different administrations whose successors brought new agendas and new priorities, 
and different ways of resolving their issues. Although these seem to be internal affairs of 
those states, they directly affect Western interests thorough hampering investments for 
the development of oil reserves. The continuation of existing problems hamper direct 
foreign investment from the oil countries and block international monetary aid for the
18 A quick glance at the information provided by the reports o f  the Freedom H ouse reveal that the Caspian  
states have a long w ay to go in democratization and developm ent o f  democratic institutions.
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projects. The internal problems of these countries, and the political impotence and 
incompetence o f their leaders, are among the problems that need to be solved for a 
smooth functioning of the oil industry and transportation of the oil to world markets.
The importance of oil in world politics is obvious. All industrial countries depend 
on the importation of oil from the Middle East and other producers. If we consider that 
the oil resources o f the world are limited, no matter how big or small the resources are we 
can understand why countries attach so much importance to issues related to securing the 
flow of oil. It is in fact an issue of survival for many industrialized nations and their 
economies, including the United States, which is highly dependent on the importation of 
oil despite its known reserves.
COOPERATION IN THEORY
Exploring these problems is an important step to resolve them. In that sense, 
dealing with the issues that produce competition rather than cooperation is an essential 
step that could contribute to their settlement. Whether states inherently compete or 
cooperate with each other is an essential discussion in International Relations theory. The 
founder of Realist Theory, Hans Morgenthau, argues that states in the international arena 
cannot trust anyone but themselves. This is accepted as the governing rule in 
international relations that breeds hostility and war.19 Morgenthau also argues that power 
politics and balance o f power are the defining characteristics of international state order, 
which decreases the possibility of cooperation among states.20 Power and national interest
19 Hans J. Morgenthau, P olitics  am ong N ations; the Struggle f o r  P ow er an d  P eace , 4 th ed. (N ew  York: 
Knopf, 1967).
20 The N eorealist scholars continue along the sam e line and argue that states operate within an anarchic 
international order where the basic understanding within that system  is com petition rather than cooperation.
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are among the most important concepts in realist theory. Since states are like those of 
egoist individuals, conflicts and wars are inevitable.21 While Realists/Neo-realists argue 
that states within an anarchic environment compete with each other, Institutionalists 
argue that this is not a universal phenomenon. Under certain circumstances, anarchy can 
be ameliorated and cooperation can be achieved.22 Supporters of this idea argue that 
institutions can help states to come together and thereby increases the likelihood of
23cooperation among them. While analyzing the causes of the lack of cooperation among 
internal and external powers in the Caspian region, I will be drawing on the theoretical 
discussions about state behavior and more specifically, on the concept of cooperation. 
While analyzing the reasons for the lack of cooperation among major players, I will refer 
to the thoughts developed by major IR schools.
First is the systemic approach of Neo-realism that focuses mainly on the systemic 
effects of anarchy on state behaviors. In the Caspian context, the rivalry among major
Kenneth N . Waltz, Theory o f  In ternational P olitics  (Reading, MA: A ddison-W esley, 1979). In addition, 
W altz argues that states within an anarchic environm ent have to com ply with the rules o f  anarchy and take 
precautions, otherwise they w ill be penalized by the system . Kenneth N . W altz, “Anarchic Orders and 
Balance o f  Pow er,” in N eorealism  an d  its C ritics, ed., Robert O. K eohane (N ew  York: Columbia  
U niversity Press, 1986).
21 For a more insightful comparison o f  realist and Institutionalist approaches, see David Baldwin, ed., 
N eorealism  a n d  N eoliberalism : The C on tem porary D eba te  (Colum bia U niversity Press, 1993); Helen  
Milner, “International Theories o f  Cooperation A m ong Nations: A  R eview  E ssay,” W orld  P o litics  44, no. 3 
(April 1992): 4 6 6 -9 6 .
22 A  prominent scholar, Robert Jervis, also argues that anarchy prevails in international relations; however, 
under certain circum stances system ic effects o f  anarchy can be ameliorated and cooperation could be 
achieved. Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security D ilem m a,” W orld P o litics  30, no. 2 (January 
1978): 167-214 .
23 For more information on how  institutions increase cooperation, see Robert 0 .  Keohane, Joseph S. N ye  
and Stanley Hoffm ann, eds., A fter the C o ld  War: In ternational Institutions an d  S tate S tra teg ies in Europe, 
1989 -1 9 9 1  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard U niversity Press, 1993). See also Judith Goldstein and Robert O. 
Keohane, eds., Ideas a n d  F oreign  P olicy: Beliefs, Institutions, an d  P o litica l C hange (Ithaca: Cornell 
U niversity Press, 1993); Robert O. Keohane, ed., N eorealism  an d  its C ritic  (N ew  York: Columbia 
U niversity Press, 1986); Robert Keohane, A fter H egem ony: C ooperation  an d  D isco rd  in the W orld  
P olitica l E conom y  (Princeton, 1984); Young, In ternational Cooperation', Kenneth A. O ye, ed., 
C oopera tion  under A narchy  (Princeton, N.J: Princeton U niversity Press, 1985); Robert O. Keohane, 
“International Institutions: T w o Approaches,” In ternational S tudies Q uarterly  32, no. 4 (D ecem ber 1988); 
Robert O. K eohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise o f  Institutionalist Theory, R esponse to John J. 
M earsheimer,” In ternational Security  20, no. 1 (Sum mer 1995).
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players over the Caspian region, and the competition over the natural resources, could be 
explained through the basic premises of neo-realist assertions. The second school of 
thought on the concept of cooperation is the Institutionalist approach, which asserts the 
possibility of cooperation under institutional framework. The lack of institutional 
establishment in the region and subsequent competition could be analyzed within this 
framework.24
The importance of the study is to incorporate different IR theory approaches and 
to analyze the policies of the major players and the outcomes that are associated with it.
IMPORTANCE OF THE REGION
The Caspian Sea has been controlled by Russia and Iran for more than a century. 
Even at a time when nobody knew oil reserves existed in the region, the sea was of 
strategic and economic importance for the bordering countries. Through a mutual 
agreement with Iran, Russia had the right to maintain a naval force in the Caspian Sea 
and both states enjoyed economic activities, namely fishing. The extraction of oil in the 
Caspian region, especially in Azerbaijan, started around the 1870s—1880s. When the 
Bolsheviks came to power, there were 28 oil and gas reserves operated by Russia, with 
the help of foreign investors from Europe.25 Most of the Russian wells drilled by those 
foreign investors were located in the Caspian Sea region. The Soviet oil industry worked 
well compared to the world standards during 1850s-1870s. However, over time the 
Soviet oil industry was unable to keep up with new developments in the oil extracting 
industry, and the incompetent Soviet administrations failed to use the resources
24 For a detailed comparison o f  Realist and Institutionalist perspectives, see John J. Mearsheimer, “The 
False Promise o f  International Institutions,” In ternational Security  19, no. 3 (W inter 1994).
25 Gokay, “The Background; History and Political Change,” 10.
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efficiently. As Gokay put it, “the most pressing aspect of the petroleum industry in the 
Soviet Union in the late [18] 80s was the fact that Soviet technology seriously lagged 
behind that of the West, the oil extraction technology was underdeveloped. Soviet drill 
pipes and bits were of such poor quality that the drilling process had to be stopped for
Ofrepairs.” In fact, the lack of progress and underdevelopment in the Soviet petroleum 
industry was the sign of a general slowdown in the Soviet socialist system. As the 
country lost its power to advance in different areas, the loss was reflected in the oil 
industry as well. This is one of the factors that made Russia weak in international 
competition over many issues. The point is, Russia still has the ambition to dominate the 
Caspian Sea region, but does not have the financial and technological resources to 
maintain its desired course of action.
Returning to the development of the issues in the Caspian Sea region, we may 
assert that the breakdown of the Soviet Empire started a new era and a new history for the 
littoral states of the Caspian Sea. The fall of the Soviet Empire was followed by the rise 
of newly independent states in the Caspian Sea region. The area once controlled by the 
Soviets and Iran now is controlled by five states: Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, 
Iran and Russia.
Although the Soviet Empire has done some oil extraction in the Azerbaijani 
fields, most of the oil reserves remain untouched. The reason is that Russia is also among 
the main oil producers in the world, with its own oil reserves. The Soviet Empire did not 
depend on the Caspian oil because they could also drill for and transport their own oil to 
internal and international markets. One of the biggest problems with the Caspian oil is 
transporting it to world markets, due to its geographical location. After this brief
26 Ibid., 12.
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introduction to the history of the development of the petroleum industry in the region, we 
turn now to the issue of the importance of Caspian oil in the world markets.
One of the first questions we ask is, is Caspian oil really important— in the sense 
that it would make a difference to the world’s oil consumers in terms of pricing and 
reliance on multiple resources rather than relying only on the Middle Eastern
27petroleum. The Caspian Sea is the largest non-OPEC oil source in the world. 
Development of oil industry and export in the region will definitely contribute to overall 
energy security in the world.28 In fact, talking about oil and world politics is almost 
equivalent to talking about Middle East and the petroleum resources in the Middle East. 
Elowever, the proven and estimated reserves in the Caspian Sea region have the potential
9 0to divert our attention from the Middle East to the Caspian Sea. Estimates of proven 
and potential reserves throughout the whole region, except for Russia and Iran, add up to 
190 billion barrels of petroleum.30 Kazakhstan has more oil reserves than were estimated 
during the period of Soviet Empire. After Russia, Kazakhstan is the second richest in 
terms of oil among the Soviet republics, with its estimated and proven oil reserves 
between 95-101 billion (bn) barrels in addition to large gas resources. Azerbaijan also 
has large oil resources compared to its small territorial size: around 31-39bn barrels of 
estimated oil reserves with 35 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas. Turkmenistan is also 
among the countries with high natural gas and petroleum resources, estimated to be
27 Ismail Hakki Iscan, “Kuresel D egisim in  Getirdigi Y eni Stratejilerle Enerji G uvenligi Sorunu ve 
Turkiye,” A vrasya  E tudleri 22 (2002): 112.
28 Hearing before the United States Senate, Subcom m ittee on International E conom ic Policy, Export and 
Trade Promotion o f  the Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, U.S. E nergy Security: R ussia an d  the C aspian, 30 
April 2003, 4.
29 A lthough w e talk about the importance o f  the Caspian oil, it is no w ay comparable to the M iddle Eastern 
oil reserves. The point here is that the Caspian oil reserves are also considerable when it com es to 
investm ent and future establishments.
30 M ehdi Parvizi A m ineh, Tow ards the C on tro l o f  O il R esources in the C aspian  R egion  (N ew  York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1999), 80.
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around 34bn barrels of oil and 159tcf of natural gas, which makes it the third highest in 
the world. Russia and Iran are among the largest oil and natural gas suppliers. Russia 
ranks number one in terms of natural gas reserves and exports, with reserves of 1.700tcf. 
Russia is the 9th largest oil producer in the world, with 50bn barrels of reserves. The fifth 
country, Iran, ranks as the 2nd largest natural gas exporter in the world after Russia. Iran 
has about 10 percent of the world’s oil resources, making it fifth in the w orld .31
Although we have said that the Caspian Sea region has a large volume of oil and 
natural gas reserves, other views suggest that the estimated reserves are exaggerated, and
-39
that the Caspian Sea region has less than the current statistics show. (See tables 1 and
2.) Although the total oil reserves of the Caspian Sea region are far less than the reserves 
in the Middle East, their potential and extraction are important for several reasons.33
First, these reserves are important for the former republics and their economies. 
These reserves seem trivial compared to that of the total world reserves, but the existing 
oil resources in the Caspian Sea would be more than enough to develop the region 
economically and bring prosperity to its people.
31 United States Energy Information Administration. A vailable 10n linel:<http://w w w .eia.doe.gov/> [2 
February 2007]
32 A nadolu Ajansi, “Hazar Petrolu Soylendigi Kadar D eg il,” 24 April 1998.
33 Som e experts on the region com m ented “the global strategic significance o f  the Caspian region with 
respect to energy resources pales in comparison to that o f  the Persian G ulf.” Richard Sokolsky, and Tanya 
Charlick-Paley, N ATO  a n d  C aspian  Security: A M ission too  Far?  (Santa M onica, CA: R A N D , 1999), 80.
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Table 1:
Proven Oil Reserves: Caspian Countries
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Russian Fed. 59.22 59.62 63.21 68.48 72.46 72.44 74.44
Turkmenistan 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55
Kazakhstan 25.02 25.02 39.62 39.62 39.62 39.62 39.62
Azerbaijan 7.0 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0
Source: BP Statistical Review o f  World Energy 2006, Unit: In Billion barrels
80 n
Turkmenistan Azerbaijan Kazakhstan Russian Fed.
Graph 1: Proven Oil Reserves: Caspian Countries (View in 3D Graph)
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Table 2:
Proven Gas Reserves: Caspian Countries
1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2003 2005
Russian Fed. 46.9 46.7 46.8 47.0 47.8 48.0 47.82
Turkmenistan 2.85 2.86 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9
Kazakhstan 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Azerbaijan 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37 1.37
Source: BP Statistical Review o f  World Energy 2006, Unit: In Trillion Cubic Meters
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Graph 2: Proven Gas Reserves: Caspian Countries (View in 3D Graph)
It is also important to have multiple channels of oil production and extraction in 
the world, since the potential exists to reduce oil prices by eliminating the Middle Eastern 
monopoly. The importance of the Caspian oil also stems from the fact that it could 
reduce the oil importing countries’ dependence on Middle Eastern petroleum, thereby 
decreasing the possibility of blackmail by the OPEC countries. The oil crisis of 1973 is a
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great lesson for oil consumers, especially industrialized countries. Given that existing 
petroleum reserves in the world as a whole are limited and will come to an end in the 
future, regardless of the large Middle Eastern and other oil sources in the world, the 
world will need to utilize every possible resource, since life on earth is very much 
dependent on petroleum and its derivatives.34 The estimated oil reserves in the Caspian 
region (around 200 billion barrels (bbl)) are far greater than Iraq, whose deposits of 
113bbl rank second in the world after Saudi Arabia’s 262 bbl.35 See tables 1 and 2 for 
more accurate data on the proven oil and gas reserves in the Caspian region compared to 
optimistic estimates.
METHODOLOGY
The dependent variable of this study is the lack of cooperation among major 
players in the Caspian Sea region, on the issue of Caspian oil. I intend to find the reasons 
behind the lack of cooperation and slow development of issues in the Caspian region as 
they relate to Caspian oil resources. In exploring the dependent variable, I will examine 
three major variables, as it is generally accepted that social events cannot be explained by 
a single variable. The overall picture may only be understood through the investigation 
of a set of variables. There could be a number of important variables at play at different 
times, with a varying degree of impact on the question asked. Since it is not feasible to
34 A s o f  the year 2000 , the planet is believed to have a total remaining oil reserve betw een 1 2 5 0 -1950  bbl. 
Looking at the total estimated Caspian oil o f  around 100 bbl, the importance o f  Caspian oil becom es clear. 
Nathan Perz, “The Caspian Basin and Shifting U .S. P olicy  in Central Asia: The Future o f  War for O il,”
Synthesis/R egeneration  (Spring 2003).
35 The figures and numbers that have been presented here are subject to change as new  explorations take 
place in the region. The main cause o f  the variations betw een numbers w ill be analyzed in the com ing  
chapters, as it relates to one o f  the policies o f  the littoral states— that in order to attract foreign investm ent 
som e people argue the numbers have been deliberately exaggerated.
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consider all the possibilities and variables, this study will concentrate on the variables 
that are most important in explaining the central question.
In the following chapters, the level of cooperation and its impact on the overall 
development of the Caspian oil industry will be investigated with reference to:
• political/geopolitical rivalry among the players over regional influence and the 
control of oil resources in the Caspian Sea region;
• armed conflicts among the regional players and military confrontations; and
• the presence and effectiveness of international institutions.
Definition o f  Cooperation: Cooperation or Conflict (A Theoretical Approach)
There is agreement on the concept of cooperation by both neorealists and 
neoliberalists. According to Keohane, “cooperation occurs when actors adjust their 
behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy
•5 r
coordination.” The neorealist Joseph Grieco defines cooperation in a similar way: 
“international cooperation may be defined as the voluntary adjustment by states of their 
policies so that they manage their differences and reach some mutually beneficial 
outcome.” Both definitions involve a certain level of goal-directed behavior. Second, 
they also imply that actors engaged in cooperation retrieve gains or rewards from it, 
although the gains received are not necessarily equal in size or kind, but must be achieved 
by each party.
The concept of cooperation is also regarded as “the opposite of competition or 
conflict both of which involve goal-seeking behavior that aims to reduce the gains
36 Robert Keohane, A fter H egem ony, 5 1 -5 2 .
37 Joseph M. Grieco, C oopera tion  A m ong Nations. Europe, A m erica  an d  N on T ariff B arriers to  Trade 
(Ithaca, London: Cornell U niversity Press, 1990), 22.
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available to others or restrain their want satisfaction.” According to Keohane, 
“Cooperation is directly related to discord, and they must be understood together. Thus, 
to understand cooperation, one must also understand the frequent absence of, or failure of 
cooperation.”39 This perspective suggests that without conflict or competition, there is no 
need for cooperation. However, cooperation or conflict should not be seen as the only 
alternatives to states’ behavior. Unilateral action, where some states could choose to 
follow without paying any attention to the impact on others, could also be a course of 
action outside the perimeters of cooperation and conflict. Therefore, cooperation should 
be understood in terms of policy adjustment to reach mutual gains. However, the main 
issue that needs to be dealt with is the likelihood of cooperation on the issue of Caspian 
oil and other related matters. Analyses of circumstances under which states are most 
likely to cooperate or compete give us more insight into understanding the concept of 
cooperation.
The first independent variable is the political/geopolitical rivalry among the 
players over the control of oil resources and regional influence in the Caspian Sea region. 
While geopolitical rivalry refers to the establishment of a zone of economic, political and 
military influence/control over the region, political rivalry refers to the disagreements 
among internal and external players, which also involves the states’ assertiveness over 
the policy choices that serve their interests. It also differs from conflict in the sense that 
rivalry does not involve military confrontation and armed conflict.
38 Helen M ilner, Interests, Institutions, an d  Information. D om estic P olitics a n d  In ternational R elations  
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton U niversity Press, 1997), 7 -8 .
39 Robert Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” in The In ternational P o litica l E conom y  
a n d  In ternational Institutions, vol. II, ed., Oran R. Y oung (Cheltenham: Elgar, 1996), 291.
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Actors inside and outside the region see the region as their sphere of influence, 
which makes it hard to cooperate on issues such as oil. Geopolitical rivalry over 
resources could be analyzed under two different areas of study. The first area that 
characterizes the main dynamic of the subject is interstate rivalry over the legal status of 
the Caspian Sea. The second issue, which represents the core of the hypothesis, is the 
long-lasting controversy over the transportation of the Caspian oil and the construction of 
pipelines. By taking the issue of rivalry and competition as an independent variable, I 
intend to find out its impact on the level of cooperation—more specifically why states 
choose to compete over the control and extraction of Caspian oil— and how it affects the 
overall picture with respect to the development of Caspian oil. The analysis of 
geopolitical rivalry and competition over the economic resources in the Caspian basin 
will be investigated with reference to major IR schools of thought. In terms of 
methodology, a comparative approach with the incorporation of realist and institutionalist 
points of view will be adapted to investigate the impact of geopolitical rivalry and 
competition among players in the absence of cooperation over the utilization of the 
natural resources in the Caspian region. While the main focus of the analysis is on the 
central questions posed at the beginning, this part of the study provides some insights into 
the application of realist and institutionalist theories to the realities of the Caspian region. 
Realists assert that power politics, competition and anarchy are the main elements of 
interstate relationships. The analysis of the reasons and impact of the geopolitical rivalry 
in the Caspian basin would be a test for the general realist assumptions in a regional 
context. The same analysis applies to other schools of thought that will be used in this 
study, as an explanatory component of the main dynamics of the issues that will be laid
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out in detail in the coming chapters. While the core of the study centers on the main 
research questions and answers, this section will also reveal some information about the 
applicability of an institutionalist approach and its explanatory power in individual 
contexts. Analysis of the states’ policies and their respective choices over 
existing/potential issues will be used to determine the impact of differences and 
variations in the general level of cooperation.
The second independent variable is armed conflicts and military confrontations 
among the regional players. By analyzing the military confrontations and armed conflicts 
that have taken place in the transcaspian region, I intend to find out their impact on the 
level of development o f Caspian oil resources. After the breakup of the Soviet Empire, 
the region witnessed bloody conflicts and wars. These deep-rooted conflicts and military 
confrontations caused political and economic instability in the region. It is an accepted 
premise that economic developments and business activities need a stable environment to 
grow. The war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, ethnic conflicts in Georgia and 
Chechnya, and the mistrust between Azerbaijan and Iran are conflicts that have the 
potential to disrupt any major economic enterprise in the region, and in the end may pose 
an obstacle to the development of Caspian oil and other projects related to its 
exploitation.
The third independent variable that will be employed is the level of 
institutionalization and the lack and ineffectiveness of institutional arrangements in the 
region, and its impact on the level of cooperation among states. In using that as an 
independent variable, I intend to measure the impact of the level of institutionalization on 
cooperation among states, and to find out how the absence of institutional arrangements
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affects the development of the Caspian oil industry. Within the same framework, regime 
analysis will be used to supplement the main discussions centered around institutional 
establishments. As is the case with institutions, regimes are also said to be an important 
factor in the achievement of interstate cooperation. Regimes are generally accepted to set 
ground rules that help the emergence of interstate cooperation. The institutionalist school 
argues that cooperation among states is easier under an institutional framework. Neo­
realists disagree, asserting that international institutions rarely contribute to political 
stability and do not have any major influence on issues of war and peace; therefore 
institutions do not have a considerable impact on the level of cooperation among states.40 
In this framework, existing institutions and organizations among the Caspian states and 
external players will be studied. The number of operating institutions and their influence 
over the political and economic issues will be investigated.
In exploring these independent variables, I expect to explain the reasons for the 
lack of cooperation among internal and external actors and the slow development of 
issues in the Caspian Sea region. I will use primary and secondary sources in my 
analysis of the relationship between dependent and independent variables. In my study, I 
will use Turkish materials on the issue of Caspian oil and the Caspian region to enrich my 
research, bring additional perspectives, and to learn the role of Turkey in the greater 
picture. In addition, I will utilize books published on different aspects of the Caspian 
region/oil and ongoing events. In order to analyze the stages of developments and 
initiatives that are related to the central question of this work, I will use newspapers, 
journals, primary writings and speeches of leaders as well as other relevant sources of
40 For a detailed neo-realist perspective see Mearsheimer, “The False Promise o f  International Institutions.” 
See also In ternational Security  20, no. 1 (Sum mer 1995) for follow -up discussions with counter arguments 
from contending schools o f  thought.
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information. I will also use information from Internet websites that specifically 
document the developments in the region and publish articles on different aspects of 
Caspian oil and the Caspian states. Among electronic resources that I will use are the 
foreign broadcasts and newspapers as translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service (FBIS), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Caspian Business Report, Caspian Oil 
and Gas, Caspian Oil Industry News, Oil and Gas Journal and Caspian World. Some 
Turkish resources that are worth mentioning here are the Zaman Gazetesi—which has 
excellent coverage of Turkey— and the Central Asian World, both of which are available 
in Print at Old Dominion University library and online. Among other Turkish resources 
are: Milliyet Gazetesi, Ayin Tarihi (which has a wide array of Turkish and Turkic world 
accounts), and Avrasya Etudleri, an academic journal in Turkish that covers the 
developments in Central Asia and Caucasus from a variety of viewpoints.
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Figure 1: The Caucasus and Central Asia
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Source: University o f Texas at Austin, Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection
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CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF OIL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CASPIAN BASIN
The region around the Caspian Sea has been a focal point since the early times in 
history. As an area that has been inhabited by many cultures and civilizations, the region 
has become an arena for competing imperial forces.1 The region has attracted many 
people from all around the world because of its natural resources. In addition to the 
resources that attracted people to the region, the Caspian Sea and the surrounding area 
became a passage between from northern and eastern Europe to East Asia. In this 
chapter, I discuss the history o f oil development in the Caspian Sea region as it relates to 
the current developments and interstate relationships. In order to understand today’s 
socio-political environment in the Caspian region, we need to look at the historical 
developments in the region. Some of the issues that the Caspian states face today are 
directly and indirectly related to the interstate relationship dating back to the times of 
early oil discoveries.
There is a longstanding connection between the Caspian region and oil. 
“Knowledge about the existence of oil—white and black—and of natural gas dates back 
to antiquity.”2 There are reports of Caspian oil as early as the sixth century BC.
Zarathustra (Zoroaster) was said to have traveled to see the fires with his own eyes. The 
ancient literature of Greece and Rome contains many references to the oil and gas of the 
Baku area. Herodotus complained in 450 BC about the evil smoke of the Persian oil and
1 A rcheological evidences reveal traces o f  human settlem ents in the South Caspian that date back to the 
prehistoric tim es. Shirin Akiner, ed., The Caspian: Politics, E nergy an d  Security  (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon-Taylor Francis Group, 2004), 3.
2 Hooshang Amirahmadi, ed., The C aspian  R egion a t a  C rossroad: C hallenges o f  a  N ew  F rontier o f  
E nergy an d  D evelopm en t (Palgrave M acm illan, 2000), 89.
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described the production of oil and salt from springs and wells.3 Heating by the use of 
natural gas was a common feature in Baku during the times of the Sassanids who ruled 
Azerbaijan in the fifth century.4
In the thirteenth century, Italian traveler Marco Polo passed through northern 
Persia and wrote that “on the edge of Armenia in the direction of Georgia there is said to 
be a fountain from which oil spurts in voluptuous quantities, so much that one could fill a 
hundred shiploads at the same time with them. This oil is unfit for consumption, but it 
bums in an excellent way and moreover serves as a remedy against camels’ scabies.
Folks from remote areas come here to fetch this oil, since in none of the surrounding 
lands oil of this caliber can be found.”5
Despite the fact that we have numerous reports and sources that talk about the 
Caspian oil and the wells in Baku, the export of oil and its use in trade was not 
completely known. What we know for sure is that hand-dug wells produced limited oil 
and it was used for medicinal purposes, cooking, heating houses and lighting in the 
homes. There are, however, reports of Caspian oil and its use in trade after the 
seventeenth century, especially the oil wells in Baku and the prospering life in the city.6 
It is interesting, however, that the real importance of the oil was not fully understood 
until it was discovered that oil could be used as a fuel for transportation. After that
3 M ichael P. Croissant and Biilent Aras, eds., O il an d  G eopolitics in the C aspian  Sea  R egion  (Westport, 
CT: Praeger, 1999), 3.
4 In terms o f  trade, both asphalt and lamb oil from Apsheron (the peninsula on the southern shore o f  which  
Baku is situated) must have been w idely  used in the region through the M iddle A ges. A ccording to most 
sources, this w as the main source o f  B yzantines’ fuel supply, w hich w as used am ong other utilities, to heat 
the bathhouses o f  Constantinople and as ammunition for land and maritime flame-throwers. “Caspian Oil 
and Gas: The Supply Potential o f  Central A sia  and Transcaucasia,” In ternational E nergy A gency  (Paris: 
The A gency, 1998), 3 0 -3 1 .
5 Ibid., 34.
6 Gokay, The P o litics o f  C aspian  Oil, 3.
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realization, heavy competition started between the people and the nations over control of 
the oil reserves.7
RUSSIAN CONTROL OF THE REGION
In 1723, Tsar Peter the Great annexed parts of the Persian controlled eastern 
Transcaucasia, including Baku. Although the existence of oil and gas was known at that 
time, the extraction and use of oil was not a highly popular industry, since the oil wells of 
Baku were too isolated from world oil markets. After the annexation of Baku Peter the 
Great, who knew the importance of oil, started drawing up plans for Russia to acquire 
white oil. Although the Russian plans to use Caucasian oil ceased after the death of the 
tsar, control of the region was completed after the defeat of Baku Khanate. The treaty of 
Gulistan in 1813, between Russia and Persia, marked a turning point in the history of 
Caspian oil, as the monopoly rights of Khan to extract and use the oil passed to the 
Russian government.8
At the beginning of the Russian period “there were eighty two wells in Baku and 
the other oil springs along the eastern shore. On Cheleken Island in the Caspian Sea, oil 
was obtained from about 3500 pits and seepages in 1838. The product was used for 
lighting and as a substitute for tallow ... the annual production of Baku oil was reported 
in 1843 as 3.4 million kg (28,000 barrels) of (black naphtha) and 14.143 kg (106 barrels) 
of (white naphtha).”9 During the initial years of Russian control, the oil wells of Baku 
contracted to private entrepreneurs for four years period for 13,000 pounds. Because of 
the length of the lease term, entrepreneurs did not have the incentive to invest heavily in
7 “Caspian Oil and G as,” 41.
8 Amirahmadi, The C aspian  R egion a t a  C rossroads, 91.
9 Croissant and Aras, O il a n d  G eopo litics in the C aspian  Sea R egion, 6.
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the extraction of oil and development of the areas, which in the end led to poor use of 
available resources. The contractors tried to get the most out of the wells but invested 
very little because of the four-year lease system. The Russian government suspended the 
lease system in 1825 and started extracting Baku oil on its own. Because of the primitive 
methods of oil extraction, oil production remained low and in 1850, the government once 
again switched to a contractor system. After 1872, the Russian government introduced a 
single contractor system to attract companies and individuals with substantial capital.
The term of the lease increased to 24 years, and the highest bidder would run the oil wells 
of Baku. With a combination of public auction and a royalty system, the new system 
continued until 1917.
THE FIRST OIL BOOM
With the new system in place, two factors that contributed to the development of 
the Caspian oil industry were the acquisition of new drilling technology and increasing 
global demand for oil. Abolition of the state monopoly worked in favor of Caspian oil 
development. Production increased by 10 percent between 1871 and 1872, and doubled 
the next year. By the end of the nineteenth century, the Caspian oil production rose 165- 
fold.10 Along with the systemic and technological developments, there were major oil 
discoveries around Baku, in Balakhany, Surakhan, Sabunchy and Zabrot. Russia became 
the world’s largest oil-producing country in 1898 and held that position until 1902. The 
peak year was 1901, during which half of the world’s petroleum came from about 1900 
wells in the Caucasus, from an area of less than six square miles. The oil fields of Baku
10 Amirahmadi, The C aspian R egion a t a  C rossroad, 91.
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district on the Aspheron Peninsula, the great Bibi Eibat, Balakhany and Sabunchy 
Ramany fields, supplied 95 percent o f the total production.11
In describing the successful development of the Caspian oil industry under 
Russian control, the contributions of several individuals were important in pushing the oil 
industry forward. The transcaspian company of Kokorev and Gubonin was responsible 
for the construction of the first factory for acquiring paraffin and kerosene in 1859. The 
construction of oil distillation machines by Jasad Malikov in 1863 increased the oil
i ̂
distillation installments in Baku by 1873. Reports written by the famous Russian 
chemist Dimitri Mendelyev also contributed to the abolition of state monopoly after his 
visits to the United States. This proved to be an important step in the development of the 
Russian oil industry in the Caspian region. The creation of the Baku Oil Producers 
Society after three oil conferences in 1884, 1885 and 1886 was also an important 
achievement in the Caspian oil industry’s development, as this society became a
i q
stabilizing factor for the smooth functioning of the Caspian oil industry.
As the oil industry developed, it also transformed the region around it into a 
wealthy town. “In the mid-nineteenth century the city covered some 60 hectares and had
11 Gokay, The P o litics o f  C aspian  Oil, 6
12 Croissant and Aras, O il a n d  G eopo litics in the C aspian Sea Region, 7.
13 “The organizational skills o f  the Baku Oil Producers Society helped foster a more confident attitude in 
the Russian oil industry. The creation o f  the “Statistical O ffice” in 1889 was one o f  the main achievem ents 
o f  the society. This contributed significantly to the rationalizing o f  the oil industry in Russia. Prior to this 
date, exact statistical data w as hard to obtain, and was based as much on estim ates as hard information. 
After 1889, the growth o f  the Russian oil industry and its expansion could be mapped in detail. The society  
also contributed to the social and cultural developm ent o f  Baku, financing the construction o f  schools, 
roads, a pharmacy, a hospital and also funding teachers, doctors, nurses and office  stuff.” Croissant and 
Aras, O il a n d  G eopo litics in the C aspian  Sea  R egion, 8.
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a population of around 13,000. By 1907/8, it encompassed an area of 1,100 hectares and 
had a population of 248,300.”14
Russian Oil Industry and the Role o f  Foreign Entrepreneurs
The abolition of the state monopoly began an era of competitive private
enterprise, which caused an explosion of entrepreneurship. As the new drilling
technology was brought in, there were more than twenty small refineries in Baku in 1873.
Two of the most important foreign figures in the history of Caspian oil were the
Nobel brothers, who arrived in Baku shortly after 1873. The Nobel family immigrated to
Russia from Sweden, and was involved in the production of artillery, cannons, and
underwater mines for the Russian army. Ludwig Nobel continued the legacy of his father
and acquired a huge contract from Russian government to manufacture rifles. He sent his
eldest brother Robert to Baku to investigate the use of wood from walnut trees in the
Caspian region. Upon his arrival in Baku, Robert was caught up in the fever of the Black
Town and without consulting his brother he bought a small refinery for the money he was
given to buy walnut wood. With additional funds from his brother, Robert quickly
modernized the refinery. In a very short time he became the most successful oil
businessman in the town. In 1876, Ludwig Nobel himself came to Baku. As a successful
businessman in Petersburg, and with his high-level connections in the Russian
government, Ludwig Nobel became the oil king of Baku in a very short time.
14 Akiner, The C aspian, 5. She also adds that the city life ow es a great deal to the wealth that came from oil 
m oney which also transformed the intellectual life in the city. “It w as an extraordinary fusion o f  old and 
new, o f  East and W e s t ... in 1873, the first national theatre w as opened and, in 1894 the first public library. 
The First Azerbaijani opera was performed in 1908. Educational establishm ents offered different types o f  
instruction and a variety o f  fields o f  study (traditional, European, secular, religious and various 
combination o f  these spheres), w hile learned societies debated philosophical, social and political topics. 
C ivil institutions were developed, including trade and professional organizations, such as the Producers 
A ssociation  for the oil industry.” Ibid., 5 -6 .
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Transportation of the oil was the weakest link in the Baku oil industry. Most of 
the oil was carried in wooden barrels by boats to Astrakhan and transferred to barges for 
a long journey over the Volga River. In 1878, the Nobel brothers’ company introduced 
the first tanker, Zoroaster, which was followed by many other ships. In addition to these 
developments, the establishment of pipelines from oil wells to refineries cut the cost of 
oil production by 50 percent and made the brothers’ oil company highly competitive. By 
1883 the Nobel brothers provided over 50 percent of the kerosene to Russia.15 This was a 
great success for them and an important development for the Caspian oil industry.16
As production increased, the Nobel brothers were forced to seek out new markets. 
Transportation of Caspian oil presented serious challenges, as it was easier to get 
American kerosene to some parts of Russia from 8,000 miles away than to get Caspian 
kerosene from 340 miles away. Nonetheless, “during the next twenty five years, the 
Nobel industry drilled more than 500 wells, employed as many as 12000 men in their 
petroleum business and produced about 150 million barrels of petroleum.”17 As the 
company of the Nobel brothers produced half of the Russian kerosene, they told their 
stockholders that they pushed American kerosene out of the Russian market.
While the Nobel brothers contributed greatly to the expansion and development of 
Caspian oil, Rothschilds was the second company to engage in the oil business that 
helped to advance the industry. In 1883, a loan from Rothschilds to the Baku-Batum 
railroad almost entirely changed the oil business, as it opened a door to outside world 
markets, especially Europe. The project was carried out by two producers (Bunge and
15Amirahmadi, The C aspian  R egion  a t a  C rossroads, 94.
16 The rapid developm ent o f  Ludwig N o b el’s oil empire in the first ten years o f  its existence has been  
described as one o f  the greatest triumphs o f  business enterprise in the 19th century. D aniel Yergin, The 
P rize: The E pic Q uest f o r  Oil, Money, an d  P o w er  (N ew  York: Sim on and Schuster, 1990), 59.
17 Croissant and Aras, O il an d  G eopo litics in the C aspian Sea R egion, 9.
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Palashkovsky), but was interrupted by the war between Russia and the Ottomans. With 
the involvement of Rothschilds in the project, they became the second largest company in 
the Caspian region after the establishment of the Caspian and Black Sea Petroleum 
Company—known as Brito for its Russian initials— in 1883.18 In addition to these 
foreign involvements, two British oil companies participated in the Caspian oil industry 
and drilled the largest oil wells outside of Baku in Groznyy in 1883. By 1910 the oil 
production from those wells reached 8.8 million barrels.19
Russian oil production steadily increased with the help of foreign companies and 
was able to compete with American oil in the world oil markets. In 1911, fields in 
Kazakhstan, on the other side of the Caspian Sea, were developed, while Turkmen oil 
production started in 1900 in the Chelecken field. Some small fields in Fergana Valley in 
Uzbekistan came into operation in 18 85.20 Up until World War I, a large, well-managed, 
well-financed oil industry was in place in the Caspian Sea region. When the war broke 
out, the oil industry in the Caspian Sea was moving forward in an orderly fashion.
Soviet Period: Caspian Oil
World War I and the Russian revolution had a great impact on the world’s oil 
industry and also the Caspian region. The stability that existed in the region and in the 
Caspian oil industry was deeply shaken by the developments after World War I and the 
Bolshevik revolution. After long battles between Russian, Turkish-Ottoman, British and 
Azeri armies, on April 28, the Red Army advanced to the outskirts of Baku and the Azeri
18 In 1911, Royal D utch-Shell Company bought Rothschilds Brito and becam e the second largest company 
in the region.
19 Edgar W esley  Ow en, Trek o f  the O il F inders: A H istory o f  E xploration  f o r  P etroleum  (Tulsa: American  
A ssociation for Petroleum G eologists, 1975), 262.
20 Dekmejian and Sim onian, T rou bled  Waters, 17.
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government fell under the Red Army’s pressure.21 On May 4, the Bolsheviks captured 
and confiscated the last oil property in Baku, and the entire oil industry and oil 
production fell into the hands of the Soviets.22 The Soviets confiscated all the private 
holdings and by a decree by Lenin himself, all the oil industry in the Soviet-controlled 
territory was nationalized. Despite heavy government control of the Caspian oil and the 
Soviet oil industry, during the years of NEP (New Economic Policy) Lenin kept the doors 
open for foreign companies in order to acquire western capital and technology. The 
Soviets negotiated with Royal Dutch-Shell over the operation and development of the oil 
industry in Azerbaijan; however, the negotiations and open-door policies ended with 
Stalin’s arrival in Politburo.
In the Soviet Empire in the following decades, intensive social engineering was 
implemented to sovietize the republics. The imposition of a centrally planned economy 
with a strong regional specialization left Azerbaijan as one of the leading centers of oil 
production in the Soviet Union.24 Up until World War II, the Baku petroleum industry 
maintained its dominant position. Sixty percent of Soviet petroleum needs in 1931, and 
80 percent in 1940, were supplied by the Baku fields. Gradually however, a decline set 
in, perhaps due to the Soviet decision to invest in strategically safer fields in Ural-Volga
21 Complete chaos and disorder dominated the Caspian region during the years o f  1918-21 . After 
Azerbaijan, Armenia and G eorgia declared their independence, the Ottoman army entered Baku. A s the 
Ottomans were under pressure in alm ost all the flanks, the city w as captured by the British troops. For a 
brief period, the British tried to keep the city and the oil industry under control by im posing martial law. In 
order to maintain the export o f  Baku oil, the British also established military control over the Baku-Batumi 
railway and the seaport on the B lack Sea.
22 Jamil Hasanov, “The Struggle for Azerbaijani Oil at the End o f  the World War I,” C aspian C rossroads 
M agazine  2, no. 4 (Spring 1997).
23 Charles Van Der L eeuw , O il an d  G as in the C aucasus an d  C aspian: A H istory  (N ew  York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 2000), 95.
24 Akiner, The C aspian , 7.
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• . 9 ̂  • •and Western Siberia. Especially after the German attempt to control the Caspian oil 
during World War II, the Soviet government realized that it would be much safer to open
9 f\up new sites that were more difficult for foreign access and annexation. In fact, after 
the death of Lenin, the West did not have a serious involvement in the entire Soviet land. 
However, some argued that “the Soviet regime deliberately prevented the Caspian energy 
resources from being developed, and deprived Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan of 
the opportunity to reach for substantially higher standards of living.”27 Until World War 
II, Russian oil production increased due to the investment in oil drilling technology and 
the high level of importance attached to the oil industry by the Soviet administration.
After World War II, the Soviet oil industry’s attention shifted to other oil reserves 
in the empire. As the drilling in some parts of Ukraine, Siberia and the Volga-Ural area 
produced huge amounts of oil reserves, Caspian oil production declined in both volume 
and importance. During the five-year plans of the Soviet administration, the oil industry 
advanced in many areas, especially in the area o f drilling and employment of new 
technologies by Soviet geologists and geophysicists. After the death of Stalin in 1953, as 
production increased and surpassed domestic usage, the Soviet government began 
exporting oil to Europe.
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, Russian oil production increased greatly; 
however, Russian oil technology remained behind that of the West. The Russian oil 
industry experienced serious problems in all areas, e.g. drilling technology, pipes,
25 Robert E. Ebel, “The H istory and Politics o f  Chechen O il,” C aspian  C rossroads  1, no. 1 (W inter 1995): 
9 -1 1 .
26 In 1942, German forces under H itler’s comm and mounted operation “E delw eiss” in an attempt to seize  
control o f  the Caucasian oilfields. H ow ever, in the m id-1940s they were stopped at Stalingrad by the Red  
Army. Akiner, The C aspian, 8.
27 Robert V . Bolersky, “R ussia, the W est and the Caspian Energy Hub,” M iddle E ast Journal 49, no. 2 
(Spring 1995): 218.
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storage, etc. One major issue was the fact that Soviet oil technology was almost 25 years 
behind American and Western oil technology. This caused inefficient extraction and 
refining of the oil, and the pipelines could not handle the high volume of oil being 
transported. Despite the existing problems, the reason that the Soviets produced such 
great amounts of oil was the availability of vast reserves in the Soviet land. However, as 
the cost of oil production increased due to the inefficiency in all areas of the oil industry, 
the Soviets had difficulty competing with American and European oil companies in the 
world oil markets, despite the huge amounts of oil production. By the mid-1980s, the 
Russian Federation had taken a comfortable lead in the combined Soviet Union oil export 
capacity. In 1987 it produced 569 million tons of an all-union output of 624 million tons, 
but the cost was so high that it was struggling to compete on the world market. In fact, it 
was not the only sector in the Soviet Union that was having serious problems; the whole 
Soviet economy was under distress because of numerous fundamental problems related to 
the social economy of the Soviet communist system. As with the general decline in the 
Soviet economy, oil production also declined all over the Soviet Union, including the
29transcaspian region.
As the Soviet Union moved toward disintegration, in 1991, the last year of the 
Union, “Azerbaijan’s oil production stood at 234,000 barrels per day (b/d), Kazakhstan’s 
at 532,000 b/d, Turkmenistan at 108,000 b/d and Uzbekistan at 57,000 b/d. Russian 
production in the north Caucasus area adjacent to the Caspian was 134,000 b/d. These 
numbers added up represented some 10 percent of total Soviet oil production and a
28 Van Der Leeuw , O il an d  G as in the C aucasus an d  C aspian , 116.
29 A s a result o f  steady depletion o f  the oil fields through overexploitation and underinvestment in 
exploration efforts, the petroleum industry was in decline. Econom ists both inside and outside the Soviet 
U nion agreed that there was enormous room for improvement. G6kay, The P o litics o f  C aspian  O il, 15.
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modest 1.64 percent of words oil production. Of a total Soviet gas production of 642 
billion cubic meters (cm) in 1991, 147.3 bcm came from Caspian riparian and adjacent 
regions with the following distribution: 84.3 bcm for Turkmenistan, 41.9 bcm for 
Uzbekistan, 8bcm for Azerbaijan, 7.9 bcm for Kazakhstan, and 5.9 bcm for North 
Caucasus. The contribution of Caspian area to world gas production was 7 percent, much 
higher than the Caspian’s share of the world oil output.”30
DEVELOPMENT OF CASPIAN OIL
The interest in the Caspian region and Caspian oil steadily increased, especially 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. First among the actors that have shown strong and 
continued interest in the region and oil are the governments of the littoral states, who 
considered Caspian oil an important tool for economic recovery and future prosperity. 
Second, politicians from OECD countries wanted to see the development o f Caspian oil 
as an alternate source for energy security. The third group to show interest in the Caspian 
oil was the Russian oil industry, which wanted to recoup the expenses that they poured 
into the development of Caspian oil. Russian politicians also continuously monitored and 
actively engaged in the developments regarding Caspian oil. They considered the 
growing Western presence as a geopolitical threat to Russian interests in the region. The 
fifth and last group is made up of Western oil companies seeking to acquire major 
petroleum contracts in the Caspian.31
30 Dekmejian and Sim onian, Troubled W aters, 17 -18 .
31 Ottar Skegan, “Survey o f  C aspian’s Oil and Gas R esources,” in The C aspian R egion  a t a  C rossroad: 
C hallenges o f  a  N ew  F rontier o f  E nergy an d  D evelopm ent, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi (N ew  York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 2000), 56.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
40
Energy development in the Caspian Sea region has progressed through different 
and distinct phases following the independence of the Soviet republics of the Caspian 
region.
The first years of independence between 1992 and 1996 were considered rough 
times for energy development in the Caspian region. Hostility, misunderstanding and 
pessimism prevailed in the business as well as in political circles. The Western oil 
companies had to face the legacy of Soviet business culture in the Caspian states and 
opposition from Russian government and oil industry. However, progress has been made 
in some areas and some Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) and Joint Ventures (JV) 
have been signed. Although difficult and slow during the first years o f these agreements, 
the PSAs and the JVs from these years proved to be major milestones of the Caspian oil 
development.
The second phase of the developments, between 1996 and 1998, was symbolized 
by a high level of optimism, and Caspian oil became a popular subject among the circles 
of oil business professionals and regional governments. Expectations were high during 
these years, and the Caspian oil in some circles was presented on a par with Middle 
Eastern oil and from time to time with Kuwait or United Arab Emirates.32 (See graph 3 
below.) However, as the studies and explorations continued and more accurate data have 
been gathered, the rosy picture portrayed especially by the governments of the Caspian 
states, started to fade as the challenges for Caspian oil development became more and 
more apparent. After 1999, a more sensible approach took place with more and more
32 A nthony Hyman, “K uwait by the Caspian,” The M iddle  E ast, no. 238 (October 1994); Lorie Laird, “Is 
Kazakhstan the N ew  Kuwait?” E urope, no. 341 (N ovem ber 1994); Hans Nijenhuis, “Azerbaijan: Kuwait o f  
the Caucasus, ” W orld  P ress R eview  42, no. 1 (January 1995); Christ Kutschera, “Azerbaijan: Kuwait o f  the 
Caucasus,” The M iddle E ast, no. 254  (March 1996).
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realistic business understanding. Developments that were already underway continued, 
but things did not move as quickly as they were initially expected to. Meanwhile, in the 
northern and southern parts of the Caspian Sea, new giant oil reserves were discovered 
(Kasghan in Kazakhstan and Shah Deniz in Azerbaijan) along with many dry wells in 
which Western oil companies invested millions of dollars to explore.
U.A.E Kuwait Iraq Iran Saudi Total Total T.Cas




Graph 3: Caspian vs. Middle East (Oil Reserves Comparison)
Source: BP Statistical Review o f  World Energy 2006
CASPIAN OIL: RESERVES AND ESTIMATES
The estimates of Caspian oil and gas vary significantly. According to Ottar 
Skegan, this is because of “a lack of a reliable information and different interpretations of
33 Akiner, The C aspian , 91 92.
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the existing data. Estimates also show changes from one year to the next not wholly 
explained by new discoveries and production; the pool of geopolitical and reservoir 
information keeps growing, warranting sometimes major revisions of prior 
conclusions.”34
In addition to the technical difficulties inherent in the process of estimating oil 
and gas deposits, geopolitical and economic motivations of regional and international 
actors increased the controversy about the existing oil and gas reserves in the Caspian 
region. Geologically, the Caspian region is largely unexplored; relatively little oil and 
gas data exist on the region. Industry has been reluctant to bear the exceptionally high 
cost of acquiring and generating basic exploration data in the region. Costs are high 
because the Caspian Sea depth changes rapidly and violent, frequent southeastern storms 
impede navigation and drilling operations in the northern and southern parts of the sea.35
There are several reasons for the exaggerated display of the Caspian oil reserves 
by the local governments. First, the Caspian states did not have the capital to invest in 
the development of oil fields, especially the ones offshore, so they depended on foreign 
investment to develop the oil fields. To attract foreign investment and oil companies, the 
Caspian states exaggerated the possible oil reserves. Second, these countries being newly 
independent and economically in bad condition, needed something they could use to 
spread hope to their people for a brighter future.36
34 Skegan, “Survey o f  Caspian’s Oil and Gas R esources,” 56.
35 Bernard E. Gelb and Terry Rayno Twym an, eds., The C aspian  Sea Region an d  E nergy R esources  (N ew  
York: N ovinka B ooks, 2004), 14.
36 Kenan Celik, Cemalettin K alayci, “Azeri Petrolunun Dunu Bugunu,” Journal o f  Q afqaz U niversity  2 , no. 
2 (1999): 63.
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After the signing of the Contract of the Century37 between Azerbaijan and a 
consortium of eight oil companies in September 1994, the energy resources in the 
Caspian region were presented to be another Middle East, Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.38
From time to time, the numbers and comparisons changed but the focus remained 
on Caspian oil as an important source of petroleum and natural gas. As we mentioned 
above, the data presented by different companies, agencies and governments significantly 
varied from year to year but during these times, especially from 1994 until 1997/98, 
people were optimistic about the development of Caspian oil. Governments and 
politicians who came up with huge numbers and estimates of Caspian oil reserves 
justified their claims on the ground that the oil-rich Middle East had been thoroughly 
explored with high-tech petroleum exploration techniques, but that the Caspian Sea 
region remained largely unexplored.
As new studies and seismic data emerged, the expectations about Caspian oil
TQ
dampened. In addition to the newly published data, the subsequent drilling failures 
changed the general euphoria and put Caspian oil on a par with the North Sea. More
37 Signed on 20 September 1994 betw een Azerbaijan and foreign oil com panies, 8 billion dollars were 
allocated for investment over 30 years, during w hich 511 tons o f  oil were expected to be produced from the 
three offshore fields (A zeri-G uneshli-C hirag). The contract is based on production-sharing principles, 
with a distribution o f  percentages as follow s: SOCAR (Azerbaijan) 20%, British Petroleum (U K ) 17.127% , 
A m oco (U SA ), 17.01% , Lukoil (Russia) 10%, Pennzoil (U SA ) 9.82% , U nocal (U SA ) 9.52% , Statoil 
(N orway) 8.563% , M cDerm ott International (U SA ) 2.45% , Ramco (Scotland) 2.08% , Turkish State Oil 
Company (Turkey) 1.75%, D elta-Nim ir (Saudi Arabia) 1.68%. A zerbaijan  In ternational 2 , no. 4 (Winter 
1994). A vailable [Online]:
<http://www.az.er.com /aiweb/cateaories/m agazine/24 folder/24 artic les/24 aioc.htm l> [31 October 2005],
38 In the 1990s, CIA energy analysts helped fuel expectations for M iddle East reserve equivalent in the 
Caspian, with predictions o f  200 billion barrels yet-to-find. Terence Adams, “Caspian Energy 
D evelopm ent,” in The Caspian: Politics, Energy and  Security, ed. Shirin Akiner (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon-Taylor Francis Group, 2004), 92.
39 The first study by W ood M ackenzie, a Scottish consulting company, revealed that the com bined proven 
oil and gas reserves o f  Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and U zbekistan were 68 billion barrel (bbl) 
equivalent. O f this amount, the total for oil was 25.2bbl, 65 percent o f  w hich belonged to Kazakhstan 
(16.43bbl) and the rest to Azerbaijan (6.5bbl), Turkmenistan (0 .9 lb b l) and U zbekistan (1.37bbl). Two later 
studies published in April 1998 by R ice U niversity’s Baker Institute and International Institute o f  Strategic 
Studies o f  London (IISS) confirmed W ood M ackenzie’s figures. Dekm ejian and Sim onian, T roubled  
W aters, 30.
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realistic data about the existing Caspian oil and gas reserves are expected to surface in the 
coming years as more detailed studies and exploratory drills are done in the Caspian 
Sea.40 Recent publications report more or less similar data about the existing oil and gas 
reserves in the Caspian Sea region. (See Table 3 for proven and estimated oil and 
reserves in the Caspian Sea and the amount of oil and gas production.)
Until more realistic and reliable estimates of Caspian energy resources emerge, 
“oil companies, investors and policy makers are bound to be at the mercy of overly 
optimistic and pessimistic assessments, often prompted by the geopolitical calculations of 
political and economic elites, lobbyists, and sensationalist media.”41
COST OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT IN THE CASPIAN SEA
One of the important factors affecting the oil business in the Caspian Sea region is 
the cost of oil production. The arrival of foreign investment in the Caspian region was 
influenced by many factors, and the cost-profit analysis affected the decisions of oil 
companies and financial institutions that provided monetary support for the projects 
undertaken by governments and companies. Because of the geological and climatic 
conditions, the cost of oil drilling in the Caspian Sea is relatively high. One reason is that 
most of the oil deposits in the Caspian Sea are offshore, therefore modem and expensive 
systems are required, which contribute to the overall cost of oil production. There are 
reports that a single offshore exploratory oil well costs a minimum of 20 million dollars,
40 A m ong the credible resources that publish data related to oil and gas reservoirs in the world and the 
Caspian are: Energy Information Administration (EIA), BP Statistical R eview  o f  W orld Energy, and Oil 
and Gas Journal.
41 Dekm ejian and Sim onian, T roubled  W aters, 33.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
45
possibly as much as 200 million dollars. Failure of these exploratory offshore oil 
drillings would cost up to 300-500 million dollars.42
The second factor that increases the cost of oil production is the necessity to build 
long and expensive pipelines. In order to remain commercially competitive, the global 
oil price must be above $ 18—$20 per barrel. Per barrel cost of oil production is $10.7- 
$12.5 for Azerbaijan and $12—$14.3 for Kazakhstan. Although these figures are slightly 
lower than North Sea oil production costs, they are far higher than the costs o f oil 
production in the Middle East. Today a fully built up cost for Caspian oil is roughly $12 
to $15/bl. This compares to the high end of a North Sea barrel, but is still some two to 
three times more expensive than an equivalent OPEC barrel in the Persian Gulf. 
Nevertheless, in the near future, Caspian built up costs will fall into the $8—10/bl band, 
which should keep the Caspian globally competitive.43
42 Adams, “Caspian Energy D evelopm ent,” 92.
43 “D ow nsizing the Caspian: OPEC & the Realities o f  Caspian Oil to the Year 2 014 ,” A P S R eview  O il 
M arket Trends 57, 24 September 2001 , 13. Relative per barrel cost o f  petroleum production in som e OPEC  
countries: Iraq $1, Kuwait $3, Saudi Arabia $ 2 .5 -$ 4 .0 , V enezuela $5, Gabon $8, Iran $8. Dekm ejian and 
Simonian, T roubled  W aters, 3 4 -8 .
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Table 3:
Proven and Possible Oil and Gas Reserves and Production in the Caspian Sea
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CHAPTER III
GEOPOLITICAL RIVALRY AND COMPETITION OVER RESOURCES: THE 
LEGAL STATUS OF THE CASPIAN SEA
More than a decade after the signing of the first major oil contract (1994) in the 
Caspian Sea, the legal status of the Caspian Sea remains an issue of state confrontation. 
The dispute over the legal status of the Caspian Sea represents a classic example of states 
pursuing self-interest, which inhibits a general sense of cooperation. Since the 
dissolution of the Soviet Empire, the riparian states of the Caspian Sea have been 
involved in discussions (oftentimes controversies) regarding the control and management 
of the resources in the Caspian Sea. The absence of a clear and accepted regime 
governing the affairs of the Caspian Sea has caused long debates among the littoral states. 
Since the use of the mineral resources was vital, especially for the newly independent 
states of the Caspian Sea, the geopolitical and economic issues remained on the political 
agenda for a long time.
In this chapter, I will mainly focus on the legal dispute over the Caspian Sea 
within the context of states seeking domination in the region and pursuing self-interest 
policies that favored themselves economically and politically. The issue of the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea has widely been covered and studied by the scholars; however 
those studies rarely analyzed the issue from the perspective of international relations 
theories. I think the long-lasting controversies among the littoral states of the Caspian 
Sea could be better analyzed and understood by employing some international theories, 
especially the failure of the states to come up with a clear cut solution in such a long
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period of time. In addition, the Iranian factor will be studied in detail in this chapter, 
since Iran is one of the major factors affecting the legal status dispute during the last 
decade.1 Analysis of the policies of individual states and the motives behind their 
policies will reveal much about the essence of this legal dispute, the absence of a genuine 
interstate cooperation in the Caspian Sea, and its impact on the development of Caspian 
oil industry.
Before analyzing the policies of individual states and their impact on general 
cooperation in the Caspian affairs, I will cover some basic issues that would help to 
understand future developments with respect to the legal status of the Caspian Sea.
The Caspian Sea
The Caspian Sea is an enclosed body of water roughly 700 miles from north to 
south and 250 miles across, lying directly between the states of Central Asia and the 
Transcaucasus. It is a salt-water body connected to the Black Sea by the Volga and Don 
rivers. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Caspian Sea is adjoined by five states: 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Russia. Despite the fact that the Caspian 
Sea has geographical divisions (i.e., North Caspian, Middle and South Caspian) formal 
delimitation is a major issue of concern, as some of the littoral states are strongly opposed 
to it. It should be noted that the positions of the some of the littoral states changed over 
time, depending on the new developments and the interstate interaction; however the 
main issue of formally delimiting the Caspian Sea among the littoral states remains 
unsolved.
1 Gokhan Cetinsaya, “R afsancani’den H atem i’ye Iran D is Politikasina Bakislar,” in Turkiyenin Kom sulari, 
ed. Mustafa Turkes and Ilhan U zgel (Ankara: Imge Yayinlari, 2002), 2 9 3 -3 2 9 .
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DELIMITATION VS CONDOMINIUM
Delimitation of the Caspian Sea refers to the sectoral division of the sea into 
national zones, with each state having sovereign rights over their sectors as they would 
have on their territories. Condominium, on the other hand, refers to the control and 
management of the sea by the participation of the coastal states. All decisions and 
policies regarding the use of the sea would be made jointly by the littoral states. 
Condominium is a system of joint governance, with each member having the same rights 
and an equal amount of influence.
The littoral states of the Caspian Sea supported either one of these options, or 
sometimes an amalgamation of the two systems, depending on the developments, after 
the break up of the Soviet Union. Another aspect of the legal status of the Caspian Sea 
is the applicability of the UNCLOS (United Nation Convention on the Law of Sea,
1982).3 Proponents of delimitation often assert that Caspian Sea is a sea and the 
UNCLOS rules should apply.
2 W hile influential and dominant states prefer condom inium , expecting that they w ould im pose their orders 
in such an environm ent (therefore Iran and Russia favor the concept o f  condom inium ), the other less 
powerful states (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan) favor delimitation o f  the Caspian Sea.
Som e o f  the U N C LO S provisions related to Caspian Sea are as follow s:
A rticle  2: This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as w ell as to its bed and subsoil. 
A rticle  3: Every State has the right to establish the breadth o f  its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding  
12 nautical m iles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Convention  
A rticle  56: Sovereign rights for the purpose o f  exploring and exploiting, conserving and m anaging the 
natural resources, whether living or non-living, o f  the waters superjacent to the sea-bed and o f  the sea-bed  
and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the econom ic exploitation and exploration o f  the zone, 
such as the production o f  energy from the water, currents and winds;
A rticle  76: The continental sh e lf o f  a coastal State com prises the sea-bed and subsoil o f  the submarine 
areas that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation o f  its land territory to the 
outer edge o f  the continental margin, or to a distance o f  200 nautical m iles from the baselines from which  
the breadth o f  the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge o f  the continental margin does not extend 
up to that distance.
A rticle  122: For the purposes o f  this C onvention, 'enclosed or sem i-enclosed sea' m eans a gulf, basin or sea 
surrounded by tw o or more States and connected to another sea or the ocean by a narrow outlet or 
consisting entirely or primarily o f  the territorial seas and exclusive econom ic zones o f  tw o or more coastal 
States.
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The main issue is whether the Caspian Sea should be considered a lake or a sea. 
Since that agreement would determine the outcome accordingly, the coastal states of the 
Caspian Sea are divided into two main groups, each supporting different strategies to 
resolve the legal dispute. Russian and Iranian administrations advocated the idea that the 
Caspian Sea is a “lake,” whereas the other bordering states strongly oppose that, asserting 
that the Caspian Sea is a “sea.” If we look at the historical practices of the bordering 
states, we see that Russia and Iran considered it a lake and made several agreements on 
the economic utilization of the area. There is no formal agreement between Russia and 
Iran that divides the Caspian Sea between the two nations or creates areas of influence. 
The usual practice was to come to an agreement on emerging issues through bilateral 
agreements. This practice is called “condominium” because the specific region or sea is 
administered by the participation of the involved actors rather than dividing it among the 
members. However, if  we accept the Caspian Sea as a sea, then the articles of 
international treaties should apply and it becomes permissible to divide the sea into 
national zones where individual states would have full sovereign rights on the use and 
exploitation of the territory. It would be the responsibility of the states to explore or to do 
anything they considered necessary, as any sovereign state would control its territory, sea 
and sea shelves.4
The government of Azerbaijan leads the claim that the Caspian Sea is subject to 
delimitation and that the UN 1982 convention on law of sea is applicable to the Caspian 
Sea.5 The provision set forth by the convention entitles the states to “claim up to 12 
miles sovereign territorial sea between 200 and 250 miles of continental shelves
4 S. Colakoglu, “Uluslararasi Hukukta Hazar’in Statu Sorunu,” A. U. S .B .F D erg is i 53, no. 1 -4  
(January/February 1998): 108.
5 “Status o f  Caspian Sea is G oing to be Changed,” A zeri Times G azetesi, 12 January 2000 , 2.
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depending on the configuration of the continental margin and 200 miles Exclusive 
Economic Zones (EEZ).”6 Azerbaijan is supported by Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan 
since their interests also fall within this category. Having laid out the fundamentals of the 
controversy among the littoral states, let us now look more into the supporting arguments 
from both sides.
Russia draws on the examples from other cases that are similar to this one. 
However, the Russian claims fall short when we look at the similarities and differences of 
those cases. The case of the Gulf of Fonseca between Al-Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua is brought forward by Russia and Iran, that an international court of justice 
favored condominium over the dispute. But the difference is that the Gulf merely 
belonged to one nation (Spain) before that. In the Caspian Sea, we have Russian and
*7
Iranian control throughout its history. The Azeri government also brings examples from 
all over the world that support the delimitation of the Caspian Sea among the bordering 
states. Some examples are: the lake o f Victoria, the lake of Malawi, and the great lakes 
of North America, where the bordering states divided the sea proportionate to their 
coastlines.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LEGAL DISPUTE
Historically, the Caspian Sea belonged to Russia and Iran. However, their 
presence in the Caspian Sea has never been an equal partnership nor has any clear regime 
existed to determine the usage of the sea surface and the seabed. Another important
6 Cynthia M. Croissant and M ichael P. Croissant, “The Legal Status o f  the Caspian Sea: C onflict and 
C om prom ise,” in O il an d  G eopolitics in the C aspian  Sea Region, eds. M ichael P. Croissant and Biilent 
Aras (W estport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 25.
7 Aleksandr A kim ov, “Oil and Gas in the Caspian Region: An O verview  o f  Cooperation and C onflict,” 
P erspectives on C en tra l A sia  (June 1996).
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aspect of history in the Caspian Sea is that Russia dominated the region and the Caspian 
Sea, which was confirmed by the treaties between Russia and Iran. Iran was never a 
naval power in the Caspian Sea and its activities were limited, for the most part, to 
navigation and fishing. “For Russia, the Caspian Sea was a route to the South, giving 
easy access to Iran’s northern territories. Peter the Great established the first Russian 
naval base on the Caspian at Astrakhan in 1723 and occupied the five Persian provinces 
on the south and east banks of Caspian Sea.... The Caspian route also enabled the 
Russian army to occupy the Iranian territories of Derbent and Baku in 1796, and to send 
troops to Russia-Iranian war fronts during the Caucasian wars of 1804-12 and 1826-
o
28.” Iran and Russia always refer to the treaties of the past between Iran and Russia/ 
USSR as a basis for the establishment of a regime in the Caspian Sea. One reason is the 
absence o f any major division of the Caspian Sea in the past, which they want to adapt to 
today’s environment. Russia and Iran tried to rationalize their adherence to a joint 
management of the Caspian Sea and its resources on the basis of the treaties that both 
states respected. The first Russian-Iranian agreement on the status of the Caspian Sea is 
the Peace Treaty o f Golestan (Gulistan) on 12 October 1813. The treaty provided equal 
access to Russian and Iranian merchant vessels. However, only Russian warships were 
granted the exclusive right to sail the Caspian Sea.9 The Peace Treaty of Turkmenchai,
22 February 1828, confirmed the same status described in the Gulistan Treaty of 1813. 
The 1828 treaty provided additional rights to Iranian merchant vessels to enter Russian
8 A li Granmayeh, “Legal History o f  the Caspian Sea,” in The C aspian: Politics, E nergy an d  Security, ed., 
Shirin Akiner (London: RoutledgeCurzon-Taylor Francis Group, 2004), 17.
9 A ccording to Article 5 o f  the Treaty: the Russian flag shall fly  over Russian warships, w hich are 
permitted to sail in the Caspian as before, no other nation whatever shall be allow ed warships in the 
Caspian. Granmayeh, “Legal H istory o f  the Caspian Sea,” 8.
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rivers to receive assistance if needed.10 The rules laid out in these treaties governed the 
conduct of economic activities between Iran and Tsarist Russia, through the nineteenth 
century.
After the revolution in Russia, the new Soviet regime took a different path from 
tsarist Russia and denounced the legacy of Russia to maintain supreme status in the 
Caspian Sea over Iran. The most important change came with the Treaty o f Friendship 
between Persia and the Soviet Union on 26 February 1921. Article 11 of this treaty 
removed the privileges given to Russia by Article 8 of the Turkmenchai Treaty, to 
maintain a naval presence in the Caspian Sea.11 Another cornerstone of the historical 
developments between Russian and Iran regarding the management and the use of the 
Caspian Sea is the Agreement on Trade and Navigation of 25 March 1940. Long talks 
between the two sides took place under the pressing needs of the coming World War II. 
The USSR needed to secure the Eastern flank by making sure that the Caspian Sea would 
not be used by a third power.12 While the provisions regarding the rights of the signing
10 Through the Treaty o f  Turkmenchai in 1828, the Russians gained the upper hand in the Transcaucasus 
area; the treaty gave them the northern part o f  the land and Persia got the southern half. Persians were 
forced to cede the Khanates o f  Erivan and N akhichevan to the Russians. The borders drawn at that time are 
still valid today
11 “The tw o high contracting parties shall enjoy equal rights o f  free navigation on the sea under their own  
flag, as from the date o f  signing o f  the present treaty.” Bahman A ghai-D iba, The Law  & P o litics o f  the 
C aspian  Sea  in the Tw enty-F irst Century: The P ositions an d  Views o f  Russia, K azakhstan, A zerbaijan, 
Turkmenistan, w ith S pecia l R eference to  Iran  (Bethesda, MD: Ibex, 2003), 20.
12 “The 1940 Convention provided for a host o f  co-equal Iran-Soviet activities in the Caspian Sea, 
including the freedom to navigate and to sabotage. Each party also reserved a 10 m ile-w ide area o f f  its 
coast for exclusive fisheries. H ow ever, the Convention made no reference to either party's territorial 
sovereignty in the Caspian. The Convention how ever did inform an exchange o f  diplom atic notes, dated 
March 25, 1940, in w hich each party referred to the Caspian Sea as an ‘Iranian and Soviet sea .’ The British  
Foreign Office's gratuitous translation o f  the note referred to the Caspian as a sea w hich the parties ‘hold to 
belong to Iran and to the S ov iet.’ The text o f  the note, how ever, makes it clear the parties did not intend to 
create a condom inium  or to express recognition o f  a prescriptive form o f  co-ow nership. The note sim ply  
referred to the Iran-Soviet character o f  the sea in the context o f  regulating third-nationality activities in the 
Caspian.” “Lost at Sea, Iran's revolving legal position in the Caspian Sea,” The Iranian, 29 October 1998. 
A vailable [Online]: < http://www.iranian.com /GuiveM irfendereski/Oct98/Caspian/> [12 February 2007].
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states for fishing, transportation and trade remained same, the treaty provided a 10- 
nautical-mile exclusive zone for the bordering states.13
By looking at the treaties between the two parties and the conduct of affairs 
between Iran and Soviet Russia, it is possible to draw some conclusions that might shed 
light on the current discussions pertaining to the legal regime of the Caspian Sea. Based 
on the articles from these treaties we can assert that the Caspian Sea has been defined as 
an exclusive zone for two littoral states wherein each state had equal rights for fishing, 
transportation and trade. The treaties also focused on the prevention of a possible 
infiltration by hostile powers. Both states offered assistance to each other’s vessels in 
case of emergencies, and they also agreed to cooperate on the issue of pollution.
However, none of the above treaties or the Soviet-Iranian relationship on the Caspian Sea 
amounts to sufficient evidence for delimitation or condominium. Historically, neither 
Iran nor Russia/USSR tried to create a legal regime for the management of the Caspian 
Sea. As Rodman Bundy notes, “ .. .terms such as condominium or sovereignty simply do 
not appear.”14
Given the historical background of the current discussions, it is difficult to make a 
case for condominium or delimitation. The best way to describe the current status would 
be Sui Generis.15 If history is any guide, it was the pressing need of new developments
13 The 25 March 1940 USSR-Iran Treaty briefly provided that “com m ercial ships o f  one party w ould be 
treated in the ports o f  the other party the sam e as its national ships; each Party reserved the right for its 
ships to fish within 10 nautical m iles o f  its coast; pursuant to the principles o f  the 1921 Treaty, only Soviet 
and Iranian ships could navigate the Caspian Sea. A ccording to the 1940 Letters, the Caspian Sea was 
regarded by the Parties as a ‘Soviet and Iranian Sea’.” “Caspian B asin D elim itation and Joint Developm ent; 
Options and Constraints,” A vailable [Online]:
< http://ww w.iea.org/textbase/work/2002/caspian/Irina% 20PALlA SH V lLI% 20R ULG % 20111102 .p d f> [22 
Decem ber 2005],
14 Rodman R. Bundy, “The Caspian— Sea or Lake? C onsequences in International Law ,” C entra l A sia  
Q uarterly  (Sum m er 1995): 4.
15 Ibid. A lso  see A ghai-D iba, The Law & P o litics o f  the C aspian  Sea  in the Tw enty-F irst Century.
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that changed the course o f management of the Caspian Sea and the treaties between two 
states codified these needs. Although these agreements will remain as a base for the legal 
regime in the Caspian Sea, they need to be replaced to the satisfaction of the littoral states 
through mutual cooperation.
IN SEARCH OF A NEW REGIME IN THE CASPIAN SEA
The breakup of the Soviet Union increased the number of littoral states, in one
night, to five. In fact, that is when discussion of the legal regime o f the Caspian Sea
started. Although by the Alma Ata Declaration on 21 December 1991, the ex-Soviet
republics confirmed their adherence to the international agreements signed by the Soviet
Union, the discussions over the regime in the Caspian Sea continued for more than a
decade.16 One of the main reasons for the dispute over the legal regime in the Caspian
Sea is the existence of huge oil reserves. The desire on the part of the new littoral states
to exploit the available resources is especially high because of their dependence on the
revenues from oil production.17 Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan perceived the
oil and gas reserves as their only conceivable way to economic development, although
1 8these concerns of the new littoral states are not shared by Russia and Iran. Discussions 
over the legal status of the Caspian regime increased after the breakup of the Soviet
16 The A lm a Ata Declaration, signed by eleven  heads o f  state o f  former Soviet republics on 21 D ecem ber  
1991, stated, “With the formation o f  the Com m onw ealth o f  Independent States the U SSR  ceases to exist. 
M ember states o f  the Com m onwealth guarantee, in accordance with their constitutional procedures, the 
fulfillm ent o f  international obligations, stem m ing from the treaties and agreements o f  the former U SSR .” 
A vailable [Online]: < http://www.countrv-data.com /frd/cs/belarus/bv appnc.html> [22 D ecem ber 2005].
17 A vrasya  D o sya si TIKA B ulteni 128 (March 2000): 2. See also “Azerbaycan,” A vrasya  D o sya si (January 
2000).
18 Russia and Iran do not have considerable oil and gas resources in the Caspian Sea but they have 
tremendous amounts o f  reserves elsew here in their territories. Russia is the 9th largest oil producer in the 
world with its 50bbl o f  reserves, and Iran ranks as the 2 nd largest natural gas exporter in the world after 
Russia. Iran has also 10 percent o f  the w orld’s oil resources, w hich makes it the fifth largest in the world. 
United States Energy Information Administration. A vailable [Online]: < http://w w w .eia.doe.gov> [26 
October 2006].
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
56
Empire. Attitude and conduct of the coastal states affected the developments with regard 
to the establishment o f a new legal regime in the Caspian Sea. Numerous opinions and 
suggestions dominated the political agenda throughout the decade. Some of the littoral 
states supported the idea of delimitation of the Caspian Sea into national zones. Others 
pushed for a joint sovereignty and suggested that the Caspian Sea should be managed by 
the participation of all littoral states rather then dividing it into national sectors. Over 
time, some states preferred to extend their sovereignty unilaterally, as they saw it fit to 
their economic and political interest. As expected, the various opinions and policy 
choices created an environment not conducive to cooperation. In order to understand the 
aspects of cooperation over the legal status of the Caspian Sea, we must examine the 
policies and respective interests of the littoral states. Developments over time also 
changed the direction of the polices and choices of the littoral states and in the end, 
affected the very nature of the issue.
As previously mentioned, some of the littoral states were eager to develop their 
resources in the Caspian Sea and therefore wanted to solve the remaining issues quickly. 
However, the developments in the coming days showed that cooperation among the 
riparian states in the region has been slow to emerge. In the next section I focus on the 
reasons behind the slow development of cooperation, by looking at the policies of the 
states of the Caspian on the legal status issue.
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AZERBAIJAN AND THE CASPIAN SEA
Azerbaijan (Baku) historically has been one of the centers of the Russian oil 
industry.19 Among the five littoral states, Azerbaijan has been the strongest and most 
enthusiastic supporter of delimitation of the Caspian Sea. Starting with its independence, 
Azerbaijan focused on the application of the sovereign rights of each littoral state to
90exploit the resources of the Caspian Sea within their own national zones. For 
Azerbaijan, the most important aspect of the legal status of the Caspian Sea is the 
exploitation of the oil and gas reserves. (See tables 4 and 5 on the oil and natural gas 
reserves in the Caspian Sea.) Other issues, e.g. fishing, transportation and environmental
91protection, remain respectively secondary. The Azeri position on the Caspian Sea is 
directly related to the dependence of the Azeri economy on the petroleum revenues.22 As 
may be the case with other littoral states, Azerbaijan’s policy on this issue is an example 
of states pursuing self-interest in the international arena, as described by the neorealist 
theoretical approach. To support its position, Azeri politicians referred to “the pattern 
derived from the division of comparable bodies of inland water, such as Lake Superior, 
Huron, Erie and Ontario between the United States and Canada, Lake Chad among Chad,
19 For more information see Chapter II.
20 Khoshbakht Y usifzade, SO C A R  V ice President for G eology and G eophysics, states that “The Caspian 
Sea has been divided in this w ay for 19 years— so that Azerbaijan had about 80,000 sq. km., Turkmenistan 
alm ost the sam e, Kazakhstan had 113,000 sq. km., and Russia had 64,000 sq. km. o f  the Caspian floor. 
There was com plete unanim ity among all the States regarding the division at that tim e.” Khoshbakht 
Y usifzade, “The Status o f  the Caspian,” A zerbaijan  In ternational (Winter 1994): 30. A vailable [Online]: 
< http://w w w .azer.com /aiw eb/cateaories/m agazine/24 folder/24 articles/24 statuscaspian.html> [22 
D ecem ber 2005].
21 Khoshbakht Y usifzade also argues that “there is a significant difference betw een the fishing rights and 
mineral rights in the sea. Those w ho have little know ledge o f  legal aspects o f  the sea usually confuse the 
fishing rights w ith the right o f  using the mineral resources. In the international arena, the division o f  sea  
floors among the countries for using the mineral resources has long been a com m on practice. If, for 
instance, the fishing rights o f  a certain country are limited to 12 m iles, this does not mean that its mineral 
resources must also be restricted to the sam e boundary.” Ibid., 30.
22 A ccording to Energy Information A gency, more than 90 percent o f  the A zeri export is oil and natural 
gas.
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Niger, Nigeria and the Cameroon; Lake Geneva between France and Switzerland; Lake 
Constance among Austria, Germany and Switzerland.”23
In the case of those lakes mentioned above, the coastal states used a median line- 
equidistance method to divide the body of water into exclusive national zones of 
jurisdiction that would cover surface, air and subsurface of the lakes. Azeri officials also 
refer to the 1975 division of the Caspian Sea into economical regions among the ex- 
Soviet republics under the leadership of the Soviet oil industry, which neither Russia nor 
other republics opposed at that time.24 The aforementioned points constituted the basis of 
Azeri approach to the legal dispute over Caspian Sea. For the most part, Azerbaijan 
turned out to be the only actor in the region that did not change its position. Throughout 
the decade Azeri officials publicly opposed any other solution to the Caspian Sea legal 
dispute, especially the Russian and Iranian initial push for joint management of the sea 
and the Russia-Iranian claim that the 1940 agreement should be considered as a basis for
9 Sfurther developments in the Caspian Sea.
23 Scott Horton and Natik M em edov, “Legal Status o f  the Caspian Sea,” in The C aspian  R egion  a t a  
C rossroad: C hallenges o f  a  N ew  F rontier o f  E nergy an d  D evelopm en t, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi 
(Palgrave M acm illan, 2000), 268.
24 Roland Sinker, “The M anagem ent o f  a Transboundary Energy Resource: The Oil and Gas o f  the Caspian 
Sea,” in The P o litics o f  C aspian  Oil, ed. Bulent Gokay (N ew  York: Palgrave, 2001), 61.
25 “At present, the 1921 and 1940 treaties between Iran and the Soviet Union, govern the legal status o f  the 
Caspian. These treaties have not yet been form ally invalidated, because no new  docum ent has been  
prepared to provide a basis for the Caspian legal regim e. There are no zoning, sectoral d ivisions or 
demarcation o f  boundaries ... unilateral actions w ithout due attention to the rights and interest o f  all the 
littoral countries w ill on ly aggravate the situation and have negative ram ifications for all.” Georgi 
Tichanov, “Am erican Interests in the Caspian Sea R egion .” A vailable [Online]:
< http://ww w.iies.org/O LD  Site/english/training-conf/conference/conf98-paper/pdf/tichanov.pdf>
[14 October 2005].
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Table 4:
Oil Reserves: Caspian Region (Billion Barrels)
World Oil Oil & Gas Journal
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Graph 4: Oil Reserves: Caspian Region (billion barrels) (View in 3D Graph)
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Table 5:
Natural Gas Reserves: Caspian Region (Trillion Cubic Feet)
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Graph 5: Natural Gas Reserves: Caspian Region (trillion cubic feet) (View in 3D Graph)
On the other hand, Azerbaijan actively participated in the conferences and other meetings 
concerning the Caspian Sea. On many occasions, Azeri officials expressed their desire to 
cooperate with other littoral states on the issues of ecology, prevention of pollution and
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
other environmental developments.26 Azeri attitude on the Caspian legal status has been 
less cooperative despite the official and non-official statements, which expressed a 
positive attitude toward cooperation with littoral states over issues concerning the 
Caspian Sea. The Tehran Conference is an example of this kind of an attitude that 
created a deadlock on the developments concerning the legal status of the Caspian Sea. 
The Tehran conference was organized by Iran in 1992 to create a regime or a treaty on 
regional cooperation in the Caspian Sea. One of the main themes supported by Iran and 
Russia in this conference was the establishment of an organization, by participation of the 
littoral states, to manage the issues of the Caspian Sea without going through 
delimitation. Decisions were to be made jointly and each state would have the power to 
veto. Azerbaijan quickly opposed the Russian-Iranian approach and announced that
77Azerbaijan would not be a part of this organization. The same persistent Azeri attitude 
was also apparent in Moscow in 1994 and Ashgabat in 1995. Azeri officials clearly 
stated that they would not sign any treaty that proposed joint sovereignty or resource 
sharing. It is clear that the idea of joint management worked against Azeri interests, and 
Azerbaijan was not willing to share the resources in the Caspian Sea with other littoral 
states. Azeri officials kept pushing for the division of the sea, as that was the only option 
that favored Azerbaijan in terms of petroleum reserves.
Having been very keen on the sectoral division of the sea, Azerbaijan moved on 
to the production sharing agreements with Western companies, to develop offshore fields
26 The single and unique environm ent o f  the Caspian Sea w as also reaffirmed in the declaration signed by 
the heads-of-state o f  Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Russia on 14 October 1993. Georgi 
Tichanov, “American Interests in the Caspian Sea R egion .” A vailable [Online]: 
<http://w w w .iies.org/O LD  Site/english/training-conf/conference/conf98-paper/pdf/tichanov.pdf>
[14 October 2005],
27 Sinker, “The M anagem ent o f  a Transboundary Energy R esource,” 62.
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in the Caspian Sea. In 1994, the Azeri government finalized the agreement on the 
development of Azeri, Chriag and Guneshli oilfields with an international consortium of 
oil companies headed by British Petroleum.28 These fields were 70-120 miles east of 
Baku and some were beyond the median line. For a long time, Azerbaijan claimed a 
superior claim over the Caspian Sea, on the grounds that Baku was the center of the 
Soviet oil industry and played a preeminent role in the development of the Caspian
29oilfields. Azerbaijan granted similar licenses to oil companies to develop other
o  rj
potential oil and gas deposits. As the contracts were implemented, enormous activity 
began in the area. New equipment was brought in, new surveys of the area were carried 
out, and staff were trained.31 As these activities continued, the legal dispute entered 
another stage where the huge investment could no longer be ignored. As Roland Sinker 
explained, “the implications of these activities, the longer these activity continues, the 
harder it is to envisage an arbitration tribunal on the status of Caspian ignoring the fiscal 
realities of this investment and the agreements leading to it.... Azerbaijan’s attitude and
28 Signed on 20 September 1994 betw een Azerbaijan and foreign oil com panies, 8 billion dollars were 
allocated for investment over 30 years, during w hich 511 tons o f  oil were expected to be produced from the 
three offshore fields (A zeri-G uneshli-C hirag). The contract is based on production-sharing principles.
29 Azeri President A liev  com m ented that “in drafting the division principle, w e should recognize the degree 
to w hich every littoral country has developed the sh e lf  and the value o f  the sea for each country.” Quoted in 
Granmayeh, “Legal H istory o f  the Caspian Sea,” 21.
30 “A zerbaycan’in Petrol A nlasm alari,” A vrasya  D osyasi, no. 2 (October 1997).
31 Karabagh and Shah D eniz field are among the deposits Azerbaijan opened for developm ent. In 1996, a 
consortium o f  western oil com panies and Russia and Iran were given  a contract to develop 1.8 billion  
barrels o f  the Shah D eniz oilfield. H ow ever, on 23 February 1999, CIPCO president James T illey  said, 
“W e found gas, w e found oil and w e found gas condensate— but w e didn't find enough o f  it. There was 
quite a gap betw een what w e found and what w ould be com m ercial, W e needed roughly to find tw ice as 
m uch.” James A. T illey, “Karabakh Prospect: N o longer in operation after February 23, 1999,” A vailable  
[Online]:
< http://w w w .azer.com /aiw eb/categories/m agazine/62 folder/62 articles/62 socar cipco.htm l>
[3 September 2006],
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conduct are effectively endorsing the current legal regime for the Caspian Sea as one 
based on delimitation.”32
BY WAY OF IRAN: IRAN’S QUEST FOR DOMINATION IN THE CASPIAN SEA
Throughout the decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, Iran emerged as 
a clever negotiator in the affairs of the Caspian region. Despite heavy pressure from the 
United States to exclude Iran from any oil Business, Iran managed to exert influence over 
the developments in the Caspian region, especially on the issues of the Caspian Sea legal 
status and pipeline negotiations. Iran successfully used its opposition to the division of 
the Caspian Sea, both the surface and the seabed, into national sectors among the littoral 
states.
Iranians call the Caspian Sea “Khazar: or the Sea of Mazandaran, and perceive it 
as a sea belonging to the people living on its coasts. Historically the sea belonged to 
Russia and Iran and the use of the sea was governed by treaties signed between the two 
nations. The breakup of the Soviet Union increased the number of littoral states but 
according to the Iranians, nothing had changed except the number of states surrounding 
the Caspian Sea. The same rules and agreements applied as the ex-Soviet republics of the 
Caspian region signed the Alma Ata Declaration, which confirmed the validity of the 
treaties and agreements signed by the Soviet Union. The main Iranian view on the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea rests on the applicability of the former treaties between the 
Soviet Union and Iran, particularly the 1921 Treaty of Friendship and the 1940 Treaty of 
Commerce and Navigation. Two main themes from those treaties were put forward by
32 Sinker, “The M anagem ent o f  a Transboundary Energy Resource: the Oil and Gas o f  the Caspian Sea,” 
63.
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the Iranians as a foundation for the legal status of the Caspian Sea: the premise of 
equality and the exclusion of third-party foreign nationals from the Caspian Sea.33 
During the early years of succession, Iran, along with Russia, stressed joint utilization of 
the sea as the legal basis for the rights and responsibilities of the littoral states.34 Through 
the coming years, Iran played an active role in the negotiations.35 In 1992, the Caspian 
states gathered in Tehran with the Iranian initiative, which marked the first step toward 
creation of a regional organization to coordinate all activities, including fishery, 
transportation, oil and gas exploration, and the prevention of pollution and the protection 
of the ecological system. Iran took part in all of the regional activities and conferences 
related to the Caspian Sea. To consolidate its position on the legal dispute, Iran worked 
closely with Russia. Iran, with Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan supported the 1994 
Moscow conference and the 1995 Biological Resource agreement. Iran on many 
occasions asserted that unilateral claims of ownership and division are unlawful and 
unacceptable. Iranian scholars focused on the legal discussions, with reference to the 
past and existing treaties, and claimed that “with a reasonable degree of certainty, Iran 
and Soviet Union never acted in any manner to indicate a delimitation of the Caspian Sea 
into their areas of jurisdiction, they never thought in terms of dividing Caspian’s surface 
or seabed ... the remaining query as to the supposition of a joint Iran USSR ownership or
33 See M ohammad A li M ovahed, “Iran’s V iew  on the Legal R egim e o f  the Caspian Sea,” in The C aspian  
R egion a t a  C rossroad: C hallenges o f  a  N ew  F rontier o f  E nergy an d  D evelopm ent, ed. Hooshang  
Amirahmadi (N ew  York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000).
34 Ibrahim Karagul, “Turk Rus C ephelesm esi,” Yenisafak, 19 October 2000.
35 For a detailed Iranian view  on condom inium , see M. Dabiri, “The Legal R egim e o f  the Caspian Sea: A  
B asis for Peace and D evelopm ent,” Journal o f  C en tra l A sia  an d  C aucasia  R esearch  (Tehran) (Summer 
1994): 1 -20 .
36 For more details on the Iranian and Russian response to A zeri initiatives, see A ghai-D iba, The Law  & 
P olitics o f  the C aspian  Sea  in the Twenty-F irst Century, 3 5 -3 8 , 9 2 -1 0 6 .
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condominium over the Caspian becomes all the more purposeful.”37 However, “Brice 
Clagged supplied an extensive legal argument against the Iranian position for 
condominium: ‘initially, it may be noted that, while certain writers have discussed the 
theoretical possibility of common ownership of lakes and inland seas no such 
condominium appears even to have existed.’ He further notes that a leading scholar 
(Verzije), after an exhaustive study concluded that ‘examples of common ownership do
•j o
not to my knowledge actually exist.’”
Iran’s opposition to the Azeri and Kazakh position on the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea continued throughout the decade. Despite the discrepancy on the Russian 
view from time to time, Iran maintained its tough stance and the legal dispute remained 
unresolved. This in fact gave way to unilateral and occasionally bilateral initiatives in the 
Caspian Sea, leaving a common solution to the problem unsuccessful. As Paul Gregory 
explains, “the viability of a comprehensive regional approach depends upon a reasonable 
degree of common interest. As noted above, the Caspian Sea littoral states have 
divergent goals and objectives that have become more apparent in the coming years. The 
lack of progress on a formal unanimous agreement has become increasingly apparent. 
Those Caspian states with rich national sectors and in need of massive capital injections
TQhave less interest in a common settlement.” One reason for the absence of cooperation 
on this issue is the littoral states’ self-interest economic and political policies. Iran, as 
one of the OPEC countries and with the second largest natural gas resources in the world,
37 M ovahed, “Iran’s V iew  on the Legal R egim e o f  the Caspian Sea,” 279.
38 Paul R. Gregory, “D evelop ing Caspian Energy Reserves: The Legal Environm ent,” in C aspian  E nergy  
R esources: Im plications fo r  the A rab  G u lf S ta tes  (Tauris: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies, 2002), 33.
39 Gregory, “D evelop ing Caspian Energy R eserves,” 34.
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tried to maximize its economic gains in the Caspian Sea.40 First, a regime of joint 
sovereignty or sharing of the resources on an equal percentage basis would give Iran 20 
percent of the Caspian resources, while delimitation of the sea would only provide a 12- 
14 percent share. A regime based on condominium would leave Iran better off 
economically and politically while leaving Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, respectively, 
worse off, as some of the resources would have to be shared by Iran. In addition to the 
distribution of the resources in percentage, a delimitation based on national zones would 
leave Iran worse off, since most of the proven and productive oil and gas deposits are 
located outside the Iranian national sectors.41 After 1997, Iran slowly moved from 
condominium to equal share of the Caspian Sea among the coastal states, with each state 
getting 20 percent of the sea.42 This indicates that Iran clearly followed a policy of self- 
interest to maximize its gain. When Iran purchased a quarter o f Azerbaijan’s share in 
1994 in the consortium, Iran temporarily reversed its position and agreed to be part of the 
project that was based on delimitation. However, Iran reverted back to its classical
40 See n. 14.
41 A s G eoffrey Kem p notes, Iran has a strong interest in claim ing a share o f  the seabed beyond its own  
sector because the main o ilfields lie in the m iddle o f  the sea, o f f  Azerbaijan. The least promising waters 
are those o f f  Iran. G eoffrey Kemp, “Iran and Caspian Energy: Prospects for Cooperation and C onflict,” in 
C aspian  E nergy R esources: Im plications fo r  the A rab G u lf S ta tes (Tauris: Emirates Center for Strategic 
Studies, 2002), 57. Iran's long-recognized sector o f  the Caspian Sea covers 12 to 14 percent o f  its surface 
area. The collapse o f  the U SSR  has changed neither the size nor the status o f  the Iranian sector. H ow ever, 
Iran now  demands either a condom inium  (or joint sovereignty) that would allow  it to claim  equal proceeds 
from all energy developed at the seabed, regardless o f  its investm ent in that developm ent or the expansion  
o f  its sector to at least 20 percent o f  the surface area and seabed. That territory includes part o f  the oil-rich  
Azerbaijani sector. Ariel Cohen, “Iran's Claim Over Caspian Sea Resources Threaten Energy Security,” 
A vailable [Online]: < http://w w w .heritage.org/R esearch/M iddleEast/bgl582.cfm  >  [29 A ugust 2006],
42 President Khatami in a speech in summer 2000 , expressed that Iran expects a system  o f  division that 
w ould leave it w ith a share o f  not less that 20 percent, and i f  the regim e is to divide then the seabed and the 
surface should equally be divided. A ghai-D iba, The Law & P o litics o f  the C aspian  Sea in the Twenty-F irst 
Century, 37.
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opposition when, as a result of American pressure, Iranian participation was not ratified 
by the Azeri parliament.43
The second aspect of the Iranian opposition to delimitation is related to political 
and geopolitical considerations. In a regime of joint management, strong states, e.g. Iran 
and Russia, would have a better chance to influence the direction of developments and 
policies of the coastal states. As has been the case for more than one occasion in the 
Caspian region, Iran and Russia would use their influence and veto to prevent any 
activity or development in the region, especially if the outcome is not desirable for them. 
Russia and Iran have expressed their discomfort with growing Western involvement in 
the development of the oil reserves in the Caspian and in the Transcaucasus region. The 
policies of the United States in the region in support of Azerbaijan and other republics, 
and of oil companies, were interpreted differently by Russia and Iran, although the U.S. 
attitude toward Russian policies was constructive. This would exclude only Iran, as the 
relations between these two nations has been poor for quite a long time. The United 
States always followed a policy that would keep Iran in check and make sure Iran did not 
get any part in the regional establishments, especially in oil deals related to production 
and transportation.44 Russia was never happy seeing a strong state in the region, as it 
prevented Russia from acting freely. Russia also had no interest in seeing these former 
dominions in the Caspian region grow more and more independent, as that conflicted 
with the Russian goal of reestablishing its old hegemony over the region. In a regime 
where each member has veto power, Iran would control the economic and political
43 Sinker, “The M anagem ent o f  a Transboundary Energy R esource,” 7 1 -7 2 .
44 It was the objective o f  the American governm ent that by fo llow ing a policy  o f  containment, Iran might 
change its support for international terrorism and acquisition o f  weapons o f  m ass destruction. Talbot 
Flashman and Paul G oble, “From M yths to Maps: American Interests in the Countries o f  Central A sia  and 
the Caucasus,” C aspian  C rossroads M agazine  3, no. 1 (Sum mer 1997).
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developments in the region, especially in Azerbaijan, since Iran has no interest in seeing a 
neighbor become economically and politically strong. Iran has long worried about the 
Azeri population in the northern parts o f the country.
A strong and influential Azerbaijan may pose a threat to the unity of Iran.
Because of this concern, Iran has long followed policies that would keep Azerbaijan in 
control. A strong relationship with Russia on many issues, and support for Armenia in 
the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagomo-Karabagh, though, clearly 
contradicts the theological foundations of an Islamic state. An alliance with non- 
Muslims against Muslims in a war is mainly directed at preserving national and territorial 
integrity in the north.45
Another factor that would explain the Iranian position on the legal dispute is the 
involvement of the United States.46 In collaboration with Russia, Iran has been trying to 
counter the American influence in the region since the presence of the United States and 
that of the West is seen as a threat to Russian and Iranian interests. However, it is the 
general trend between the United States and Iran and the ongoing hostility and mistrust 
that guides their policies in the Caspian Sea. as each party tries to push for options that 
would exclude the other. A regime of condominium would eliminate more and more 
U.S. involvement in the Transcaucasus and the Caspian region, while a regime of 
delimitation would confirm the U.S. presence in the Caspian Sea basin through its 
support for the newly developed countries and the oil companies. For these reasons, Iran
45 Iran has constantly worried about the A zeri population in the Northern provinces. There are alm ost 15 
m illion ethnic Azeri, nearly tw ice as m any as in Azerbaijan, and they also constitute one fourth o f  the total 
Iranian population.
46 The basic aims o f  American policies in the region is “promoting stability, securing uninterrupted flow  o f  
oil to the world market, excluding Iran from oil business and preventing any single (Russia) state 
dominating the entire region and Caspian o il.” (See “Hearing on the U .S. R ole in the Caucasus and the 
Central A sia ,” testim ony o f  Federico Pena, Secretary, Department o f  Energy, Com m ittee on International 
Relations, 30 April 1998.)
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and Russia strongly criticized the Azeri initiative in 1994 to establish an international 
consortium to develop three Azeri offshore oilfields.47
Despite the unilateral initiatives and Russian compromise in light of the policy 
shift starting in 1995 and 1996, Iran remained as the only state supporting the idea of 
condominium. As with new developments, Russia dropped its initial tough stance and 
worked with the littoral states to find bilateral solutions to the demarcation of the Caspian 
seabed. In 1995-96, Russia slowly moved to the idea of sharing the seabed and allowing 
35-40 miles of national zones. During 1995-96, Russia and Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan and Iran held bilateral meetings to find a solution for the 
legal status of the Caspian Sea. Most of the meetings and conferences did not produce an 
actual solution apart from the parties’ acknowledging the need to work closely with each 
other to find a solution to the legal dispute. After 1996, the Caspian states also 
followed the same pattern. Despite the fact that disagreements among the littoral states 
remained at the political level, there are instances of high tension between the coastal 
states emanating from the absence of a regime governing the use of the Caspian Sea 
resources. One of the most serious confrontations occurred between Azerbaijan and Iran 
in July 2001, when two Azerbaijani survey vessels were forced out o f a contested zone by 
an Iranian gunship.49 The area would fall into the Iranian sector if  the 20-percent rule
47 See Nur-Muhammad N oruzi, “Contention o f  Iran and Turkey in Central A sia  and the Caucasus,” Amu  
D a rya  4, no. 5 (Sum mer 2000).
48 In bilateral negotiations, each side expressed their intention to form a regim e that could be acceptable to 
all parties. In a jo in t statement on 11 M ay 1996, Iran and Kazakhstan agreed that “the parties consider that 
drawing up and conclusion o f  the convention on the legal status o f  the Caspian sea, on the basis o f  a 
consensus betw een the five coastal states, is a task o f  utmost importance w hich must not be delayed.” 
V yacheslav G izzatov, “N egotiations on the Legal Status o f  the Caspian Sea 1992-1996: V iew  from  
Kazakhstan,” in The C aspian: Politics, E nergy an d  Security, ed. Shirin Akiner (London: RoutledgeCurzon- 
Taylor Francis Group, 2004), 356.
49 The A lov, Araz and Sharg contract area covers approxim ately 1,400 sq. km and is about 120 km  
southeast o f  Baku in depths betw een 300 and 800 meters. Prospective reservoirs are expected to be found
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was applied; however, Azerbaijan claims that the area falls within the Azeri sector and 
Azerbaijan has a right to survey/develop the area. A warplane also flew over the same 
location to show Iranian determination on the issue. The BP-operated vessels had to 
retreat from the contested zone; however, this has created a major diplomatic and 
political crisis between the two countries. Although the issue was settled later with the 
efforts of Azeri President Haidar Aliev, the neighboring countries expressed their concern 
over Iran resorting to force to find its way out of the legal dispute in the Caspian Sea.50 
Meanwhile, Turkey openly criticized the Iranian move in the Caspian Sea and in support 
of Azerbaijan, the Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that Turkey was prepared to send 
troops to Azerbaijan if necessary.51 Turkish F-16s flew over Baku in an air show and the 
Turkish Chief of Staff General Hussein Kivrikoglu visited Azerbaijan after the incident.52 
These developments added another dimension to the dispute and increased the already 
heightened tensions. The work carried out by BP in the Alov-Alborz field was put on
between 2 ,500  and 6 ,500 meters below  the sea's surface. N o w ells have been drilled in the contract area, 
w hich is the largest block granted in Azerbaijan's sector o f  the Caspian Sea and reflects the size o f  the 
geological structures contained within its boundaries. A vailable [Online]:
<http://ww w.azer.com /aiweb/categories/m agazine/63 folder/63 articles/63 socar alov.htm l>
[02 August 2004],
50 The main im plications o f  the Caspian im passe were not obvious until the informal CIS sum mit held in 
the Russian B lack Sea resort o f  Sochi at the beginning o f  August. The sum m it w as attended by ten CIS 
heads o f  state, including three Caspian nations: Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. A t the m eeting  
Azerbaijan was given  unconditional support. Heidar A liev  was quoted as saying Russian President 
Vladimir Putin had undertaken to “broker a sum mit o f  four Caspian nations,” cutting Iran out. The m essage  
to Iran w as loud and clear: former Soviet nations in the Caspian are forming an alliance, and Iran isn't 
invited. Arkady Dubnov, “Tehran Guns for Caspian O il,” Institute o f  War a n d  P eace  Reporting, CRS no. 
95, 24 August 2001.
51 Mustafa Y ilm az, “A n A ssesm ent o f  Turkey’s A ctivities towards the Turkish W orld,” Eurasian Studies 
21 (Spring 2002): 165-92 .
52 “Irana G ozdagi,” H urriyet, 23 A ugust 2001; “Tahran Tirmandiriyor,” M illiyet, 22 A ugust 2001. See also  
Erdal Guven, “Akrobatik D iplom asi,” Radikal, 26 A ugust 2001.
53 A ccording to Turkish newspapers, Iran was trying to delay the developm ent o f  the Caspian resources as 
Iran w ished the main export pipeline from Caspian states go through Iranian territory. Since under current 
conditions, that is not likely to happen, Iran expected to achieve its aim s in the future. Turkish newspapers 
also comm ented that the Iranian media provoked the issue and pushed the Iranian governm ent to stand up 
on the issue. Foreign M inistry spokesm an Hamid Riza A sefi stated that “Iran is determined to protect its
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hold by BP and Azerbaijan until a solution was found in these contested areas. Iran has 
been negotiating for months over these oilfields and Iranian officials have said that one 
solution would be the joint development of the field.54
The focus on the legal status of the Caspian Sea shifted along with the new 
developments in the region. The Russian policy change, and the proceeding bilateral 
agreements with Kazakhstan in July 1998 regarding the sectoral division of the seabed on 
the basis of a modified median line and joint use of the surface, left Iran as the only 
country still adamantly opposing a regime of delimitation.55 This affected the Russian/ 
Iranian alliance on the Caspian Sea over the legal dispute; with the latest developments, 
Russia and Iran became opposing parties. The rift between Russia and Iran became more 
apparent when the Iranian president Khatami walked out of the Ashgabat conference 23- 
24 April 2002. Apparently, the walkout was a protest against the Russia-Azerbaijan- 
Kazakh block. Despite long and serious preparations, the conference ended without even 
a joint statement.56 The following years, the littoral states of the Caspian Sea continued 
to hold meetings on the same issues. Although the meeting of foreign ministers in Baku 
produced some promising results, especially on the demilitarization o f the sea, free 
merchant shipping, and the protection of the ecosystem, the main issue of contention
rights in the Caspian and w e hope that the A zeri governm ent and the oil com panies received the m essage.” 
Zam an G azetesi, 26 July 2001. A vailable [Online]:
<http://ww w.zam an.com .tr/200 l/07/26/dishaberler/dishaberlerdevam .htm #9> [11 January 2003].
54 H ow ever, in a report published by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “a U .S. official said there is little 
chance that Iran w ill be able to settle its Caspian oil field dispute with Azerbaijan by proposing a joint 
developm ent. A  U .S. com pany is already part o f  a consortium for the field, and Tehran has show n no sign  
that it w ill drop its claim  to 20 percent o f  the Caspian, clearing the w ay for an agreem ent among the five  
shoreline states. M ichael L elyveld , “U .S. O fficial D isputes Iranian Success with Caspian Project,” RFE/RL, 
18 October 2002 A vailable [Online]: <http://www.rferl.Org/features/2002/l0/18102002170429.asp>
[13 Decem ber 2005], There are reports about these areas that the A lov-A lborz field may hold up to 9 
billion value o f  oil and gas.
55 According to Iranians, it w as a violation o f  the existing regim e in the Caspian Sea. Quoted in Tehran  
Times, 30 M ay 1998. Granmayeh, “Legal History o f  the Caspian Sea,” 37.
56 Ibid., 37.
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remained the same. Although Iran kept insisting on a solution based on joint 
management and ownership of the modified median line, the developments in the region 
complicated the Iranian position. By 2003, Russia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan had 
agreed on the demarcation of the seabed on the basis of a modified median line with the 
sea surface being open to all. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan agreed on the principle of 
national sectors in 1997, and the Turkmen accord with Iran in 1997 on the common 
borders left only the Turkmen Azeri disagreement on the Kypaz/Serdar oilfields.57 
Although from the very beginning the littoral states said that the solution for the legal 
dispute could be achieved with the participation of the five coastal states, the following 
years proved that it was the bilateral agreements that could settle the region’s conflicting 
issues. While a final solution was not reached, Iran would be in a difficult situation if 
Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan reached an agreement on the conflict over the 
Kypaz/Serdar field.58
Iran followed a policy of self interest in the Caspian region from the very 
beginning, and remained the only littoral state pursuing a regime o f joint sovereignty.
Iran was blamed by other littoral states for slowing down the developments; some of the 
littoral states were in need of a solution to start their projects in the Caspian Sea.59 Iran 
may eventually yield to the pressure from the other littoral states and agree to the 
delimitation of the Caspian Sea into national zones. As mentioned above, Iran does not 
have only economic concerns in the Caspian but also other considerations, e.g., keeping 
the ex-Soviet republics in check, especially Azerbaijan. For that reason Iran may not
57 S. Colakoglu, “Uluslararasi Hukukta Hazar’in Statu Sorunu,” 47.
58 M ustafa A ydin, “Kafkasya ve Orta A sya ile Iliskiler,” in Turk D is Politikasi, Kurtulus Savasindan  
Bugune Olgular, B elgeler, Yorumlar, vol. 2, ed. Baskin Oran (Istanbul: Iletisim  Yayinlari, 2001).
59 Kemal Karpat, “Orta A sya D evletleri, Turkiye ve Iranin D is Politikalari,” Ye n't Turkiye 2 (July/August 
1997): 2 1 6 8 -7 0 .
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easily agree to sign a formal declaration for the division of the seabed between Iran and 
Azerbaijan, since that might cause Iran to lose important leverage with its neighbors, as 
well as foreign companies, on other issues. However Iran, sooner or later, must accept 
the existence of a de facto  regime in the Caspian Sea that based on delimitation.60
RUSSIA AND THE CASPIAN SEA: FROM CONFRONTATION TO COOPERATION 
Russian policy on the legal status of the Caspian Sea represents a classic example 
of realist thinking of states pursuing self interest in the international arena. Although 
there are a number of inconsistencies in Russian policies toward the legal dispute, it 
could also be interpreted as a change in the interests of Russia, which affected the 
eventual policy shifts. Like Iran, Russia has been a strong supporter of joint management 
of the Caspian Sea.61 During the early years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
Russia, in alliance with Iran, supported the idea of condominium and favored joint 
utilization of the sea surface and the seabed. Along with Iran, Russia claimed the validity 
of early treaties between the Soviet Union and Iran. By referring to the Caspian Sea as a 
lake, Russia denied the applicability of 1982 UNCLOS articles on exclusive economic 
zones and continental shelf. Having subscribed to these main policies, Russia also 
acknowledged the fact that the Caspian Sea environment has changed and that there is a 
need to redefine of the terms of the management and joint use of the sea, which should be 
realized through a formal agreement among the coastal states. Therefore any unilateral
60 Sinker, “The M anagem ent o f  a Transboundary Energy R esource,” 72.
61 Faruk Unal, “Azerbaycan R usya Iliskilerinde Hazar Sorunu,” Journal o f  Q afqaz U niversity  2, no. 2 
(1999): 19.
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action without the consent of the five littoral states or any activity related to the use of the
ftOsea resources would be illegal and unacceptable.
After the establishment of an international consortium in 1994 by Azerbaijan to 
develop three Azeri oilfields in the Caspian Sea, the legal debate among the littoral states 
intensified. The initial Russian response to the Azeri move was harsh and strong, and 
Russia declared this unilateral initiative illegal, claiming that Caspian states were still 
subject to USSR agreements and laws and the development of marine resources of the 
Caspian Sea must be resolved unanimously.
While Russia has economic motives for its opposition to the delimitation of the 
Caspian Sea, the political and geopolitical considerations surpass the projections of 
economic gain. Russia as the successor of the Soviet Union does not want to see the 
growing presence of Western oil companies and Western powers in its backyard. As the 
number of states involved in the Caspian Sea oil development projects increases, the 
stakes get higher. Similarly, as Western investments grow in the Caspian Sea, Western 
influence will spread. This might contradict Russian geopolitical considerations. On 
many occasions, Russian officials stated their dislike for the growing American 
involvement and influence in the Transcaucasus and the Caspian Sea region. Like Iran, 
Russia also would not want to see prosperous and politically independent states in the 
region, where Russia claims historical sphere of influence.
62 For more information on the initial Russian approach to legal issues in the Caspian Sea, see Horton and 
M em edov “Legal Status o f  the Caspian Sea.”
63 Certainly the Russian and the Iranian m oves have an econom ic motivation, but they have also a com m on  
goal that w ould be “to restrict the sovereign ability o f  Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to freely 
develop their offshore oil and gas resources with the active participation o f  the W estern oil com panies and 
governm ents.” Croissant and Croissant, “The Legal Status o f  the Caspian Sea,” 28. B eside these, R ussia is 
not w illing to see the former dom inions develop a genuine econom ic independence from M oscow . In fact, 
it is part o f  a general Russian policy  to keep the former Soviet republics under control and maintain a 
sphere o f  influence.
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Another issue brought forward by the Russian-Iranian front is the necessity to 
preserve the delicate ecological balance in the Caspian Sea. Their claim is that joint 
management of the sea would provide a better arrangement that would preserve the 
nature and the environment. In fact, it is doubtful the natural balance could be preserved 
better by a joint committee than by the initiatives of individual states. As Arthur Pizzi 
points out, “multiple-ownership removes incentives for conservation of the common 
resources thus causing increased production costs, quicker depletion of the resources and 
decreased market price for the product due to oversupply. Exclusive ownership, on the 
other hand, promotes more efficient oil and gas extraction due to lack of completion for 
the common resource.”64
Despite strong Russian opposition, there has been dissension in the Russian policy 
circles. The foreign ministry’s tough stance was not approved by the Ministry of Energy 
and the Russian oil companies. Starting in 1995, Russian policy on the legal dispute 
started to change. First, Russian oil company LUKOIL acquired a share in the Azeri 
international consortium that Russia had previously condemned. Other reasons also 
might explain this change in Russian attitude. One reason might be the fact that Russia 
realized the difficulty of holding onto the initial claims for so long, especially under the 
pressure coming from the energy ministry and the Russian oil companies. It is also the 
case that Russia may have realized that it might gain more in a regime of delimitation, 
especially through joint projects and later on pipelines and transit fees. In addition,
Russia might also have feared alienating the old dominions by pressuring on an issue that 
these republics perceived vital. This could diminish Russian influence over these states
64 Arthur M. P izzi, “Caspian Sea Oil, Turmoil and Caviar: Can They Provide a B asis for an Econom ic  
U nion o f  the Caspian States?” C olorado  Journal o f  In ternational E nvironm ental Law  a n d  P o licy  7, no. 2 
(Summer 1996): 4 9 5 -9 6 .
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and might push them more towards the West and the United States, which would be even 
more of a problem for Russia. It might also be that Russia did not want to confront the 
Western oil companies and the United States on this issue since these powers might resort 
to use of other leverages at a time that Russia depended on Western assistance to relieve 
economic hardships. It is hard to say what exactly affected the change in Russian 
behavior, but it is possible that all of the above reasons may have played a role in pushing 
Russia toward cooperation. Besides, the new Russian proposal focuses on sharing the 
seabed, whereas the surface still remains as a property for common use. This would 
allow Russia to exercise its naval power and trade. Another aspect of this change is that 
Russia wanted to control the transit routes of the oil export of the ex-Soviet republics by 
using the delimitation issue as leverage. In August 1995, the Russian ambassador to 
Turkey, Vadim Kuznetsev, stated that “Russia was ready to modify its position on the 
legal status of the Caspian Sea, if Azerbaijan agreed to export its oil through Russian 
pipeline.”65
Starting in 1995, Russia slowly shifted its tough stance on the issue and made 
progress through bilateral agreements with the neighboring countries, Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan. Russia proposed a 35-40 mile exclusive economic zone in 1996, and 
increased its proposal to 45 miles in the Ashgabat meeting in November 1996. A low- 
level conflict between Russia and Kazakhstan opened the way for bilateral agreements.
In 1997, Kazakhstan protested LUKOIL operation in the northern part of the Caspian Sea 
close to the Kazakh sector. After a period o f negotiations, Russia and Kazakhstan agreed 
to develop these contested areas jointly and in February 1998, a joint drilling agreement 
was signed between Kazakoil and LUKOIL. In July of that year, the presidents of each
65 Quoted in Granmayeh, “L egal History o f  the Caspian Sea, 21.
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state signed an accord on the sectoral division of the seabed. The agreement between 
Russia and Kazakhstan constituted an example for the further developments in the Sea 
and helped the emergence of a de facto  regime in the Caspian Sea. Russia engaged in the 
same type of negotiations with Azerbaijan on the issue of demarcation and by a protocol 
signed in Baku in March 1997, both parties agreed on the division of the sea on an 
equidistance median line principle.66 Although there has not been an agreement signed 
by all of the coastal states, the Russia-Kazakh accord continued to affect future 
developments and caused the relationship between Iran and Russia on the legal status 
issue to deteriorate slowly over time.
KAZAKHSTAN AND THE CASPIAN SEA
Having elaborated on the tough Iranian and Azeri approach to the legal status of 
the Caspian Sea, we could assert that the Kazakh approach would lie in the middle. 
Kazakhstan, from the very beginning, supported the idea of delimitation of the Caspian 
Sea, with an emphasis on the participation of all littoral states on an equal basis in 
determining a regime suitable for today’s environment. Kazakhstan in fact has the largest 
and most productive oil deposits in the Caspian Sea and the Kazakh government has 
prioritized the use of available oil and gas reserves for the development of the country. 
Foreign Minister Gizzatov refers to the 1982 UNCLOS and claims that the UN articles 
should apply to the Caspian Sea. Although Kazakhstan accepts the validity of the 1921 
and 1940 treaties between the Soviet Union and Iran, it draws attention to the fact that 
those treaties were signed even before the introduction of new concepts such as exclusive 
zones, seabed, or continental shelf, and therefore those treaties are not suitable for today’s
66 Granmayeh, “Legal History o f  the Caspian Sea, 32.
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environment. Kazakh officials also assert that those treaties between the Soviet Union 
and Iran cannot be taken as a legal basis since those treaties do not have any provisions 
regarding the exploitation of the mineral resources. Despite the fact that Kazakhstan 
favored the sectoral division of the Caspian Sea, it has taken a fairly positive attitude 
compared to the rigid and ambitious policies of Azerbaijan. This is partially related to 
the peculiar Kazakh-Russian relationship, where Russia had tremendous influence over 
Kazakhstan, especially during the initial phases of transition from the Soviet Union to an 
independent Kazakh state. It could also be due to the interdependent relationship 
between Kazakhstan and Russia where Kazakhstan needed Russia on many economic 
and political issues. Considering the Russian minority in Kazakhstan and the need to 
keep a friendly relationship with Russia, we can better understand the Kazakh position on 
the legal status of the Caspian Sea and the careful Kazakh approach not to antagonize 
Russia. Another aspect of the issue is the Russian pipelines Kazakhstan has to use to 
transport its oil to outside oil markets. These factors may explain the soft and
cooperative approach of the Kazakh officials over time, despite the fact that Kazakhstan
68had enormous reserves in the Caspian Sea. Within this framework, Kazakhstan offers 
“other Caspian states to participate in the development of oil and gas deposits in 
Kazakhstan sector o f the seabed of the Caspian.”69
Although Kazakhstan tried to find a solution for the legal dispute within a 
common ground by the participation of all the littoral states, in 1993 it unilaterally took 
some initiatives and “Kazak government signed an agreement with the Kazakhstan
67 Gizzatov, “N egotiations on the L egal Status o f  the Caspian Sea 1 9 9 2 -1 9 9 6 ,”55.
68 Gun Kut, Yeni Turk C um huriyetleri ve  U luslararasi Ortam : B agim sizligin  Ilk Yillari, A zerbayjan, 
K azakistan, Ozbekistan, Turkmenistan  (Ankara: T.C. Kultur Bakanligi Yayinlari, 1994).
69 Ibid., 5 5 -5 6 .
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Kazpishelf consortium of western oil companies to explore for oil in the Kazakh sector of 
the sea. This followed the development of Tengiz oil field by TengizChevroil, a joint 
venture between Kazakhstan and Chevron.”70 Kazakhstan participated in all the meetings 
related to the determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, and signed the 1995 
Agreement on the Conservation and Utilization of Biological Resources in the Caspian 
Sea. Kazaks also hosted a session in May 1995 to settle differences between the littoral 
states. However, the real development with respect to the settlement of differences came 
through bilateral negotiations. In 1997 and 1998, Kazakhstan and Russia signed an 
agreement on the demarcation of the seabed and the joint development of the oil fields in 
contested areas. This became a cornerstone of the creation of a de facto  regime in the 
Caspian Sea to which Iran sharply objected. On 27 February 1997, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan agreed on the demarcation of their sectors in the Caspian Sea, which 
continued to be in place up to then. In December 2001, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan 
reached an agreement on determining their sectors in the Caspian Sea. By the completion 
of the above agreements with the Caspian littoral states, Kazakhstan basically secured its 
own sectors in the Caspian Sea.
TURKMENISTAN AND THE CASPIAN SEA
Turkmenistan’s policy on the Caspian Sea has been inconsistent. Turkmenistan 
supported the delimitation of the Caspian Sea but sometime later announced that IT WAS 
in full accord with Iran and Russia. The Turkmen position in some aspects resembles the 
Kazakh approach. While Turkmenistan in 1993 enacted a Law on State Border that 
clearly demarcated maritime and territorial borders, it also expressed its desire for a
70 Sinker, “The M anagem ent o f  a Transboundary Energy R esource,”66.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
80
71common solution. In contrast with the Common Border Law, Turkmenistan was among 
the first states to support the 1992 Iranian proposal for cooperation in matters of the
• 72 •Caspian Sea. This could be explained by the Turkmen government’s inexperience in 
international relations and the absence of a national policy formulation on the Turkmen 
side. Another explanation for the inconsistency might be the changing nature of 
relationships with the Caspian neighbors and the implicit pressure coming from Russia 
and Iran. As with the changing nature of interstate relationships, Turkmenistan’s need 
for support from Russia and the huge natural gas deal with it might have shifted 
Turkmenistan’s view on the legal status of the Caspian Sea.
Turkmen Azeri Dispute and the Turkmen Borders
The absence of a clear-cut regime in the Caspian Sea has caused some tension 
among the littoral states, especially in areas where states border each other. One example 
of this kind of dispute is the incident between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan over 
Kypaz/Serdar oilfields, where each state claims ownership. In July 1997, Azerbaijan 
signed an agreement with two Russian oil companies, LUKOIL and Rosneft, to develop 
the Kypaz/Serdar area, which is located 145 km off the coast of Azerbaijan. The Azeri 
side claims that the area was discovered in 1959 by Azeri experts and the first oil well
71 In 1992, Turkmenistan passed its “Law On State Borders,” one provision o f  w hich claim ed for 
Turkmenistan a 12-m ile coastal zone (not 10 m iles) bordering the so-called Astara/Hasanqoli Line on the 
south. This line crosses the Caspian Sea and connects the points o f  exit o f  the land border o f  the Astara 
village on the western shore and the Hasanqoli village on the eastern shore. Irina Paliashvili. “ Caspian 
Legal D im ension: Investment Risk in South Caspian D elim itation; D iscussion  o f  the Legal Status o f  the 
Caspian Sea,” presentation for the International Energy A gency  Roundtable on Caspian Oil & Gas 
Scenarios, 15 April 2003 , 7. A vailable [Online]:
< http://w w w .iea.org/textbase/w ork/2003/caspian/Palias.pdf> [27 M ay 2006].
72 In 1993 and 1995, Turkmenistan entered into agreements with W estern oil com panies to develop  
offshore o ilfields within the Turkmen sector with the participation o f  the Turkmen oil com pany  
Chelekeneft. Contrary to the Turkmen support for Iran and R ussia on many occasions, Turkmenistan 
continued its unilateral initiatives in 1997 and 1998, when it issued licenses for offshore drilling rights in its 
new ly-declared 12-m ile coastal zone.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
81
was dug in 1986, with the first year of Azeri production totalling more than 300 million
-71
tons. Turkmenistan protested the deal, claiming that the area belongs to Turkmenistan 
since it is closer to Turkmenistan and therefore falls within the Turkmen sector. Russia 
had to withdraw from the project on the grounds that Russia itself criticized unilateral 
initiatives in the Caspian Sea and the fact that Turkmenistan on many occasions sided 
with Russia over the legal dispute. Despite the efforts made by Azerbaijan to find a 
common solution for the contested areas, the status of the Kypaz/Serdar oilfields remains 
unresolved.
Another dispute occurred between Iran and Turkmenistan when Turkmenistan 
issued a tender for eleven blocks that were located on the Iranian border. Turkmenistan 
later withdrew its tender for the Iranian claimed fields when Iran voiced its objection. 
After these developments, Turkmenistan and Iran agreed on the joint utilization of the 
non-clarified areas until a final resolution to the legal status of the Caspian Sea could be 
found.
CONCLUSIONS
More than a decade after the first major contract in the Caspian Sea, the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea remains unsolved. There is no joint agreement by the coastal 
states on the use of the sea resources. Despite numerous initiatives, conferences, 
meetings and talks among the riparian states, neither a regime nor an organizing body 
emerged to manage the transboundary resources of the Caspian Sea. One of the most 
striking factors that affected the legal status issue in the Caspian Sea is the fact that each
73 Natiq A liyev , “Kapaz: Socar’s O fficial Statement,’’A vailable [Online]: 
< http://ww w.azer.com /aiweb/categories/m agazine/53 folder/53 articles/53 statement.html>
[19 February 2007].
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nation state followed self-interest policies that would be economically and politically 
favorable for themselves. The tough stance of Azerbaijan and Iran on opposite ends 
proves the existence of realist thinking in the making of their policies. As we have 
discussed above, existence of other motives, such as geopolitical considerations caused a 
great deal of controversy among the riparian states. In the end, the states of the Caspian 
Sea could not reach a common solution with respect to the settlement of their differences 
on the legal status of the Caspian Sea.
However, the deadlock on the achievement of a common solution has been 
partially bypassed through bilateral negotiations. As the newly independent states 
enthusiastically pursued a solution to start oil production in the Caspian Sea, eventually 
some sort of regime or understanding emerged especially in the northern part of the 
coasts. The Russian initiatives and efforts to find a solution to the legal issue in the 
Caspian Sea greatly contributed to the emergence of a de facto  regime. By the signing of 
the bilateral agreements among Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, the 
Caspian states agreed to divide the seabed on the basis of a modified median line. From 
the very beginning, the littoral states continuously sought a common solution acceptable 
to all the participants. However, the latter developments proved that in the context of the 
Caspian Sea, bilateral agreements were much more effective. The role of Russia in the 
emergence of some sort of cooperation should be acknowledged. The shift in Russian 
policy from condominium to sectoral division of the seabed is one of the cornerstones of 
the improvement of interstate relations in the Caspian Sea with regard to the legal issue. 
Certain compromises have been made on both sides, but the littoral states that agreed to 
divide the seabed were satisfied with what they achieved. Russia maintained its
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dominant status on the sea, as the sea surface remains an area for common use for 
navigation, fishery and transportation. Newly independent states mainly focused on the 
offshore oil drilling in the Caspian Sea, and with the signing of the agreements they were 
granted the right to develop the oil deposits in the Caspian Sea freely. Eventually, the 
sectoral division of the seabed worked well for Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and 
in some ways for Turkmenistan but not for Iran. Iran currently is not a part of the 
emerging regime and still favors a solution based on joint management or equal sharing 
where each individual state gets 20 percent of the seabed and the surface.
As we have suggested from the beginning, the emergence of cooperation among 
the Caspian States has been quite slow despite the fact that littoral states of the Caspian 
Sea urgently needed a regional solution in order to start oil production. Geopolitical 
considerations and pursuit of self-interest policies in the region, and the existence of 
divergent economic and political policies, impeded the settlement of disputes over the 
legal status of the sea. Even after a temporary settlement of the differences in the 
Caspian Sea, we could assert that each individual state continued to follow policies that 
favored themselves the most. The Russian policy shift from condominium to division of 
the seabed could be construed as a compromise from Russian interests. However, the 
long-lasting legal status dispute is only one aspect o f the trans-boundary interstate 
relations in the Transcaucasus region. Issues are in many cases tied to each other, and 
compromise in one area might mean a gain in another. In that respect, the Russian move 
in the legal dispute should be viewed from a broader perspective, as it is directly related 
to the issue of pipelines, an issue that has dominated the agenda more than any other 
issue in the Caspian Sea region.
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CHAPTER IV
THE PIPELINE DILEMMA IN THE CASPIAN SEA: DREAM OR REALITY?
Another aspect of the Caspian oil diplomacy or the so called new great game is 
the complex set of issues related to the transportation of Caspian oil.1 The Caspian Sea is 
a landlocked sea and the only connection to the outside world is the Don-Volga River 
that passes through Russian territory to Baltic Sea.2 The oil producing countries of 
Caspian Sea have to rely on the cooperation of their neighbors to be able to transport the 
oil produced in the region to the world oil markets. As each country had its own 
preferences and desires as to which route and method to use as a means for 
transportation, the pipeline dilemma in the Caspian Sea became an issue of contention 
among the countries involved in the affairs of the Caspian Sea. Alongside the technical 
and geological / geophysical difficulties that prevented the development of petroleum 
exploration and production, the competition over the control of pipelines and the 
expected economic benefits deeply affected the Caspian oil development.
1 Lutz Klevem an compares the today’s politico-m ilitary environm ent in the region to the 19th century 
struggle betw een British and Russian Empires. “N ow  more than a hundred years later, great empires once  
again position them selves to control the hearth o f  the Eurasian landmass left in a post-Soviet power 
vacuum. Today there are different actors and the rules o f  the neocolonial gam e are far more com plex than 
those o f  a century ago: The U nited States has taken over the leading role from the British. A long with the 
ever present Russians, new  regional powers such as China, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan have entered the 
arena, and Transnational Corporations (w hose budgets far exceed  those o f  many Central A sian countries) 
are also pursuing their ow n interests and strategies.” Lutz K levem an, The N ew  G rea t G am e: B lo o d  a n d  O il 
in C en tra l A sia  (N ew  York: Grove Press, 2003), 3.
2 “Europe's longest river and the principal waterway o f  w estern Russia, it rises in the V aldai H ills northwest 
o f  M oscow  and flow s 2,193 m iles (3 ,530  km) southeastward to em pty into the Caspian Sea. It is used for 
power production, irrigation, flood control, and transportation. The river has played an important part in the 
life o f  the Russian people, and in Russian folklore it is characteristically named M other V olga .” “V olga  
River,’’A vailable [Online]: < http://ww w.answers.com /topic/volga-river> [4 A ugust 2006]. “The D on is 
one o f  the major rivers o f  Russia. It rises near Tula, southeast o f  M oscow , and flow s for a distance o f  about 
1,950 km (1 ,220  m iles) to the Sea o f  A zov. From its source, the river first flow s southeast to V oronezh, 
then southwest to its mouth. The main city on the river is R ostov on Don, its main tributary the D onets. At 
its easternmost point, the Don com es near the V olga, and the V olga-D on Canal (length ca. 105 km (65  
m iles)), connecting both rivers, is a major waterway.” “D on River: R ussia,” A vailable [Online]: 
< http://en.wikipedia.org/w iki/D on River. Russia> [4 A ugust 2006],
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In this chapter, I would like to explore the complex interaction among state and 
non-state actors on the issue of pipelines and find out how the behavior of each actor on 
the Caspian pipeline issue affected the development of cooperative or non-cooperative 
outcome. I would also like to draw on some contending theories of international relations 
on the issue of cooperation and analyze the policies of the diverse actors from a 
theoretical perspective. As an actor in pipeline politics, Turkey’s involvement proved to 
be a decisive factor. In this chapter I would also like to devote more space on Turkey and 
its role in the whole Caspian pipeline negotiations.
The issue of control and profit attached to the control of the oil has manifested 
itself in the form of state confrontation, which has simultaneously slowed down the 
implementation of oil extraction projects in the region. The Russian policy to maintain 
influence in the Caspian region and the desire of the littoral states to break away from 
Russia’s stranglehold and gain complete independence has emerged as an issue of serious 
political confrontation on the pipeline discussions. The complexity o f the whole pipeline 
tangle doubled with the involvement of the outside actors who had economic and 
political interests in the Caspian region. The involvement of the United States as an 
outside actor and as a strong supporter of the regional states and their independence and 
its special emphasis on Iran’s role added another dimension to the transportation of oil 
and pipeline discussions.
The very economic and political development of the former Soviet republics and 
strengthening of their independence depend on the revenues they receive from petroleum 
exports. It is an issue of utmost importance for the petroleum producing countries of the 
Caspian Sea to be able to secure a stable export route and a dependable pipeline system.
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Share of oil and gas in Azeri exports amounts to 90 percent, while it is 80 percent in 
Turkmenistan and 65 percent in Kazakhstan. (See graph below.) The oil companies 
which have already invested billions of dollars in the Caspian oil are interested in the 
most feasible and economical means of transportation. On the other hand, the priorities 
of some external powers, i.e., Turkey, Iran and the United States, are a bit different than 
those of the regional states and oil companies. The complex web of interests and the 
multiplicity of actors involved in the whole Caspian oil pipeline game created an 
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Graph 6: Share o f Oil & Gas in Total Export
Source: World Bank Country Briefs and Azerbaijan Ministry o f  Finance Fact Sheet
3 Data gathered from World Bank Country B riefs and Azerbaijan M inistry o f  Finance Fact Sheet.
4 Hans M orgenthau says that, “the idea o f  interest is indeed o f  the essence o f  politics and unaffected by the 
circum stances o f  tim e and place.” Morgenthau, P olitics am ong N ations, 10.
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As Mustafa Aydin suggests, securing a major share in these pipelines will provide 
enhanced influence throughout the region.5 Export of large scale oil to the world markets 
from the Caspian Sea may provide great opportunities for economic development and 
prosperity for the Caspian oil producers; especially Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan.6 However, the course of the developments and the ability of the states to 
manage their differences will be an important factor in the realization of their goals for 
economic development. In a world of increasing oil prices, the competition over 
resources and interstate rivalry maybe even more fierce than expected.7
Table 6:
Oil Prices by Year
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Dubai-Spot crude price 17.25 26.2 22.81 23.74 26.78 33.64 49.35
Brent-Spot crude price 17.97 28.5 24.44 25.02 28.83 38.27 54.52
Oil Prices: US dollars per barrel
Source: BP Statistical Review o f World Energy 2006
5 Mustafa A ydin, “Oil, P ipelines and Security: The G eopolitics o f  the Caspian R egion” in The C aspian  
R egion , ed. M oshe Gammer and Frank Cass, 1st ed. (N ew  York: Routledge, 2002), 6, 14 -16 .
6 In 2003, Turkish energy M inister H ilm i Guler told that BTC pipeline is one o f  the biggest projects o f  the 
2 1 st century in the sense that this pipeline w ill provide energy to the European countries where the demand 
for oil is expected to increase in the com ing decades. Faruk Arslan, H azarin  K u rtlar Vadisi: P e tro l 
Im paratorlugundaki Guc S avaslari (Istanbul: Karakutu Yayinlari, 2005), 300.
7 A ccording to the estim ates taken from International Energy A gency, the global demand for energy w ill 
rise by 59 percent by 2030  with 2/3 o f  this demand com ing from developing countries particularly from  
China and India. U .S. demand for oil is also rising w hile U .S. dom estic production is set to fall by 12 
percent over the next decade. “B oom  or Bust in the Caspian?” E urom oney  (January 2005). A lso  A vailable 
[Online]: <w w w .eurom onev.com  >121  March 2005].
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Graph 7: Oil Prices by Year (View in 3D Graph)
Source: BP Statistical Review o f  World Energy 2006
EARLY OIL DEVELOPMENT AND PIPELINES
Despite the fact that Baku and the Caspian region provided half of the world oil 
production at the beginning of the twentieth century, the importance o f the region as an 
oil producer declined after World War I and II. Soviet policymakers shifted their focus to 
Siberia and the whole Russian oil pipeline network redesigned to serve the domestic need
o
and the export to Western countries. The oil from the Caspian region was used to serve 
domestic needs rather than export. Therefore, during the Soviet era, no major pipeline 
has been built to carry oil from the Caspian region to the outside world. The Azeri and 
Kazakh oil production were linked to the internal Russian pipeline network and carried to
8 Jennifer D elay, “The Caspian Oil Pipeline Tangle: A  Steel W eb o f  C onfusion” in O il a n d  G eopo litics in 
the C aspian  Sea  R egion , eds. M ichael P. Croissant and Bttlent Aras (W estport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 45.
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Russian refineries for domestic use. After 1991, Caspian oil producers found themselves 
in a very difficult situation in terms of oil export. On one hand, they were heavily 
dependant on the revenues that might come from oil export; on the other hand they did 
not have a stable and a secure outlet for the export of the oil produced in their countries. 
Azerbaijan was only linked to a Russian pipeline (Baku-Grozny-Novorossiysk) passing 
through war-torn Chechnya towards the Russian port at Black Sea. The Baku-Supsa 
pipeline had not been used in years and needed a fundamental renovation to be 
operational. The situation in Kazakhstan was no different than Azerbaijan. The only 
export line for Kazakhstan was the Atyrau-Oask-Samara pipeline that needed a major 
upgrade to be useful in exporting Kazakh oil. The small pipeline would not have been 
sufficient to carry even a fraction of Kazakh oil production.
Even then, the oil producers in the Caspian Sea region had to deal with the 
Russian policies regarding the use of the internal Russian pipeline system. “The old 
Soviet system had served all the republics of the Soviet Union on an integrated basis, but 
now the natural preference of the Russian companies would be to use the system for 
Russian energy first, and secondarily to carry oil and gas produced by fellow Soviet 
producers that could now be regarded as commercial rivals.”9 Caspian oil producers 
found themselves in an urgent need to find an export route that could sustain Caspian oil 
production. On the other hand, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan started looking for 
alternatives to reduce or eliminate their dependence on Russia and Russian pipeline 
system in the long run, though it was much more difficult for Kazakhstan to bypass 
Russia totally because of its geographical location. As the investment by the oil
9 John Roberts, “Pipeline Politics,” in The C aspian: Politics, E nergy an d  Security, ed. Shirin Akiner 
(London: R outledgeCurzon-Taylor Francis Group, 2004), p. 77.
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companies grew, pipelines became an issue for both oil producing countries and oil 
companies which already have invested huge amounts of money in the Caspian oil 
projects. Before starting with the complex and long-lasting negotiations among the 
Caspian states, oil companies and external powers, I would like to cover some of the 
basic issues related to pipeline discussions.
MAIN PIPELINE PROJECTS AND PROPOSALS
As soon as the need for alternative routes for the export of Caspian oil became 
apparent, the Azeri and Kazakh government persistently worked to develop new export 
routes either independent of Russia or less susceptible to Russian control while still 
having to remain on good terms with Moscow to ensure that their existing oil and gas 
systems were not jeopardized.10 With the involvement of oil companies and external 
players there has been a plethora of proposals and projects to transport Caspian oil.
One of the factors behind the multiplicity o f the proposals is the transit fees that host 
states would collect for a long period o f time once the pipes have been laid. The 
neighboring countries in the region offered their territories as a passage to pipelines for 
the Caspian oil. This has created a great scale of competition among the major proposals 
and has it also caused a great deal of confusion over the course of negotiations for the oil 
producing countries with regard to the choice they had to make under prevalent 
circumstances.11 Below is a summary of existing pipelines and contending proposals for 
the coming years. The discussions over the main export pipelines and the complex
10 Ibid.
11 Gawdat Bahgat, “R egional Report: The Caspian Sea: Potentials and Prospects,” G overnance: An  
In ternational Journal o f  P o licy  an d  Institutions 17, no. 1 (January 2004): 119.
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Atyrau-Samara Pipeline was the largest export pipeline for Kazakhstan before the 
construction of CPC (Caspian Pipeline Consortium) and Kazakhstan exported almost all 
of its early oil production through this northern route that connects Caspian port of 
Atyrau to Russian Ural refinery at Samara and then connects with Russia’s main East-
19West Druzhba system. The pipeline capacity was increased from 240,000 bbl/d to 
300,000 bbl/d with the addition of another pumping station.
CPC: Caspian Pipeline Consortium
It is one of the biggest projects to carry Kazakh oil from Tengiz oil reserves to 
Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk. The CPC project was carried out by the 
governments of Russia, Kazakhstan and Oman in cooperation with a consortium of oil 
companies headed by Chevron. CPC consists of the upgrade o f existing pipelines in 
Kazakhstan which connects to Russia and reaches to Novorossiysk. After its completion, 
the 1512 km long pipeline went into use and on October 13, 2001 first crude oil was 
loaded onto a tanker at the port of Novorossiysk on Black Sea.13 With the new additions
12 In June 2002 , Kazakhstan and Russia signed a 15-year oil transit agreement under w hich Kazakhstan w ill 
export 340 ,000  bbl/d o f  oil annually via the Russian pipeline system . Russia's trade ministry also pledged to 
increase the capacity o f  the line to around 500 ,000  bbl/d. A s the CPC project grow s with Kazakh  
production, absolute volum es though Atyrau-Samara are expected to grow, but this pipeline w ill becom e 
relatively less significant.” “Kazakhstan: Background,” A vailable [Online]: 
<http://w w w .eia.doe.gov/em eu/cabs/kazak.htm l> [12 February 2006],
13 For details see, “Caspian P ipeline Consortium: General Information,” A vailable [Online]:
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and upgrades and the additional pumping stations, CPC is expected to carry 67 million 
tons of oil annually. (1.35 million bbl/d by 2009, 2.5 times the current capacity)
Baku-Supsa
An existing oil pipeline system from the twentieth century which Nobel brothers 
used to transport oil from Baku to Georgian city of Supsa on Black Sea provided an 
opportunity for the transportation of early Azeri oil and in 1998 the construction and 
upgrade of the old system completed with an initial capacity of 115,000 bbl/d.
Baku-Novorossiysk
It runs from the oil terminals outside of Baku to Novorossiysk, passing through 
Chechnya. It had an 180,000 bbl/d initial capacity but the flow of oil had never been 
stable due to the war between Russia and Chechnya.14
Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan
Supported by the governments of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Turkey and 
the United States, Baku-Ceyhan represents one of the biggest projects in the Caspian oil 
development. It runs from Baku to the Turkish marine terminal of Ceyhan at the
<http://w w w .cpc.ru/portal/aliasipress/langien-us/tabID i3357/D esktopD efault.aspx> [31 July 2006],
14 “B aku-N ovorossiysk pipeline ("northern route"), w hich sends approxim ately 50,000  bbl/d o f  Azeri (and 
exclusively  SO CAR) crude oil to the Russian B lack Sea. The Baku-N ovorossiysk pipeline closed briefly in 
late June 2004  after oil thieves set o f f  an explosion  w hen they attempted to steal oil from the pipeline. The 
A zeri state com pany expects to begin reducing oil exports via the B aku-N ovorossiysk pipeline in August 
2005 in order to divert crude to the BTC line, once it becom es operational. Som e A zeri governm ent 
officials have hinted that SO C A R  w ill stop using the N ovorossiysk  route once BTC becom es fully  
operational because it w ill no longer make sense to have higher quality A zeri crude oil m ixing with  
Russian-based Urals blends. The crude oil m ixing has decreased the price o f  pure 'Azeri light' at the port o f  
N ovorossiysk  by as much as $ 4 -5  per barrel. AIOC w ill, how ever, continue to export oil via pipeline and 
rail from Baku to Supsa and Batumi on the Georgian B lack Sea coast.” “Azerbaijan: Background,” 
A vailable [Online]:
< http://ww w.eia.doe.gov/em eu/cabs/azerbian.htm l>  [17 June 2006].
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Mediterranean Sea. 1,780 km (1,100 miles) long pipeline passes through the territories of 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey, and is designed to carry a million bbl/d (50 million tons 
of oil). According to the initial estimates of oil production by the AIOC (Azerbaijan 
International oil Company), Baku-Ceyhan should be able to serve the Azeri needs even 
when the production is expected to peak around 2010-2014.15 “The BTC pipeline project 
cost an estimated $3.7 billion, with BP as operator. The pipeline was officially 
inaugurated at the Sangachal terminal, near Baku, by President Ilham Aliyev of the 
Azerbaijan Republic, President Mikhail Saakashvilli of Georgia and President Ahmet 
Sezer of Turkey, joined by President Nursaltan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan on 25 May 
2005.”16 Almost a year after its start, on June 13, 2006 the first oil loaded onto tankers 
and BTC pipeline officially became fully operational. In the opening ceremony of the 
BTC pipeline, the Turkish President of republic called the project the “Rising Star of the 
Mediterranean.”17
15 The pipeline route passes over 1,768km  (1 ,100  m iles) through the countries o f  Azerbaijan (445km ), 
Georgia (245km ) and Turkey (1,070km ). In doing so it reaches an altitude o f  2 ,800m  as it passes across the 
Caucasus M ountains and East Anatolia. The pipeline crosses the land o f  20 ,000  individuals and com panies 
w ho have been com pensated with a share o f  over $133 m illion for the acquisition o f  rights to the small 
portion o f  their land where the pipeline runs. A lthough the pipeline is underground and the land reinstated 
on top, all that remains v isib le are eight pumping stations (two each in Azerbaijan and Georgia and four in 
Turkey). “Baku-Tbilisi-C eyhan (BTC ) Caspian Pipeline,” A vailable [Online]: 
<http://ww w.hvdrocarbons-teehnology.com /proiects/bp/>  [21 July 2006].
16 BP holds a 30 percent stake in the consortium running the pipeline. Other consortium members include 
Azerbaijan's state oil com pany SO C A R  (25% ), Amerada H ess (2.36% ), C onocoPhillips (2.5% ), Eni (5%), 
Inpex (2.5% ), Itochu (3.4% ), Statoil (8.71% ), Total-FINA-ELF (5% ), TP AO (6.53% ) and Unocal (8.9% ). 
The pipeline was constructed by, and w ill be managed by, the consortium com pany Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan  
Pipeline Company (BTC Co). Ibid. For more details on the technical information about the BTC pipeline 
see “Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Inaugurated on M ay 2 5 ,” P etroleum  E conom ist 72, no. 7 (July 2005).
17 “Turkiye’y i Petrol U ssii Yapan Y tizyihn Projesi Buytik bir Torenle B ajladi,” M illiye t G azetesi, 13 July 
2006 , A vailable [Online] : <w w w .m illivet.com .tr/2006/07 /13 /son /sonsiv l6 .asp> [21 July 2006],




In 1997, the governments of Kazakhstan and China signed an agreement to build
a pipeline from Atasu in northwest Kazakhstan to Alaskanhou in China’s northwestern
Xingjian region to carry Caspian oil to serve the growing energy demand of China. The
project had an estimated cost of 850 million dollars and originally expected to be 
1 8operational by 2006. The first section of the pipeline was completed in 2003 and the 
Kazakh-China pipeline will have an initial capacity of 200,000 bbl/d, which maybe 
expanded to 400,000 bbl/d in the following years. The 1860 km long pipeline faces 
major challenges as it passes through seismically active territories. The Kazakh-China 
pipeline will only carry a small percentage of China’s demand for oil, at about 5 percent 
as China has risen to the world’s second oil consumer.
TCP: Trans-Caspian Pipeline
This is originally intended to carry a 16 bcm/y of Turkmen gas to Turkey through 
a pipeline laid under the Caspian Sea. It was planned to cross the Caspian Sea to 
Azerbaijan and Georgia to the Turkish city o f Erzurum.19 The project initially was 
supported by the governments of the United States, Turkey, Azerbaijan and
18 The pipeline w ill extend 988 kilom eters from the Kazakhstan oil terminal in Atasu to the C hinese railway  
station in Alashankou. Its carrying capacity w ill be 10 m illion tons a year at the first stage, then w ill 
increase up to 20 m illion tons at the second stage and could even reach up to 50 m illion tons in the long  
term. Construction should be com pleted at the end o f  this year, and Kazakhstan hopes to begin the first 
deliveries o f  oil in 2008. A lexander Sukhanov, “Caspian O il Exports Heading East,” C entra l Asia, 9 Feb 
2005 . A lso  A vailable [Online]: < http://atim es.com/atimes/Central Asia/GB09AgQ 2.htm l> [28 A ugust 
2006],
19 See A vrasya  D o sya si TIKA Bulteni, July 1999 and A vrasya  D o sya si T1KA B ulteni (October 1999).
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Turkmenistan to establish another East-West corridor alongside with BTC.20 However 
the Azeri government pulled its support from the project when the issue between 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan turned into a competition for Turkish gas markets after the 
discovery of Azeri gas fields in Shah Deniz.21 Although the parties had optimistic views 
about the project around 1998-99, the disagreement on the side of the Azeri and 
Turkmen government virtually ended the possibility of its implementation especially 
when the Turkmen government cut a deal with Russia on the sale of Turkmen Gas to 
Russia and to other republics through the Russian internal pipeline network.22
INTERSTATE COOPERATION IN THE CASPIAN SEA: THE EARLY OIL DEBATE 
As the investment in oil exploration and development in the Caspian Sea 
continued, the oil producing countries and the oil companies had to work on the 
transportation of current production and the huge volumes expected to be produced in the 
following years. Therefore it is possible to analyze the transportation of Caspian oil and 
pipelines issue in two phases. The first part is about the transportation of small amounts 
of oil to provide revenue for the producers. The second phase represents an important 
stage in the Caspian oil development as it might affect the stability o f the long term oil 
industry and transportation of oil in the region
Despite the existence of differences among the major players, policies o f the 
involved actors proved to be conducive to cooperation during the early phases of the
20 Hakki Buyukbas, “Dunya Siyaseti: Kuresellesm e, B o lgesellesm e ve Turkiye,” A vrasya  D osyasi, no. 1 
(2004).
21 Semih Idiz, “Trans Hazar: Boru Hatlari Konusu Arap Sacina Dondu,” Star G azetesi, 3 April 2000.
22 For more details see John Roberts, “Energy R eserves, Pipeline Routes and the Legal R egim e in the 
Caspian Sea,” in The Security o f  the C aspian  R egion, ed. Gennady Chufrin (O xford U niversity Press,
2001), 3 2 -6 8 .
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negotiation for early oil. Azerbaijan was mainly concerned about securing an outlet for 
its already produced oil. Although Azerbaijan clearly tried to avoid dependence on 
Russia, it also realized the importance of staying on good terms with it for long term 
stability in the region. The role of Russia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the 
Russian involvement in the internal conflicts in Georgia clearly affects the policies of the 
Caspian states. Therefore Azerbaijan was also willing to go for an option in which 
Russia was also included to certain levels such that Russia would not resort to use of 
other means to influence the developments. The main Russian policy was the control of 
the transportation of the Caspian oil for many reasons. First o f all, Russia wanted to 
maintain a superior status in the region. Holding the pipelines for oil export in control 
was seen as a way of maintaining a good level o f influence over the countries of the 
Caspian states and also over the developments in the coming years. The economic 
benefits that would come with the pipelines are undoubtedly an important factor in the 
policies of the involved parties. As the transportation of oil and pipelines would yield 
easy long term benefits, the push for favorable options intensified on all sides. As an 
example to the benefits that host nations collect from these pipelines, “CPC has recently 
presented its Shareholders with a comprehensive investment decision package to support 
expansion of the Project to its full capacity of 67 million tons -  1.4 million barrels a day, 
as was envisaged in the originally approved design of the pipeline system.
Implementation of this project, which will assure the long-term financial success of CPC, 
is expected to generate revenues to the Russian Federation between $16 and $18 billion. 
Since operations began, CPC has contributed $650 million to the Russian budget in taxes, 
fees and contributions. CPC employs directly or indirectly around 1,500 personnel in
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Russia and spends over 85 percent of its annual budget locally.” AIOC in many 
occasions stated its interests and desires to move forward with the most feasible and 
beneficial options. However, in the complex negotiations among the actors, geopolitical 
considerations most o f the time dominated the thinking of the states.
As for the early oil, despite prevalent policies and complexities, the negotiations 
on the pipelines seem to be little bit of a soft confrontation among actors rather than 
being involved in a deadlock situation. For example, the U.S. government also wanted to 
eliminate the dependence of the Caspian states on Russia; however, it did not push for an 
option that would completely exclude Russia from the oil business in the region. As for 
the early oil, the main U.S. policy was the diversification of the pipelines to eliminate a 
complete dependence on a single route. As the Russian government pushed for Baku- 
Novorossiysk as a main outlet for Azeri and Kazakh oil, the United States and the Azeri 
government insisted on the availability of a second route; Baku-Supsa. During the 
negotiations, Baku-Supsa emerged as a second option for the export of early Azeri oil. 
Although an Iranian route as proposed by the government of Iran on many occasions 
could have economically and technically been more feasible and easier for the Caspian 
oil to reach open seas for export, the Americans insisted on two exit routes for the early 
oil and the exclusion of Iran from any type of oil transaction.24 “Zbigniew Brzezinski
23 “Caspian Pipeline Consortium Loaded Its 800th Tanker,” Caspian Pipeline Consortium, Press Release, 
April 7, 2006 . A vailable [Online]:
< http://ww w.cpc.ru/portal/aliaslpress/langien-US/tablD13474/DesktopDefault.aspx> [19 June 2006],
24 The Iranian option includes o il swaps with the Caspian countries. Iran proposes to buy oil from Caspian 
nations for its dom estic use and agrees to pay for it in kind by making it available on Kharg Island for 
export to world markets. The Iranian governm ent awarded an Iranian oil com pany with 350 m illion dollars 
for a pipeline project that w ould connect Iranian port N eka on the Caspian Sea to the refineries in the 
country. The 325 km long pipeline how ever could not materialize because o f  the financial problem s that 
the Iranian governm ent could not finance it on its ow n and the foreign investm ent could not be secured. 
Here is the details o f  the Iranian Proposals for the transportation o f  Caspian oil by w ay o f  Iran:
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delivered a letter form president Clinton to Aliyev stating the American preference for 
the second pipeline while offering assistance for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Shortly 
afterwards, president Bill Clinton placed a phone call to the Azeri President to assert the 
significance to have two exit routes for the early oil. Clinton could also convince 
Aliyev— counter the Baku’s initial interest—to exclude Iran from the early oil 
business.”
After the agreement on the double route for the early Azeri oil, the Baku- 
Novorossiysk pipeline became operational in late 1997 with a capacity o f 340.bbl/d on 
the Russian side. However, the Baku-Novorossiysk line proved to be an unstable route
Phase I: Crude Oil for Tehran & Tabriz Refineries: The com bined processing capacity o f  these two  
refineries currently stands at 350 ,000  b/d w hich are primarily supplied by Iran's northern oil fields and 
further supplanted by a 40 ,000  b/d pipeline directly linked to the Tehran R efinery from N eka port in the 
Caspian Sea. In this phase it is foreseen that a 390km ., 32 inch diameter pipeline w ith a capacity o f  370 ,000  
b/d w ill be constructed from N eka directly to Tehran and subsequently be connected to the Tabriz refinery. 
This plan also foresees the construction o f  oil storage facilities and the reconfiguration o f  the Tehran and 
Tabriz refineries so as to be able to effectively  refine Caspian crude. It is foreseen that the project w ill take 
two years to implement. International Tender documents were released concurrently in Tehran and London  
and evaluations are now  under way.
Phase II: R efinery and P ipeline M odifications: In this phase it is foreseen that the refineries o f  the cities o f  
Isfahan and Arak w ould also be geared towards the processing o f  Caspian crude. To achieve this objective, 
the fo llow ing steps are foreseen:
(I) Reversal o f  the flow  o f  the existing pipeline betw een Tehran to Isfahan and Tehran to Arak.
(ii) Transfer o f  oil from Northern Iran to Tehran via a new  line from Neka, originating from Kazakhstan 
and Turkmenistan and/or a new  route from the Port o f  A nzali or Baku, depending on the oil swap  
applications.
It is thus foreseen that in Phase II, the capacity for crude oil transfers could rise by 450 ,000  b/d. Investment 
is foreseen to take place concurrent with developm ent within the region.
Phase III: N ew  Pipelines: In this phase it is foreseen that Caspian Oil w ould be fully capable o f  being  
transferred to Iran's southern oil terminals after full utilization o f  Iran's northern refineries as w ell as 
existing lines from Isfahan and Arak having a capacity o f  800 ,000  b/d. This can be achieved by:
(i) Reversal o f  the flow  o f  the existing pipelines o f  Isfahan and Arak to Iran’s southern oil terminals.
(ii) The im plementation o f  new  pipelines from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan or Azerbaijan linked to Isfahan 
and Arak.
It is o f  particular note that this Third Phase requires minimal investments in Iran's southern infrastructure as 
there already exists a proven capacity to unload over 5mb/d o f  oil. In sum, the im plementation o f  the above 
three phases can enable the transfer o f  over 1.6 mb/d o f  Caspian oil with minimum delay and expense. Iran 
Trade Point N etwork w ebsite, “G eo E conom ic Factors o f  Oil and G as,” A vailable [Online]: 
< http://www.irtp.com/howto/partner/partner/chap3/chap3v.htm > [July 21 2006].
25 Jofi Joseph, P ipelin e D iplom acy: The Clinton A dm in istra tion ’s F ight f o r  B aku-Ceyhan, W oodrow  
W ilson School o f  Public and International Affairs, Case Study in In ternational D ip lom acy  no. 1 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University, 1999), 16 -1 7 . Cited in Marcus M enzel, D oom ed  to C oopera te: A m erican  
F oreign  P o licy  in the C aspian R egion  (Frankfurt am M ain, Berlin: Peter Lang Publishing, D ecem ber
2002), 78.
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for the Caspian oil as it had not been free o f long interruptions for varieties of reasons. 
One of the main reasons for the interruption of the transportation of Azeri oil through the 
northern Russian route was the ongoing hostility between Russia and the Chechen 
insurgents. The pipeline has been damaged many times during the bombings of 
Chechnya and also the Chechen fighters used it to damage Russian interests in the region. 
In addition to the war that was already destabilizing the region, some people in Chechnya 
used to dig holes to steal oil from pipelines and sell it in the black market.26 The weak 
Russian control over the Chechen territories raised serious concerns over the viability of 
this route for Azeri oil. The concerns about the Russian route were coupled with the fact 
that the Russian port of Novorossiysk had to be closed for 3-4 months during the winter.
The Baku-Supsa pipeline, despite the difficulties and the ravaging costs, began 
operations in April 1999 with a capacity o f 115,000 bbl/d. The cost estimates of the 
pipelines have been proven wrong. In the case of Baku-Supsa, it cost about 600 million
9 7dollars, twice the amount of earlier estimates.
The first phase of the oil transportation and pipeline negotiations was more or less 
smooth and the cooperation among the actors has been achieved. One of the reasons for 
the emergence o f cooperation among actors on the issue was the absence of relative gain 
considerations. The neo-realist theories argue that the states in international arena carry
26 A ccording to the State Oil Company o f  Azerbaijan (SO CA R), a mere 4.3 m illion metric tons o f  oil has 
been exported since shipments began along the Baku-N ovorossiysk route. Oil from Azerbaijan accounted  
for 1 m illion metric tons o f  the total. Experts believe that the pipeline has been operating at 35 percent o f  its 
capacity. A  total o f  120,000 metric tons o f  crude worth $ 5.5 m illion have been stolen from the Baku- 
N ovorossiysk  oil pipeline in Chechnya since the beginning o f  1999. N evasim aya  G azeta  and G udok  via  
N ew s Base, A vailable [Online]: < http://w w w .gasandoil.com /goc/com panv/cnc93206.htm > [14 July 2006]. 
“B aku-N ovorossiysk Operation at 35%, Oil Stolen,” A lex a n d er’s G as an d  O il Connection  4 , no. 14 (June 
1999).
27 Dekm ejian and Sim onian, T roubled  W aters, 37.
28 Realist assum ptions do not accept the existence o f  ethic or morality in international relations and state 
behavior. A s Morgenthau puts it, “R ealism  maintains that U niversal moral principles can not be applied to
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9Qrelative gain considerations. It is not only about what they gain from a transaction 
between/among states, it is also the fact that what others gain and how much their gain 
affects the existing power balance among states. As it goes from this assumption that if 
the gain of others is considered to be higher, then the states may prefer to abstain from
-J A
cooperation. Menzel argues that in the discussions for early oil it was the absolute gain 
that prevailed. “Indeed a strict relative gains orientation would have impeded if not
o  1
killed cooperative endeavors at a rather early stage of pipeline development.” In the 
case of early oil, the Russian government focused on the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline and 
did not oppose Baku-Supsa as the bulk of the oil was planned to flow through the 
northern route. The United States joined by Turkey, mainly focused on the 
diversification of the pipelines and Baku-Supsa as an alternative to Baku-Novorossiysk. 
Joseph Stanislaw and Daniel Yergin argue that “tight oil market is vulnerable to shocks in
IT
a way that an oversupplied market is not.” Although Azerbaijan wanted to be less and 
less dependent on the Russian pipeline system, under the prevailing circumstances and 
the United States’ willingness to compromise, Azerbaijan agreed on the double route. It
the actions o f  states in their abstract universal formulation, but they must be filtered through the concrete 
circum stances o f  tim e and place.” Morgenthau, P olitics A m ong N ations, 50.
29 Mearsheimer, “The False Promise o f  International Institutions.”
30 A ccording to realist paradigm, it is the nature o f  the international system  w hich is anarchy that prevents 
international cooperation. It stem s from the fact that “states seek absolute gains and worry about 
com pliance. H ow ever realists find that states are positional not atom istic, in character, and therefore realist 
argue that, in addition to concerns about cheating, states in cooperative arrangements also worry that their 
partners might gain more from cooperation than they do.” Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Lim its o f  
Cooperation: A  R ealist Critique o f  the N ew est Liberal Institutionalism ,” in C ontroversies in In ternational 
Theories: R ealism  a n d  the N eo libera l C hallenge, ed. Charles W. K egley, Jr. (N ew  York: The M acm illan  
Press Ltd., 1995), 152.
31 M enzel, D oom ed  to C oopera te , 81.
32 A li Gungor and Ersel Aydinli, “The Dual Pipeline: Cooperation V ersus Com petition,” C aspian  
C rossroads M agazine  2, no. 1 (Spring/Sum m er 1996).
33 Joseph Stanislaw and D aniel Yergin, “Oil: R eopening the D oor,” F oreign A ffairs 72, no. 4 (Septem ber/ 
October 1993), 91.
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was also the fact that, Azerbaijan was in an urgent need to find an outlet for the produced 
oil to provide revenue for the future investments for the development of the reserves.
Since each country focused on absolute gains, the outcome was a cooperative 
behavior. Although Russia secured the biggest portion of the oil transportation, the 
United States and Azerbaijan did not focus on that part which indicates that they did not 
carry relative gain considerations. The outcome could be interpreted as a win-win 
strategy that could be better explained by the neo-liberal school of thought. Relative gain 
considerations did not dominate the policies of the negotiating parties which eventually 
made it easy for them to achieve cooperation.
As for Iran and the United States, the situation was just the opposite. Relative 
gain considerations and zero-sum thinking determined the nature o f the entire United 
States-Iran relationship. The U.S. government used its resources to exclude Iran from 
Caspian oil business and pipeline discussions despite the fact that the Iranian option 
appealed to Azeri government and oil companies at the beginning. According to the 
Iranian scholars, Iran is the most logical and feasible outlet for Caspian oil considering 
the advantages it offers compared to the other options especially BTC. Nasri states that 
“not only the Caspian oil and gas be exported cheaper in terms of transportation costs but 
it can also reach both Europe and the huge Asian market.”34
The U.S.-Iran situation would be an example for state interaction from a neo­
realist perspective as each state pursued a relative gain policy and tried to eliminate the 
involvement/influence of other in the affairs of the region. A gain for Iran is seen as a
34 Narsi Ghorban, “B y  W ay o f  Iran: C aspian’s Oil and Gas Outlet,” in The C aspian  R egion  a t a  C rossroad: 
C hallenges o f  a  N ew  F rontier o f  E nergy an d  D evelopm ent, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi (Palgrave 
M acmillan, 2000), 154.
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loss for the United States and therefore the U.S. government used its power to persuade 
Azeri government and oil companies to exclude Iran.
After all the negotiations for the transportation of early oil, the actors were able to 
achieve cooperation because each party accepted to modify their policies according to 
others. While Russia accepted the inclusion of a second route other than the Baku- 
Novorossiysk, Azerbaijan accepted the U.S. proposal to exclude Iran. The United States 
although did not want to give Russia a big share in the transportation of Azeri oil, for the 
stability o f the region and the apparent need for urgent settlement, agreed on the northern 
route.35
From a stand point of international relations theories, we might also conclude that 
the number of actors also affected the likelihood of cooperation in the early oil debate. In 
the case of early oil, the number of actors in the negotiations could be considered small; 
which facilitated the achievement of cooperation.36
Another aspect of the issue is the shadow of future.37 In the case of case of early 
oil discussions, the compromises made by the negotiating parties could be understood by 
the existence of an understanding by which actors expected to interact with each other in 
the future. Since this was all about the transportation of early oil, the actors wanted to 
prepare a ground for the transportation of main oil. Adjustment of policies by each state
35 Three m illion tonnes o f  Azeri crude through the B aku-N ovorossiysk pipeline 2005 . Braemar Seascope 
Saturday, July 08 2006 . Braemar Seascope reports that Azerbaijan hopes to export a minimum o f  3 m illion  
tonnes o f  crude oil through the B aku-N ovorossiysk pipeline this year. Under the agreement, signed with  
Russia in 1997, Azerbaijan can export up to 5 m illion tones per year through the line. H ow ever, the 
alternative Baku-Supsa pipeline is cheaper to use, charging a transit tariff o f  only $3.20 per tonne, 
compared to $15 .67  per tonne to N ovorossiysk. Another disadvantage for the Azerbaijanis using the 
N ovorossiysk  line is that their high quality A zeri crude is blended with lower grade Russian crude to make 
Urals Blend, w hich sells at a discount o f  about $ 4 -5  pmt lower than pure A zeri crude. Braemar Seascope, 
“Three M illion T ones o f  A zeri crude through the Baku-N ovorossiysk Pipeline 2 0 0 5 ,” A vailable [Online]: 
< http://w w w .intertanko.com /tem plates/Page.aspx?id=331 3 1> [21 September 2005],
36 Kenneth A. O ye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypothesis and Strategies,” in C oopera tion  
under A narchy, ed. Kenneth A . O ye (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U niversity Press, 1985), 19.
37 Ib id , 13 -18 .
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and oil companies could be viewed from this perspective as well. Menzel asserts that “the 
shadow of the future loomed large because the negotiations for the main export pipelines 
MEP had yet to commence and the early oil deals could therefore serve as a test. This 
implies that the United States could not, at this stage, exit from agreement without 
suffering, in Crawford’s term, a reputational loss disadvantaging Washington’s 
negotiation position for the main oil in the future.
The stake in the early oil was not so high, compared to the economic benefits
39expected from the transportation of main oil. The countries involved in the early oil 
negotiations had high hopes about the main oil and main export pipelines (MEP). Russia 
considered Baku-Novorossiysk as a success and expected the MEP pass through Russia. 
However, the number o f actors in the second phase of the pipeline negotiations for the 
main oil increased as with the stakes at hand.
MAIN EXPORT PIPELINES (MEP) AND COOPERATION
Starting with the Production Sharing Agreements, the search for the main export 
line(s) has gone through several stages of complex state interaction. The early stages of 
the developments could be characterized as the complete absence of coalition with the 
existence of multiple proposals, and routes pushed by different governmental and non­
governmental actors. Although the involving countries and oil companies started to 
define their interests, there was not a strong center or a coalition nor a regime existed to 
determine the rules o f negotiations for the main export pipelines. The friendly
38 M enzel, D oom ed  to C oopera te , 83.
39 The Azeri Production o f  oil was not too high as it could bee seen from the numbers below .
1 9 9 2 .2 2 2 .2  1 9 9 3 ,2 0 6 .5  1 9 9 4 ,1 9 1 .2  1 9 9 5 ,1 8 0 .5  1996,180.3 1997,179.9
1 9 9 8 ,2 3 6 .7  1 9 9 9 ,2 8 3 .6  2 0 0 0 ,2 8 8 .6  2 0 0 1 ,3 0 8 .9  2 0 0 2 ,3 1 7 .8  2 0 0 3 ,3 2 7 .6
2 0 0 4 .3 1 9 .2
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environment emerged throughout the negotiations over the transportation of early oil 
started to fade as each actor in the Caspian Sea petroleum development realized the 
nature of the MEP issue. It was no longer a win-win scenario as it was the case with 
early oil. The main pipeline would not possibly benefit all the involved parties. As there 
would be winners of the game, there was going to be some losers out of all this MEP 
negotiations. Having realized this fact, the actors in the game started competing over the 
main export pipelines. Starting with 1997 and on, the countries of Caspian Sea 
(including Russia and Iran), the United States and Turkey fiercely fought over their 
preferred route for the transportation of Caspian oil. Despite the fact that there has been a 





Other than these proposals, Bulgarian Black Sea route of Burgaz and Greek port 
of Alexandropoulos on the Aegean Sea have been considered as an option by the AIOC.40 
As the number of proposals increased, the completion over the MEP intensified.41 This 
has also pushed the Caspian oil producing countries in a difficult situation. They had to 
choose a route for the main export pipeline and at the same time deal with the pressures 
coming from powerful neighbors and external powers. Kazakhstan, for its part expressed 
its support for a Western route as long as it was commercially feasible and at the same
40 See Hugh Pope, “Azerbaijani Leader Favors Pipeline B acked by U .S .,” cited in “R eb uff to R ussia,” The 
W all S tree t Journal, 9 M ay 1999.
41 “With so many options and so many com peting interests, it is hard to predict where the pipelines w ill 
run.” Zenny M inton B edoes, “A  Survey o f  Central Asia: Pipeline Poker,” The Econom ist, 7 February 1998, 
1 1 .
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time Kazakh government displayed interest in the Iranian route.42 These were interpreted 
as a way o f throwing off of the Iranian pressure or maintain a level o f friendship with the 
neighbor countries. Azerbaijan acted similarly and expressed its desire on a route that 
would commercially be viable.43
Although it has been stated that the decision for the MEP would be based on 
commercial viability and technical feasibility, the involvement of external players and the 
nature of the issue at stake, geopolitical considerations took precedence.44 This was 
especially visible in the policies of the Turkish government who rejected any option other 
than Baku-Ceyhan. With the United States backing up Turkish government, the Baku 
Ceyhan route became one of the main issues of discussion among the states and the oil 
companies. Although the United States had been trying to play a role of an impartial 
arbiter, its support for Baku-Ceyhan and Turkish government changed the dynamics of 
relationships in the Caspian MEP discussions. American policy on the MEP is also 
geopolitically oriented contrary to the oil companies whose policies are based on 
commercial viability and cost-benefit analysis. Opponents of BTC criticized the 
American government for its support for BTC, a project that is not economically feasible 
and not the most efficient.45
42 “Iran Offers Transport Routes for Caspian O il,” C aspian  Business R eport 2 , no. 15 (A ugust 1998).
43 “The developm ent toward a com petitive, com m ercial environm ent and em ergence o f  multiparty, 
m ultilevel negotiations betw een states-as- and oil com panies-as-actors with diverging interests, i.e. 
com m ercial interests m ainly o f  the oil com panies opposed to geopolitical interests o f  nation states, 
enorm ously com plicated and slow ed dow n prospects for an early or readily predictable outcom e on main 
export pipelines.” M enzel, D o o m ed  to C ooperate, 90.
44 Andrew I. K ilgore, “Ideology Triumphs E conom ic E fficiency, as the Baku-Tbilisi-C eyhan Pipeline 
O pens,” Special Report, The W ashington R eport on M iddle E ast Affairs, A ugust 2005.
45 Hooman Peimani, The C aspian  P ipelin e D ilem m a: P o litica l G am es a n d  E conom ic L osses  (W estport, 
CT: Praeger, 2001), 77.
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TURKEY AND THE BAKU-CEYHAN PIPELINE
The involvement of Turkey as a regional actor in the MEP negotiations proved to 
be a decisive factor in the future of the interstate relations/negotiations in the Caspian 
region over the pipeline issues. Turkey, as a regional power, has close ties to the 
countries of the Caspian region. The historical friendship and kinship with Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is one of the driving forces behind Turkey’s enthusiasm to 
reestablish close ties with these countries.46 Starting with the break up of the Soviet 
Union, Turkey supported the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus by being one of 
the first to recognize their independence. Ever since, Turkish governments made 
continuous attempts to increase political and economic relationships.47 The newly 
independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus were seen as brother countries by the 
Turkish people, and the Turkish governments tried to provide every possible help to these 
countries with their transition to being an independent state and to democracy. Turkey 
also assumed a role model for these countries after their independence.48 In fact, this was 
also welcomed by the littoral states of the Caspian Sea as they needed every possible help 
to consolidate their place as an independent country.49 Although both sides here had high 
hopes about the possibilities of close relationships and Turkey being a primary caretaker 
for these countries, the availability of political and economic resources limited the extend 
of interstate relationships between Turkey and the Turkic states in the Caspian Sea and
46 Pinar E geli, “B izim  Icin A sya  N edir?” A vrasya  E tudleri, no. 26, 2004.
47 Orhan M orgil, “Y eni Turk Cumhuroyetleri ve Turkiye Ekonom ik Iliskileri,” in Balkanlar, K afkasya ve  
O rta d o g u ’da  G elism eler ve  Turkiye, ed. Erol M anisali, Uluslararasi Girne Konferanslari, Kibris 
Arastirmalari V akfi, no. 10, 1994.
48 Busra Ersanli, “Cok Boyutlulugun Y eniden Kesfi: Turkiye’nin Turk Cumhuriyetleriyle Isbirligi A rayisi,” 
in Turk C um huriyetleri ve  P e tro l Boru H atlari, ed. A laeddin Y alcinkaya (Istanbul: Baglam  Yayinlari,
1998).
49 Kamer K asim , “Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Caspian O il and Regional Pow ers,” in The P o litics o f  
C aspian  O il, ed. BUlent G okay (N ew  York: Palgrave, 2001), 189 -90 .
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the Central Asia. Soon they realized the need for a broader framework for transition to 
being an independent state after years of Russian rule. Despite the fact that, Turkey 
could not provide the resources needed by the former Soviet republics,50 it presented 
itself as a door to the Western World as a NATO country and a long time ally of 
Washington.51 Nevertheless, Turkey continued to support these countries as best as it 
could and established strong relationships in economic and political arenas.52
When it comes to the negotiations for pipelines, Turkey moves from the very 
same stand point where it sees itself as a natural outlet for these countries.53 For Turkish 
people and Turkish government, a pipeline that will carry Azeri petroleum, Turkey must 
be the first choice among others, considering the level of closeness between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan.54 Therefore Turkey, starting with 1992, has strongly been supporting the 
Baku-Ceyhan as a main export pipeline for the Caspian oil. Any alternative to this option 
fiercely opposed by the Turkish governments on several grounds.
50 Som e Turkish scholars also claim  that the inability o f  Turkey to provide a broad range o f  help in many 
areas is not actually related to the absence o f  sufficient amount o f  resources in Turkey. They tend to put 
the blame on the Turkish governm ent asserting that Turkey had no vision over the course o f  developm ents 
in the region. The lack o f  a grand strategy com plicated our initiatives in the Caspian and Caucasus area and 
caused Turkey to be unsuccessful compared to what w e could have done considering that fact that turkey 
has certain advantages over the region compared to other external countries. See D en iz Kutluk, H azar  
K afkas P etrolleri, Turk B ogazlari, C evrese l Tehdit 16 (Istanbul: Turk D eniz Arastirmalari Vakfi, 2003), 
5 0 -5 1 .
51 Fuad H useyinov, “Avrupa B irligi Turk Cumhuriyeleri Iliskileri ve Turkiye,” A vrasya  E tudleri 21 (2002).
52 Turkish minister Ahad A ndican also confirm ed the fact that Turkey has m ade certain m istakes with  
respect to the policies over the region and the relationship with these countries, emanating from the fact 
that the internal problem s inside the country prevented Turkey from taking an active role in the regional 
affairs. He also m entioned the lack o f  experience on the side o f  Turkey to involve in the affairs o f  other 
countries and regions compared to the other great powers in the world w ho have had vast experience for 
centuries. “Kafkaslar, Orta D ogu Avrasya Perspektifinde Turkiyenin Onem i Sempozyum u: Sorular 
Cevaplar” (Istanbul: Harp Akadem ileri Y ayini, 1998), 2 3 4 -3 5 .
53 For more details on the Turkish approach to the region see A laeddin Yalcinkaya, ed., Turk 
C um huriyetleri ve  P e tro l B oru H atlari (Istanbul: Baglam  Yayinlari, 1998).
54 Both countries speak Turkish language which, Azeri is the c loses to the language spoken in Turkey. 
Kasim, “Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Caspian Oil and R egional Powers,” 185. A lthough m ost o f  the Azeri 
people are Sh i’as, it never constitutes a problem in terms o f  establishing close ties in different realms.
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First, from the very beginning of the pipeline negotiations, Turkey has been 
complaining about the intense tanker traffic on the Bosporus where more than 12 million 
people lives. The status of the Istanbul straits had been determined by the Montreux 
Treaty in 1936. The treaty proposes free passage to commercial ships and only gives the 
right to Turkey to close it during wartimes against enemy warships.55 Therefore Turkey 
has no right to intervene in the passage of oil tankers through the Turkish straits 
(Dardanelles).56 After 1990, the traffic on the Bosporus intensified and this has caused 
several serious accidents that threatened the city life in Istanbul.57 Turkish government 
stepped up and introduced certain regulations to control the passage of heavy loaded 
ships, however these regulations could not help to solve the existing problems as the
CO
traffic through the straits increased each year. Potential threats posed by accidents still 
affecting city life in Istanbul and also around Marmara Sea and Dardanelle.59 The Turkish 
argument on the basis of high traffic on the Turkish straits indicates the very fact that, 
transportation of Caspian oil through Turkish straits will increase already tight traffic 
which would eventually increase possibility of accidents and oil spill into the sea.60
55 A s it is proposed by the first article o f  the M ontreaux Treaty “The High Contracting Parties recognize  
and affirm the principle o f  freedom o f  transit and navigation by sea in the Straits.”
56 Full text o f  the Treaty can be located at: Turkish Maritime Pilots A ssociation  W ebsite, A vailable  
[Online]: < http://www.turkishpilots.org/DOCUM ENTS/m ontro.htm l>
[21 A ugust 2005],
57 For more details on the accidents and incidents where serious threat was posed to human life, see Kutluk, 
H azar K afkas P etrolleri, Turk B ogazlari, C evrese l Tehdit 16, 8 -1 2 . Zaman G azetesi reports a recent 
incident that a big disaster w as barely prevented in Istanbul. Zam an G azetesi, 22  February 2006. Turkish 
M edia has numerous reports on the incidents that posed serious threat to human life in Istanbul from the 
passage o f  the giant oil tankers through Bosporus. See for exam ple Zaman G azetesi, 13 February 2004.
58 For details o f  these regulations see Kutluk, H azar Kafkas Petrolleri, Turk Bogazlari, Cevresel Tehdit 16, 
176-232 .
59 Ors and Y ilm az argue that “Oil spills from tankers, sm all or large, have resulted in considerable damage 
to the environment. I f  no major damage to human population took place, there is no guarantee that w e are 
spared forever.” Haluk Ors and Server Levent Y ilm az, “O il Transport in the Turkish Straits System , Part 
II: A  Simulation o f  Contamination in the Dardanelles Strait,” E nergy Source  26 (2004): 175.
60 Ahmet Ozturk, “From Oil Pipelines to Oil Straits: the Caspian Pipeline Politics and Environmental 
Protection o f  the Istanbul and the Canakkale Straits,” Journal o f  Southern a n d  the B alkans 4 , no. 1 (2002): 
59.
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Throughout the negotiations, Turkey used this card continuously to extract some support 
for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline that would carry a million barrel per day. Some people 
however challenge the Turkish argument on the ground that the bulk of the Caspian oil 
will still be carried by oil tankers through Turkish straits since the Kazakh oil is already 
flowing through Novorossiysk. The construction of CPC and the completion of Russian- 
Kazakh oil network through Novorossiysk take up most of the oil production in the 
Caspian Sea region.61 Therefore the argument is that, still most of the Caspian oil has to 
go through Turkish straits despite the fact Baku-Ceyhan will carry a million barrel to 
Mediterranean. According to the proposed levels of production, the Caspian oil 
production is expected to be around 200 million tons per year which 50 million tons of 
the oil will be carried by the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. This amounts to only 22 percent of
/r-\
the total Caspian oil production. As we see from the numbers, the Caspian oil is still 
expected to put a lot of pressure to tanker traffic on the Turkish straits.63 Nevertheless, 
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline might still be able to reduce certain amount of traffic and relieve 
the pressure over the Turkish straits. As it looks from the Turkish perspective, this issue 
will continue to be on agenda when it comes to negotiations over pipelines for the 
Caspian oil.64 Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated in the grand opening 
ceremony o f the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline on July 13 2006, that Turkey will pursue other
61 Zeynep G ogus, “Ceyhanin Rakibi N ovorossisk ,” Sabah G azetesi, 29 Eylul 1997.
62 The numbers might change slightly as the new  discoveries are made and the production capacity 
increased around Caspian Sea.
63 The Russian side did not agree with the Turkish arguments. D espite the Turkish insistence on the issue 
o f  Traffic on the Bosporus, the Russian side did not quite agree w ith the Turkish com plains and blamed 
Turkish governm ent for introducing tight m easures to regulate the passage from Istanbul strait. For more 
details on the opposition to Turkish arguments, see F elix  N . K ovalev, “Transportation o f  Caspian O il 
Through R ussia,” in The C aspian  R egion a t a  C rossroad: C hallenges o f  a N ew  F rontier o f  E nergy an d  
D evelopm ent, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi (Palgrave M acm illan, 2000), 159.
64 For more statistical information on the high traffic that has been increasing in the Turkish Straits and 
possibility o f  oil spills and accidents; see Ors and Y ilm az “O il Transport in the Turkish Straits System , Part 
II,” 167-75 .
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options for carrying Kazakh and Russian oil through another pipeline project from 
Samsun ( a Turkish city on the Black Sea) to Ceyhan.65 If Turkish government can bring 
other parties together on the project, it is quite possible that the tanker traffic might be 
reduced to safer levels. However, these would require the cooperation of the Russian and 
Kazakh government, although Kazakhstan would accept such proposal, Russia may not 
pursue this option because of other political considerations.66
Another reason that Turkey has been so enthusiastic about Baku-Ceyhan as a 
main export pipeline for the Azeri petroleum is the fact that, the direction of the pipelines 
has become an issue of geopolitical importance. The country that the pipeline goes 
through will have a political influence over the region and the regional affairs. Turkey, 
Russia and Iran have long competed for establishing influence over the region. Svante E. 
Cornell argues that “the building of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline constitutes a 
strategic milestone in post-Soviet Eurasia. In the first place, the pipeline’s construction 
will have major implications for the South Caucasus, especially as regards its role in 
European and World Politics. For everyone involved, within as well as in every 
direction from the South Caucasus, the building o f the BTC pipeline reconfigures the 
mental map with which political observers and decision-makers look at the world. 
Azerbaijan and Georgia will see their futures in more direct relation to Europe through 
the umbilical cord that BTC constitutes.”68 Russia as the successor of the former Soviet
65 M illiyet G azetesi, 13 July 2006.
66 R ussia’s resentment over Baku-Ceyhan was visib le from the opening cerem ony o f  the Baku-Ceyhan 
pipeline. A lthough the other countries were represented at high diplomatic levels, Russia did not 
participate at ministry level; only the Russian ambassador to Turkey was present. “ 15 Y illik  Ruya Gercek 
Oldu,” Zam an G azetesi, 14 July 2006.
67 DPT, Turkiyenin U yeliginin AB ’y e  M uhtem el E tkileri (Ankara: D PT Yayinlari, 2004).
68 Svante E. Cornell, M amuka Tsereteli and Vladimir Socor, “Geostrategic Im plications o f  the Baku- 
T bilisi-C eyhan,” in The B aku-Tbilisi-C eyhan P ipeline: O il W indow to the W est, eds. S , Frederick Starr and 
Svante E. Cornell (John H opkins U niversity Press, 2005), 17.
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Union sees the region as a natural sphere of influence. Any attempt by outside powers is 
seen as a setback for Russian control in the region. Among the other political and 
military games that have been played in the region over the course o f developments, the 
MEP issue has become an issue of influence and reputation. The country that controlled 
the direction o f MEP would be in a better position to exert influence over the regional 
affairs. Turkey has long been striving to be an important actor in the region through the 
establishment of economic and political links. Baku-Ceyhan pipeline presented itself as a 
big opportunity for Turkey to gain an important status in the region. As the early oil was 
agreed to go through Russian territories and neither Turkey nor the United States wanted 
to see Russia establishing full control over the future of Azeri oil.69 It was also a priority 
for Azerbaijan to break away from Russian stranglehold, and during the negotiation for 
MEP, Azerbaijan sided with Turkey and the United States.70 Turkish struggle for 
geopolitical influence is also related to domestic politics in Turkey.71 Turkish 
governments have long tried to establish an eminent position in the Caucasus and the 
Caspian region. The issue of pipelines, Baku-Ceyhan, became an issue of reputation for 
Turkey. From 1990s to 2007, Turkish government changed hands many times. Each 
political party made it a high priority for itself to complete the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline
69 Russian scholars argue that the Russia phobia in the Caucasus-Caspian region is unwarranted. K ovalev, 
“Transportation o f  Caspian Oil Through R ussia,” 159.
70 Turkish prime minister referred to a corridor that BTC establishes that “BTC w ill not be only a pipeline 
that carries petroleum but also a golden line that links the countries o f  the region to each other. It w ill help  
to improve our relations at political and econom ic areas. “ 15 Y illik  Ruya Gercek Oldu.” See also M illiyet 
G azetesi, 13 June 2006.
71 The policies follow ed by Turkey set an exam ple to Realist explanation for struggle for power. The 
realist paradigm assum es the existence o f  a struggle for power and influence in international arena. States 
also try to prevent others from gaining power which in such settings achievem ent o f  cooperation becom es 
very difficult. A s Morghantau puts it, “A ll Politics, dom estic and international reveals three basic patterns; 
that is all political phenom ena can be reduced to one o f  the three basic types. A  political policy  seeks to 
either to keep power, to increase power and to demonstrate pow er.” Morgenthau, P olitics am ong N ations, 
50. He also asserts that “struggle for power is universal in tim e and space and is an undeniable fact o f  
experience.” Ibid., 36.
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project. The governments thought that it could also increase their popularity as a political 
party that was able to achieve such a big and beneficial project for the country.72
In fact, the rising Turkish enthusiasm for the project, for some people, has harmed 
Turkish interests in the negotiations as the oil companies (AIOC) used it as a leverage to 
extract more benefits by asking for reduced tariffs and land right prices. Turkish 
governments have been criticized by giving big concessions during the negotiations to the 
oil companies and also providing subsidies for the project when the cost estimates passed 
the initial projections.73 Although the United States also supported the Baku-Ceyhan 
project, it never accepted providing financial support. Turkish scholars also criticized the 
American policy of providing infinite political support during the negotiations for MEP 
but abstaining from giving out subsidies for the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.74 Some argued 
that Turkish government knowingly accepted the lower tariffs and provided additional 
support on the ground that this project is an important step for the Caspian states to 
export oil and build up wealth and break away from the Russian and the Iranian 
influence.75 This is also in the Turkish interest to see the exclusion of Russia and Iran 
from the MEP and therefore the Turkish attitude and compromises should be considered 
from this perspective. Dr. Kutluk content this view by asserting that the aforementioned 
points were also in the American interests but the U.S. government never promised any 
financial contribution to the project.
72 N ejdet A . Pamir, “Baku-Ceyhan Boru Hatti,” Avrasya Stratejik Arastirmalar M erkezi (A SA M ) Yayinlari 
(Ankara: Kirali M atbaasi, 1999), 11.
73 N ejdet A . Pamir, Baku C eyahan Boru H atti ve  O rta  A sya  ve K afkasyada  B itm eyen Oyun, Avrasya 
Stratejik Arastirmalar M erkezi (A SA M ) Yayinlari (Ankara: Kirali Matbaasi, 1999).
74 M enzel, D oom ed  to C oopera te , 63
75 See Suha Bolukbasi, “Ankara’s Baku-Centered Policy: Has it Failed?” The M iddle  E ast Jou rnal 51, no. 1 
(W inter 1997).
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Regardless of the discussion about the material and financial benefits that will 
come from BTC to Turkey, the project in fact will deliver certain financial benefits to 
Turkish people in the long run. As Mr. Erdogan explained in his speech, Turkey will 
receive a 250-300 million a year from the BTC pipeline, other than the employment and 
the profits to be made for the maintenance of the long pipeline.76
Dr. Kutluk is also critical of the oil companies which, despite the increase in oil 
prices, heavily bargained on the tariffs that the host nations will receive. 77 On the day 
that the BTC first started loading on the Ceyhan port, Turkish newspapers praised the 
capacity of the Ceyhan port (160 million ton) as the biggest in Europe even passing
7 8Rotterdam. It is also expected that Ceyhan could be a center for the oil industry that 
would greatly benefit Turkey.
As it could be seen from the explanations above, Turkey followed a strict self- 
interest policy during the negotiations for MEP.79 As we have mentioned before, any 
other option has been strongly rejected by the Turkish government and especially after 
1997 and onwards, Turkey used every possible policy to achieve its aim, including 
pressuring the U.S. government to use its power and influence over BTC option. There 
has been no sign of a possibility for a compromise for MEP as far as Turkey is 
concerned.
76 “Tiirkiye’yi Petrol U ssii Yapan Y uzyihn Projesi Buyuk Bir Torenle B ajladi,” M illiye t G azetesi, 13 July 
2006. Dr. Kutluk states that, despite the fact than BTC pipeline is longer than Kerkuk-Ceyhan, the material 
benefits that Turkey gets from BTC is lower, referring to the low  tariffs rates Turkey accepted. Kutluk, 
H azar K afkas P etrolleri, Turk B ogazlari, C evrese l Tehdit 16, 108-112 .
77 Ibid., 105-107 .
78 “T urkiye’yi Petrol UssU Yapan Y iizyilm  Projesi Bttyttk Bir Torenle B ajladi,” M illiye t G azetesi, 13 July 
2006.
79 “Realism  v iew s the modern state as a rational actor engaging in strategic action with other states. A ll 
states are taken to be structurally motivated to advance their respective national interests on the basis o f  
their power in an anarchical international system .” B aldev Ray N ayer, “R egim es, Power and Institutions,” 
In ternational O rganization  49, no. 1 (W inter 1995): 141.
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Since the number o f actors in the whole MEP negotiations was big, the possibility 
for a common solution was considered very thin. Despite the fact that Turkey did not 
play a big role during the early years of oil development and transportation of early oil, 
Turkey emerged as one o f the main centers of the negotiations for the MEP discussions. 
One of the results of strong Turkish approach to the issue was the slowing down of the 
developments. Considering the fact that the negotiations for the main export pipeline 
started as early as 1994-95 and ended around 2001 and completed in 2005, the attitude 
and policies of the involved actors particularly slowed down the advancements of the 
negotiations over MEP. The same kind o f attitude was also visible on the policies of 
other actors in the MEP negotiations.
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE PIPELINE DILEMMA
The United States as an external power took a more or less impartial role during 
the negotiations for early oil but changed the course of its policies fundamentally and 
provided full support for the BTC and Turkey. American foreign policy in the Caspian 
region is formulated around the exclusion of Iran from any oil business, therefore 
preventing Iran from extracting any lucrative benefits, controlling and limiting Russian 
influence in the region, protecting the interests of American oil companies and ensuring
the smooth transition of newly independent states to democracy and market economy
• • 80 ♦while helping them to consolidate their independence. Some of the interest listed
above overlaps with the interests of Turkey. Turkey has been a dependable ally for
80 For more details on the American foreign policy  in the Transcaucaus region, see Gawdat Bahgat, 
A m erican O il D ip lom acy in the P ersian  G u lf an d  the C aspian  Sea  (G ainesville: U niversity Press o f  Florida, 
2003), 167. See also United States Senate, Hearing before the Subcom m ittee on International E conom ic  
Policy, Export and Trade Promotion o f  the Com m ittee on Foreign Relations, “U .S. Energy Security: Russia  
and the Caspian,” 30 April 2003 , 4.
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Washington since the end of the World War II. When it conies to the MEP negotiations, 
Turkey and the United States supported the same agenda and tried to counter the Russian 
and the Iranian alternatives and their influence in the region. Energy security is an 
important issue for the United States and the diversification of the energy supplies and 
reduction of dependence on Middle Eastern oil is an important aspect of achieving this 
aim. The American approach to Caspian is interpreted within this venue that extraction 
of the Caspian oil in a smooth and steady way may provide additional resources for 
consumption. Although this view is challenged by some people on the ground that the 
Caspian oil is no way close to be an important source for diversification of oil supplies, 
the U.S. government continuously supported a smooth and a healthy oil development in 
the Caspian Sea region and openly supported Baku-Ceyhan route as a main export 
pipeline.81
American involvement in the MEP issue is also related to the control of Russian 
hegemony over oil outlets as Russia possesses certain advantages coming for the 
historical establishments and its geographical location vis-a-vis to Caspian and Central 
Asian states. In addition to these, Russia was already controlling the early oil pipelines 
from Caspian Sea and the Kazakhstan’s oil export line, including CPC. Under the 
circumstances, the U.S. government alongside with Turkey and Azerbaijan favored a 
different route that would not fall under the Russian control. Although the Iranian route 
seemed to be the shortest and the cheapest according to the analyses made by European 
companies, the U.S. policy to isolate Iran left no ground for any Iranian option for MEP.
81 At its peak level, Caspian oil production is estimated to be around 3 -5  percent o f  the total world oil 
production.
2 Zbigniew  Brzezinski, The G ran d  C hessboard, A m erican P rim ary an d  its G eostra teg ic  Im peratives  (N ew  
York: Harper Collins, 1997), 129.
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Considering the directions of the developments and the heightening tensions between the 
United States and Iran over nuclear plants and Iran’s support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, 
any policy change on the U.S. side towards Iran in the coming years is not expected.83 
American licensed oil companies are forbidden to get into any type of business 
transaction with Iran, exceeding 20 million dollars. ILSA (Iran Libya Sanction Act 1996) 
serves this purpose and designed to control Iranian involvement in lucrative projects.
This represents an important aspect of non-cooperation in the region as it simply ignores 
the Iranian side and their policies. Overall, we could assert that the nature of the 
relationship between United States and Iran has long been an important impediment to 
the achievement of a general cooperation in the region in terms of developing the energy 
resources of the Caspian Sea. The deepening of the tensions between Iran and United 
States has negatively affected the prospects for a larger scheme of cooperation in the 
region.
Despite the fact that the BTC option is longer and more expensive,84 under the 
circumstances the U.S. government accepted the BTC option as the most reliable and safe
oc
exit for the Azeri oil and possibly for Kazakh oil from Kasghan reserves. The 
American policy on MEP and its push for support from oil companies has been criticized
83 See Gawdat Bahgat, “The United States and Iran: Prospects for Rapprochement,” in A m erican O il 
D iplom acy in the P ersian  G u lf an d  the C aspian  Sea  (G ainesville: U niversity Press o f  Florida, 2003), 103— 
140.
84 For an extended cost-benefit analysis o f  the pipeline proposals, see Ronald Soligo and A m y M yers Jaffe, 
“The Econom ics o f  Pipeline Routes: The Conundrum o f  Oil Exports from the Caspian B asin,” in The 
C aspian Region: P resen t an d  Future, ed. Y elena Kalyuzhnova et al (Palgrave M acm illan, 2002).
85 There have been concerns over the security o f  the BTC pipeline especially  it passes through som e areas 
where there has been som e internal conflicts betw een insurgents and host nations. The internal problem s in 
Georgia long lasting quarrels betw een the Abkhazian and Georgian created som e concerns over the security 
o f  BTC. In addition to this, the PKK issue in Turkey raised som e fears about the stability o f  the flow  over 
BTC line. H ow ever, the governm ents o f  these countries took important steps in clearing som e o f  the 
existing issues for the security o f  the pipeline. The PK K  issue is no longer a serious thereat to BTC  
security since the arrest o f  the leader o f  the organization. Under the circum stances, the possib ility  o f  
interruption o f  the flow  o f  oil through BTC pipeline is very low  considering the security precautions taken 
by the host governments.
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by the company executives. One of the main criticisms directed at the U.S. government 
was that the United States supported the BTC pipeline but was not willing to provide any 
financial support. As some Turkish scholars did, oil companies in the region also blamed 
American government for not providing any subsidy for the costly project. Nevertheless, 
the discovery of Kasghan reserves and the increasing oil prices after 1995 worked as an 
incentive for oil companies to drop their opposition to the BTC after long years of 
dragging their feet.
RUSSIAN RESISTANCE TO BTC AND NEGOTIATIONS OVER MEP
However, the Russian opposition to BTC never stopped and Russia kept pushing 
for the northern option that goes through Novorossiysk. Russian opposition to East-West 
corridor is related to many factors. One of them is the Russian fear o f loosing influence 
over the course of developments in the Caucasus and Caspian region. The fight for the 
MEP turned into a great competition between Russia and the U.S.-Turkish alliance. It 
was considered to be a game where winner takes all. Historically, Russia dominated the 
region especially after the arrival of Putin into Kremlin, Russia intensified its pressure 
over the Caspian affairs. Policy of Near Abroad proposes the continuation of the Russian 
sphere of influence in Central Asia, Caucasus and the Caspian region. A move by 
Western states or regional powers, i.e. Turkey, is considered as a direct threat to Russian 
interests in the region. The activities of the Western oil companies are considered to be a 
deliberate act of placing a wedge between Russia and ex-dominions. Because of these 
considerations, Russia strictly opposed to other options for the MEP that would not pass 
through Russian territory. The Russian activities in the Caucasus and the Caspian region
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were directed to force the regional states to comply with the Russian requests in favor of 
the northern route. Russian support and transfer of a billion dollar value of weapon to 
Armenia during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Russian activities in Georgia 
have been seen as an indirect way of Russian pressure over the issues related to the main 
export pipeline.86 According to Aydin, Russia “decided to keep Azerbaijan weak and on 
the defensive”87 to achieve its aims in the region.88
The second reason that Russia insisted on the northern route is related to the 
financial benefits associated with the pipelines. Once the pipelines have been laid, it 
provides continuous and easy revenue for the host country. Despite the fact that Russia 
has one of the largest oil and gas reserves in the world, Russian economy is still in need 
of support.
Nonetheless, the Russian arguments in favor of the northern route have been 
challenged on several grounds. The first and the foremost concern over the Baku- 
Novorossiysk pipeline option is the issue of security. During the fight between Chechnya 
and Russia, the pipeline has been damaged and sabotaged by the Chechen insurgents. 
They have also used the pipeline to threaten the Russian military operations in the region. 
Additionally, the local people developed a habit of breaking into the pipeline to steal oil.
86 It is assumed that M oscow  was behind the operations that resulted in the overthrow o f  E lcibey  
Governm ent (E lcibey has been known for his strong pro-Turkish policies) in Azerbaijan in 1993 after he 
has com pleted som e oil deals w ith western com panies. The successor A liyev  barely escaped a coup attempt 
after the signing o f  the D eal o f  the Century in 1994 with a consortium o f  W estern oil com panies. 
A ccording to Bolukbasi, M oscow  has also been blam ed for two coup attempts against Elchibey's successor 
A liev, w hose opposition to the reintroduction o f  Russian military forces in Azerbaijan m ay have prompted 
M oscow  to act. The first coup attempt took place in late September 1994, w hen the Azerbaijani deputy 
interior minister Roushan Javadov, in collusion  with Prime M inister H useinov challenged the A liev  
administration. A liev  quelled the revolt, and H useinov escaped to M oscow .62 Javadov, w ho was pardoned 
by A liev, challenged him again in March 1995, but the coup failed and Javadov w as killed during the 
clashes. (Bolukbasi “Ankara’s Baku Centered Transcaucasia P olicy .”
87 A ydin, “Oil, P ipelines and Security,” 17.
88 For more details on the Russian activities to maintain its influence in the region see Arslan, H azarin  
K urtlar Vadisi, 125 -253 .
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Despite the fact that Russia insisted on the Baku-Novorossiysk as MEP for Azeri oil, it 
could not provide a safe and a secure passage for the transportation of Azeri oil. Another 
hurdle for the Russian side was the Novorossiysk port itself. Due to the climate 
conditions, the port had to be closed at least 3-4 months a year. Considering the 
conditions and concerns stated above, the Azeri government and oil companies did not 
want to commit themselves to a highly problematic route, although the northern route 
was cheaper than the BTC.89 Azerbaijan and AIOC opted for BTC which seemed to be 
much more stable and yet costlier.
The American support for Azeri government and also its insistence on BTC 
helped Azeri government to move forward with the western route.90 We could also 
mention the fact that the Caspian countries particularly avoided Russian alternatives due 
to the fact that they indeed wanted to loosen Russian control over their countries. 
However, the situation for Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan is different. Their dependence 
on Russia is way greater than the Azeri people. Among these states, Kazakhstan depends
89 D espite the fact that B aku-N ovorossiysk pipeline has a capacity o f  180.00 on Azeri side and 340.000  b/d 
on the Russian side, Azerbaijan Oil Company have not been able to utilize it to its full capacity due to the 
interruptions because o f  the Chechen conflict. During 2 0 0 4 -0 5 , AIOC transported 50.000 b/d o f  oil 
through this pipeline. On the other hand, Baku-Supsa has a capacity o f  115.00 b/d and later expanded to 
250.000  b/d. A ccording to a report by A lex a n d er’s G as a n d  O il C onnection  (1999), “A  spokeswom an for 
the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIO C) said that the new  Baku-Supsa pipeline was 
pumping oil at its full capacity o f  115,000 barrels per day. The AIOC had originally planned to bring the 
early oil pipeline up to full capacity in June o f  this year, Tamam Bayatly said. A ll construction work on the 
pipeline itse lf has been com pleted, and the sixth and final pumping station along the Baku-Supsa route was 
finished earlier in M ay, she added. AIOC officia ls have said they are eager to make good use o f  the new  
pipeline, particularly since the Russian state pipeline operator Transneft appears to be having trouble 
keeping the B aku-N ovorossiysk pipeline— the consortium's only other export outlet— open. The northern 
pipeline has been shut dow n repeatedly since the beginning o f  the year. Frequent interruption o f  service is 
not the only drawback o f  the northern pipeline; Transneft charges the AIOC and SO C A R  $ 15.67 for every  
ton o f  oil transported from the Azerbaijani border to N ovorossiysk. B y  contrast, the cost o f  shipping one 
ton o f  crude from Baku to Supsa through the new  pipeline has been figured at only $ 2 -3  per ton. The 
westward-leading pipeline m ay becom e even more econom ic i f  the AIOC builds new  infrastructure 
facilities; w ith extra pumping stations and storage facilities at the Baku and Supsa terminals, industry 
experts say, the pipeline could handle 250 ,000  bpd.” “Baku-Supsa Pipeline R eaches Full Capacity Ahead  
o f  Schedule.”
90 Without the support from the U .S. and Turkish governm ent, it could have been remarkably d ifficult for 
Azerbaijan to resist Russian pressure for the B aku-N ovorossiysk option.
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on Russia the most. Kazakhstan has also the largest reserves among the Caspian 
countries excluding Russia and Iran. For the Kazakh oil, Russia is the only natural outlet 
under the current conditions. For this very basic reason, Kazakhstan’s attitude towards 
Russia has been a lot more conciliatory compared to other countries of the region. 
Kazakhstan has to use the existing Russian pipelines to be able to export its production.91
Q9Although it has been quite difficult for Kazakhstan to deal with Russia , they have come 
a long way with regard to the use of internal Russian pipeline network, compared to the 
early years of independence. With the competition of CPC (Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium) Kazakhstan now is able to transfer large volumes of oil to the Russian port 
of Novorossiysk.
Russia for long dragged its feet over the construction of CPC pipeline that was 
planned to carry oil from Kazakh Tengiz fields to the port of Novorossiysk at Black
QTSea. When things really started moving in favor of BTC, Russia found itself in a 
position where it has to make certain moves to keep up in the competition. That is when 
Russia cleared up some o f the issues with CPC; which Kazakhstan, Russia, and Chevron 
(one of the biggest American oil company) came to an agreement on the details of
91 Another important reason that forces Kazakhstan to be mindful o f  its policies towards Russia is its 
sizable Russian minority in the country. A ccording to CIA W orld B ook o f  2006 , the Russian minority  
takes up 30 percent o f  the Kazakh population. A vailable [Online]: 
<https://w w w .cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kz.htm l> [2 April 2006],
92 A s early as 1993, Kazakh officia ls were openly com plaining that the new  post Soviet regim e in Russia  
w as taking advantage o f  its pipeline m onopoly to make Kazakhstan to pay a heavy price for its reliance on 
Russian gas line system . ...n o t only Russia dud Russia use its m onopsony purchaser to force Kazakhstan to 
accept only a fraction o f  the world price for gas entering Russia from western Kazakhstan, it also used its 
position as m onopoly shipper to force the Kazakhs to pay much higher price for gas exported from R ussia  
to eastern Kazakhstan. Roberts, “Energy R eserves, Pipeline Routes and the Legal R egim e in the Caspian  
Sea,” 79.
93 One o f  the reasons for Russian policy  is the idea that any oil that goes through R ussia from Kazakhstan 
to world oil markets works against Russian share in the oil market. H aving seen the Kazaks as their 
competitors, the Russians used their advantages to create problems to Kazakhstan and therefore extract 
more benefits. It was also the desire o f  Chevron and the Kazakh governm ent to develop a pipeline that 
goes through R ussia as the only natural outlet but less and less Russian control is given  to Russians.
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proposed pipeline.94 On October 13, 2001 the Kazakh oil reached to Black Sea and 
started loading onto tankers. The CPC pipeline has been completed by 2003 and started 
its regular operation.95 As the activities of the Western companies increased in the 
Caspian Sea area, Russia kept making new moves to counter the Western influence and 
also to be able to participate in the oil business in the region. Another step taken by 
Russia was the re-establishment of natural gas transaction with Turkmenistan. At a time 
when TCP (Trans Caspian Pipeline) had no promise for Turkmenistan, Russian proposal 
was welcomed by the Turkmen government. The negotiation of the deal and the 
agreement between the two countries officially ended the prospects for TCP. This was 
considered as a victory for Russia while it was seen as a setback for American and 
Turkish interests. Turkmenistan, although wanted to stretch towards western direction, 
was frustrated by several developments in the Caspian Sea. First of all, Turkey promised 
to buy large amounts of Turkmen gas from Turkmenistan to be transported by a pipeline 
built under the Caspian Sea.96 This project was also supported by the American 
administration mainly because the TCP project would further reduce Russian influence
94 It was probably after the integration o f  the Russian oil com pany LUKOIL into the CPC project as a 
shareholder that the Russians started m oving towards cooperation. Roberts, “Energy R eserves, Pipeline  
Routes and the Legal R egim e in the Caspian Sea,” 82.
95 CPC has a com plex organizational structure. Three Governm ents and ten com panies representing seven  
countries participate in the project. Two join t stock com panies— CPC-R (R ussia) and CPC-K  
(Kazakhstan)— have been created to im plement the project. CPC Managers and specialists are from  
shareholder com panies. The initial construction o f  the pipeline w as funded by o il producing shareholder 
com panies, com bined with the assets provided by the host governments. Future pipeline capacity  
expansions w ill be financed from the C PC’s revenues. “Caspian Pipeline Consortium: General 
Information,” A vailable [Online]:
<http://ww w.cpc.ru/Dortal/aliaslpress/langlen-us/tabIDi3357/D esktopD efault.aspx>  [17 September 2006]. 
The Structure o f  CPC Shareholder Capital is the follow ing: R ussia-24% ; K azakhstan-19%; Om an-7% ; 
Chevron Caspian Pipeline Consortium C o.-15% ; LUK AR CO  B .V .-12 ,5% ; M obil Caspian Pipeline C o -  
7,5%; R osneft-Shell Caspian Ventures L td.-7,5% ; A gip  International (N .A .) N .V .-2% ; Oryx Caspian 
Pipeline LLC -1,75% ; B G  Overseas H oldings Ltd.—2%; Kazakhstan Pipeline Ventures LLC -1,75% . 
“Caspian Pipeline Consortium: CPC Structure,” A vailable [Online]:
< http://ww w.cpc.ru/portal/aliaslpress/langlen-US/tabID 13360/D esktopD efault.aspx>  [17 September 2006],
96 A ccording to the original proposals, Turkey promised to buy 16 bcm /y natural gas from Turkmenistan.
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over the region and also prevent any Iranian involvement in the Turkmenistan, Russia 
and Iran fiercely opposed to such a project on the ground that it might cause serious 
ecological damage to the Caspian Sea as the base of the sea was known to be seismically 
active and not very steady. The further discovery of Azeri natural gas in the Shah Deniz 
area in the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijan’s desire to sell this gas to Turkey complicated the 
project when Azerbaijan pulled its support from TCP in favor o f its own benefits. 
Frustrated by these, Turkmen President Saparmurat Turkmenbashi blamed the U.S. 
government for favoring Azerbaijan over Turkmenistan and approached to the Russian 
offer in 2000, despite the fact that the deal with Russia had certain downsides.97 The 
Turkmen gas is delivered to domestic market in Russia and to other former Soviet
QQ
Republics, which are not able to pay their debt in hard currency.
Another successful move by Russia during the negotiations for main export 
pipeline is the completion of Blue Stream Project with Turkey. Turkey and Russia 
agreed on the construction of a pipeline that would carry large amounts of Russian 
natural gas to Turkey.99 Despite the technical and financial difficulties that was expected 
to slow down the project, the consortium was able provide finance in a short period of 
time. To everyone’s surprise, the project started as soon as the parties agreed on the
97 Here one o f  the reasons that no serious project has been developed for Turkmen gas and oil production is 
that, it is the inability o f  the Turkmen governm ent to attract foreign investors through making certain 
political and regulatory adjustments at dom estic level.
98 The stand o f f  betw een R ussia and Ukraine is a clear exam ple o f  the situation m entioned above. Russia  
stopped transferring natural gas to Ukraine due to the disagreem ent on the price o f  the natural gas. Russia  
has been selling gas to Ukraine for and charging quite less than the world market average. (50$  per 1000 
cm where Russian sale to other countries were around 240$  for the same amount. M illiye t G azetesi, 4 
January 2006 . W hen the dom estic politics in Ukraine follow ed a different track than what R ussia expected, 
R ussia decided to treat Ukraine the sam e w ay and increased to prices to 230$ . W hile R ussia was charging 
230$  per 1000cm  for Russian natural Gas, the custom ers for Kazakh and Turkmen natural gas paid 95$. 
Zaman G azetesi, 5 January 2006.
99 Ironically, Russia initiated a project that involves laying pipes under Black Sea w hile it w as opposing to 
the TCP project on the ground that undersea pipelines m ay bring ecological damage to the Caspian Sea and 
the marine life.
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terms and conditions.100 These moves by Russia are said to compensate what Russia had 
lost on the other side of the Caspian oil business namely the direction of the main export 
pipeline. The new deals and intense Russian involvement in the Caspian oil strengthened 
the Russian position in the whole picture. However, the U.S.-Turkish alliance won the 
second round when the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey signed an 
agreement on the construction of BTC in 1999 in Istanbul.101
OIL COMPANIES AND IRAN
In fact Russian policies were not the only factor that stalled the negotiations for 
the main export pipeline. The oil companies that invested in the Caspian Sea also created 
serious problems for the development of the negotiations over BTC. One of the main 
differences between the oil companies (Despite they are mostly American based oil 
companies) and the governments (both regional and external) is the fact that the oil 
companies are profit minded. They would like to move into the direction where they
109could extract more revenue from investments. Unlike the oil companies, the 
governments of the regional and external countries had secondary or tertiary agendas. 
Geopolitical considerations most of the time took precedence over economic gains. As 
the fundamental way of thinking differed, the oil companies and the governments had
100 The Turkish governm ent has been criticized by the Turkish scholars and journalists for their inability to 
bargain a good deal out o f  the B lue Stream Project. W hile Russia sold its natural gas to European 
Countries for about 150$ per a 1000cm , Turkey paid 260$ for the same amount w hile the Russian sale to 
other countries averaged around 240$ . M illiye t G azetesi, 4 January 2006.
101 The President o f  the U nited States B ill Clinton was also present in the cerem ony to show  the support o f  
the United States and its com m itm ent to the project. Signed in 1999, alm ost 3 years o f  heavy negotiations 
and preparations, “On 18 Sept.2002, the construction o f  Baku-Ceyhan starts in a cerem ony hosted by the 
Azerbaijan president. The pipeline is 996 m illim eters in diameter, it w ill be 1760 km, and it w ill be ready 
som etim e in 2 0 0 5 .” A ghai-D iba, “Baku-Ceyhan P ipeline.”
102 See Svetlana Tsalik and Robert E. Ebel, C aspian  O il W indfalls: Who W ill B enefit, C aspian  R evenue  
Watch, Open Society Institute Central Eurasia Project (M ay 2003). A lso  see D avid I. Hoffm an, 
“Azerbaijan: The Politicization o f  O il,” in E nergy an d  C onflict in C en tral A sia  a n d  the C aucasus , ed. 
Robert M enon and Rajan Ebel R owm an (Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000).
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certain issues to deal with, which eventually slowed down the developments of oil 
business in the region. First of all, when it comes to the MEP issue, the oil companies 
opted for the easiest and the cheapest option. As it was commonly accepted, Iran is the 
closest and the cheapest route for the export of Caspian oil. A pipeline from Baku could 
be linked to the internal Iranian network which would then find its way to Arabian Sea. 
During the negotiations for the MEP, Iran proposed many alternatives for the 
transportation of Caspian oil and tried to use every possible option to work its way for a 
better outcome for Iran. Although the Iranian proposals have been dismissed by the 
governments of the United States and Turkey, without even being given serious 
consideration, it created some confusion on the side of the oil companies and the regional 
governments.103 The U.S. government had to provide incentives for the Azeri 
government to disregard any Iranian proposal with respect to the export of Caspian oil.104 
The American government also had to apply pressure to oil companies not to consider 
Iran105 as an outlet for the Caspian oil export.106 The reason for the U.S. attitude towards
103 Rob S. Sobhani, “President C linton’s Iran Option,” C aspian  C rossroads M agazine  1, no. 1 (Winter 
1995). On the issue o f  oil com panies vs. the U .S ., see Nadr Entessar, “Iran: G eopolitical Challenges and the 
Caspian R egion ,” in O il an d  G eopolitics in the C aspian  Sea  R egion , ed. M ichael P. Croissant and Billent 
Aras (W estport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 174.
104 The United States was able to persuade Azeri governm ent on double route and exclusion  o f  Iran form  
Caspian oil developm ent through establishing linkages betw een issues. B y  prom ising to provide help on 
the conflict betw een Armenia and Azerbaijan, the United States w as able to secure Azeri support. Robert 
Axelrod and Robert K eohane argue that “linkage can be beneficial to both sides in negotiations and 
facilitate the agreem ents that might not otherwise be possib le.” Robert A xelrod and Robert O. Keohane 
“A chieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in C oopera tion  U nder A narchy, ed. 
Kenneth A. O ye (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U niversity Press, 1985), 239.
105 H ow ever, “Former U .S. W hite H ouse national security adviser Z bignew  Brzezinski says American  
efforts to isolate Iran and keep Caspian oil pipelines out o f  that country could push Tehran into 
collaboration with R ussia to exclude western presence from the region. B rzezinski, w ho headed the 
national Security C ouncil under President Jimmy Carter, told a Senate Foreign Relations subcom m ittee 
W ednesday that i f  the U .S . wants a stable Persian g u lf  and central A sian region, “som e gradual 
accom m odation is in the mutual interest o f  both countries.” RFE/RL, W ashington, 9 July 1998.
106 The relationship betw een states and non-state actors started to change as the importance o f  the non-state 
actors in world politics started to rise. In the case o f  BTC and oil com panies, the oil com panies had to 
change their policies despite the fact that for long they perceived it against their interests. It all com es 
dow n to the fact that in areas o f  high politics, states w ill alw ays force the non-state actors to com ply with
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Iran is obvious but some say that an Iranian option would direct the Caspian and Middle 
Eastern oil through the same outlet (Hormuz Strait) which would not make any sense if 
the Caspian oil is expected to provide diversification for imports. It is also the fact that 
Hormuz strait is already crowded with the transportation of huge Middle Eastern oil, and 
additional burden would not be a wise choice considering the issue from a perspective of 
Global Energy security. Iran, for its part kept maneuvering during the negotiations for 
MEP. Iran tactically sided with Russia from time to time and proposed easy access to 
Iranian oil network. Even then, the Iranian proposal for swapping the Caspian oil for its 
domestic use in the northern and central parts of Iran and making it available in the south 
for export to world markets, has been seen as a favorable option especially by the oil 
companies and Turkmenistan as well.
Iran and Russia created an alliance against American and Turkish side; however 
they were also indeed rivals considering the MEP as a single outlet. Therefore this 
alliance did not continue throughout whole discussions as their interests conflicted with 
each other. Russia and Iran share the same interests when it comes to slowing down the 
developments. It could also be said that, Iran from the very beginning knew that the 
American government would not allow any Iranian option to materialize but kept 
working on different options as a way of stalling the developments through creation of
♦ 107  •confusion on the other sides. The idea behind stalling the developments was that they 
could maybe get a better deal in the future rather than accepting BTC as a main outlet. In
their policies. For more details on the d iscussions about the rise o f  transnational actors and power o f  states; 
see Thomas Risse-K appen, “Structures o f  Governance and Transnational Relations: What W e Have 
Learned?” in B ringing T ransnational R elations B ack In: N on-State A ctors, D om estic  S tructures an d  
In ternational Institutions, ed. Thomas Risse-Kappen (N ew  York: Cambridge U niversity Press, 1995), and 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. N ye, Jr. “Transnational Relations and W orld P olitics,” in T ransnational 
R elations an d  W orld P o litics, ed. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. N ye, Jr. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1972).
107 For more on Iranian Approach, see Peimani, The C aspian P ipelin e D ilem m a, 1 -121 .
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fact oil companies also hoped for a change in the future and expected a more favorable
solution rather than going for BTC, the western route. This mentality and expectations
stalled the developments of MEP discussions until it became clear that the U.S.
government and persistent Turkey will not go for a different alternative. With the rise in
the oil prices after 1995-96, the oil companies dropped their opposition to costly BTC 
108project. With the accumulation of enough support and finance, the parties agreed on 
the construction of BTC as a main export pipeline for the transportation of Azeri oil and 
possible Kazakh oil from Kasghan reserves.
BTC: A DREAM COMING TRUE
Early years of negotiations for BTC have been marked with so many questions 
and confusions. People has pessimistic views about BTC coming into reality, even there 
have been number of people talking about BTC pipeline in terms of pipe dreams.109 One 
of the points that need to be taken into consideration is the continuous U.S. support and 
Turkish insistence on the project. With the changing environment and increasing oil 
prices, BTC pipeline was chosen to be the main export pipeline in 1999. Even then it 
took six years to materialize because of the unexpected problems (most of them are 
related to political, economic and technical challenges) on the way. The issue of finance 
has been one of the main problems that the actors in the process had to deal with for a 
long period of time. The Turkish flexibility on the issue has helped the project to move
108 Roberts, “Energy R eserves, Pipeline Routes and the Legal R egim e in the Caspian Sea,” 84.
109 Martha Brill O lcott, “P ipelines and Pipe Dreams: Energy D evelopm ent and Caspian Society” Journal o f  
In ternational A ffairs 53, no. 1 (Fall 1999): 305; Manana K ochaladze, “Pipeline Dreams: The World Bank 
Oil D evelopm ent and Environmental Protection in Georgia,” M ultinational M on itor  23 (5 M ay 2002). See 
also N ancy Lubin “Pipe Dreams: Potential Impacts o f  Energy Exploitation,” H arvard  In ternational Review , 
Harvard International Relations Council (22 March 2000). After years o f  debate it seem s the 3-billion- 
dollar Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline project w ill go ahead, or w ill it? Som e industry experts remain 
unconvinced. Jon Gorvett. “Pipeline dreams?” The M iddle E ast 38, no. 2 (N ovem ber 2002).
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on. Out of schedule but steady, the BTC pipeline has been completed in May 2005 and 
AIOC started loading the pipeline with oil. It took a year to fill the BTC pipeline to its 
full and first tanker was loaded on 13 June 2006, at the Turkish port of Ceyhan on 
Mediterranean.
The grand opening ceremony of BTC itself showed the importance o f project for 
Turkey and for Azerbaijan and the other parties who took part in the process.110 The 
leaders of the three countries depicted the BTC pipeline as a golden link that brings these 
countries together. Although not planned at the beginning, the establishment of the BTC 
pipeline may have helped to strengthen the economic and political relationship among 
these countries as well.111
CONCLUSIONS
Blessed with large amount of oil and gas reserves, Caspian states found 
themselves in a dilemma right after they gained their independence. Apart from the 
technical and technological difficulties that they had to deal with to extract the natural 
resources, the transportation of oil to world markets presented to be one of the most 
difficult problems for the newly independent states. Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and 
Turkmenistan do not have direct access to outside world and therefore are dependent on
110 The importance given to this project by the participating countries and the U nited States as an outside 
supporter o f  the project was quite visib le from the amount o f  effort spent for the cerem ony and the security 
measures taken for the diplomatic representatives o f  guest countries. In the cerem ony, Turkey was 
represented at the highest diplom atic level w ith the participation o f  the President o f  the Turkish Republic, 
Prime M inister and several other ministries. Azerbaijan and Georgia were also represented by their 
Presidents. The cerem ony was v iew ed by 400  journalists and reporters and Turkey and BP alm ost spent 
3.6 m illion dollars for the w hole cerem ony including the concert given by Mariah Carey. Zam an G azetesi 
reported this event w ith a title o f  15 year Dream Came True (“ 15 Y illik  Ruya Gercek Oldu.”)
111 Turkish President A hm et N ecdet Sezer in his speech during the opening cerem ony o f  the BTC pipeline 
indicated that the pipeline w ill play an important role in the very strategic geographical location where 
m ost o f  the w orld’s oil is produced (referring to M iddle East and Caspian) and that B TC  w ill be one o f  the 
cornerstone o f  the developm ents that provides stability in the region by connecting the regional countries 
together. Zam an G azetesi, 14 July 2006.
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the cooperation of neighbor countries. As soon as the western oil companies started 
investing, they also started looking for ways to export Caspian oil. Although at the 
beginning limited amount of production was somehow exported either trough swaps or 
railroads, further discovery of new recourses and expected increase in the oil production 
necessitated the construction of oil pipelines that would link the Caspian states to the 
open seas. (See tables below for the Caspian oil and Gas Production across recent years.) 
However, the issue o f pipeline proved to be one of the most difficult and troublesome 
issues that they had to deal with. As the construction of pipelines involves neighboring 
states, the number of actors increased naturally which at the end caused complications.
Table 7:
Oil Production: Caspian States
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Russian F. 304.8 323.3 348.1 379.6 421.4 458.8 470.0
Azerbaijan 13.8 14.0 14.9 15.4 15.5 15.7 22.4
Kazakhstan 30.1 35.3 40.1 48.2 52.4 60.6 63.0
Turkmenistan 7.1 7.2 8.0 9.0 10.0 9.6 9.5
Source: BP Statistical Review o f  World Energy 2006, Unit: In Million Tones
Table 8:
Gas Production: Caspian States
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Russian Fed. 551.0 545.0 542.4 555.4 578.6 591.0 598.0
Turkmenistan 21.3 43.8 47.9 49.9 55.1 54.6 58.8
Kazakhstan 9.3 10.8 10.8 10.6 12.9 20.6 23.5
Azerbaijan 5.6 5.3 5.2 4.8 4.8 4.7 5.3
Source: BP Statistical Review o f  World Energy 2006, Unit: In Billion Cubic Meters
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In the Caspian context, the transportation of Azeri and Kazakh oil went through 
two distinct stages. The first stages o f pipeline construction involved a limited amount of 
early oil from the offshore Azeri fields. The stake was not so high considering the daily 
pumping capacity of the pipeline projects. The limited number of the actors at the first 
stage, helped to the achievement o f cooperation in a fairly short period o f time. As we 
have discussed earlier, the willingness of the United States, Russia and Azerbaijan to 
come to a middle ground by making certain compromises further ameliorated the 
achievement of an acceptable solution. States did not have relative gain considerations as 
the stake at hand was not so high and the shadow of the future loomed large. Each party 
focused on what they wanted most, not on what others might get.
On the other, hand the second phase of the pipeline development turned out to be 
totally different.112 As states and oil companies prepared for a main export pipeline, each 
party in the game favored an option that served their interest best.113 It was either 
northern or western or the southern route that the Caspian oil would be carried. The 
benefits associated with the realization of their objectives is considered to be big and the 
loss is believed to be huge. The zero-sum thinking dominated the MEP negotiations 
throughout most of the decade.114 With regard to cooperation on the MEP issue, we
112 Faruk Arslan depicts the Caspian region as a “V alle o f  the W olves” for the rivalry and intense 
com petitions over the Caspian. Arslan, H azarin  K u rtlar Vadisi: P e tro l Im paratorlugundaki Guc Savaslari.
113 Hooshang Amirahmadi considers the rivalry in the Caspian region as a negative force that creates 
further hazard for the future security o f  the region. He argues that “the current positions held by major 
players involved often ignore this com plexity in favor o f  narrowly defined strategic and econom ic interests 
largely informed by the shortsighted anim osity, rivalry or alliances.” Amirahmadi, “Pipeline Politics in the 
Caspian R egion ,” 163. H e also claim s that the one sided choice made by U .S.-Turkish alliance w ill further 
the split betw een regional countries by excluding Russia and Iran, w hich w ould eventually endanger the 
security in the region. (Ibid., 167-69)
114 A s Robert A xelrod and Robert O. Keohane suggest, “achieving cooperation is difficult in world politics. 
There is no com m on governm ent to enforce rules, and by the standards o f  dom estic society, international 
institutions are weak. Cheating and deception are en d em ic .... W orld politics is not a hom ogeneous state o f  
war: cooperation varies am ong issues and over tim e.” A xelrod and Keohane “A chieving Cooperation under 
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” 226.
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consider that the cooperation has not totally been achieved considering the fact that 
Russia and Iran never accepted BTC route as a main outlet for the Caspian oil. One of 
the purposes of this chapter was to find out the reasons for the lack of interstate 
cooperation over energy development in the Caspian Sea region. In that context, we may 
assert that one of the most essential reasons for the absence of interstate cooperation (this 
also involves state and non-state actors) is the relative gain considerations which drew 
actors away from each other as each actor tried to exclude an option that might advantage 
others. The U.S. policy to exclude Iran and to limit Russian control of the future of oil 
developments in the region and in the same line, Russian policy to maintain a sphere of 
influence in the region by limiting the presence of Western powers clearly indicates a 
relative gain policy by each state. In a setting where actors are obsessed with relative 
gain thinking, cooperation among actors is not expected to occur. In the case of MEP 
negotiations, cooperation among all the involved parties has not been achieved.
However, the United States was able to deliver its promise to Turkey on the realization of 
BTC by applying pressure on the oil companies to bring them to the table.115 Within this 
context, we might argue that the United States had to use its hegemonic power to 
convince oil companies and regional countries (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan) to accept
114 See Amirahmadi, “Pipeline Politics in the Caspian R egion ,” 13-18 .
115 The project also has been supported by Israel and Jewish lobby. Andrew K illgore argues that Israel 
wanted to prove that Turkish alliance with Israel pays o f f  in different areas. K ilgore, “Ideology Triumphs 
E conom ic E fficiency, as the Baku-Tbilisi-C eyhan Pipeline O pens,” 32. See also Suat Taspinar, “Turkiye- 
Israil Ittifaki,” Sabah G azetesi, 1 September 1997. For more information on the lobbying activities o f  
Caspian states and oil com panies in the United States to get American support in favor o f  their own  
interests, see Stone H. Peter “Caspian W ells Com e in for K Street,” N ation al Journal 31, no. 11 (March
1999): 680. (Info Trac One File. Thom son Gale. Old D om inion University Library. 8 Aug. 2006), 
http://find.galegrouo.com .proxv.lib.odu.edu/itx/infom ark.do?& contentSet=IAC-
Docum ents& type=retrieve& tablD=T002& prodld T rO F & d ocld -A 543Q 9521 & source:=gale&srcprod==ITOF 
& userGroupNam e=viva odu& version^ 1.0
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
131
BTC as a main outlet; and also Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan not to consider 
oil transaction with Iran.
In addition to this is the self interest considerations of the actors involved in the 
negotiations. While Russia pushed for the northern route, the U.S, Turkey and Azerbaijan 
insisted on the western route. On the other hand Iran proposed its own territory as a 
passage for the Caspian oil produced by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and some of the oil 
companies have inclined towards Iranian side as the Iranian proposals seemed to be 
shorter and cheaper. This has created an environment in which multiple actors interacted 
with fundamentally different and conflicting interests. Considering the existence of 
varieties of alternatives each state leaning towards one direction, the expected 
cooperation among the actors has been at its best slow to emerge.
Another reason that might explain the slow emergence of cooperation on the MEP 
issue is the number of actors participated in the negotiations. The number of actors in the 
MEP discussions increased and the likelihood of cooperation diminished. A large group 
of state and non-state actors with different agenda and concerns did not produce an 
environment that is readily conducive to cooperation. Therefore; we may argue that the 
number of actors in the MEP negotiations also prevented the emergence of cooperation 
among the involved actors in a short period of time.
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Figure 2: Existing and Projected Pipelines
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CHAPTER V
CONFLICTS IN THE CAUCASUS AND CASPIAN OIL DEVELOPMENT
Throughout the history, the Caucasian region has been dominated by outside 
powers. The transcaucasian region has been ruled by the Turkic Empires, Persians, and 
the British and finally fell in to the hands of the Soviets.1 With the arrival of Communist 
Russia, the region has been included under the Soviet Union; theoretically abolishing the 
nation states. The issue of internal borders and the existing conflicts among the 
neighboring states has been suppressed during the Soviet era. The Soviet rhetoric of 
brotherhood under communist umbrella did not quite help to the elimination of the 
existing disputes related to land and border. But the strict and heavy handed Soviet 
policies helped these issues to be frozen for a long period of time. Through the end of the 
Soviet Union and after its break up, the existing issues in the Transcaucasian region 
began to emerge. As the Soviet Russia lost its power and control of the former republics, 
these states had to deal with internal and external issues. Caught in the phase of transition 
to independence, the issues of minorities and autonomous regions have caused a great 
deal of problems for the Transcaucasian states. Although some of the issues purely 
remained as an internal issue of nation states, the extent of the violence and the potential 
for spread to regional states internationalized the conflicts.2
1 “The Caucasus's com plex and shifting m ix o f  cultures, religions and nationalities, has long been a source 
o f  potential instability. A s a rule, its com m unities have lived in harmony only, w hen peace has been  
im posed by an outside power. For the past one hundred and fifty  years, that power was the Russian empire 
and its successor, the Soviet U nion.” Quoted in A lishov  Dadash Rahim, “The R ole o f  Caspian Oil in 
M aintaining Stability in the Caucasus Region: In the Case o f  M ountainous Karabakh C onflict.” (Ph.D. 
diss., K eele University, U K , 1999). See also “Transcaucasia: H ell is Other P eople,” S trategic Survey  
(1 9 9 3 -1994 ): 89.
2 Sokolsky and Charlick-Paley, N ATO  an d  C aspian Security, 13.
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In this chapter, I will mainly focus on the conflicts and subsequent wars between 
different ethnic groups and states in the Caucasian region, especially the conflict between 
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians which had the greatest impact on the 
course of the developments in the region. By looking at the consequences o f these wars 
and violence, I would like to assess the impact of these conflicts on the achievement of 
interstate cooperation in the Caspian region over the issues related to the development of 
Caspian oil. The long-lasting conflicts in the region prevented the early development of 
the oil industry and the flow of foreign direct investment. The countries of the Caspian 
Sea were in serious need of foreign investment for oil extraction in the offshore oil fields, 
but the wars in the transcaspian region and instability accompanied with it slowed down 
the arrival of western oil companies.
There are number of examples of such conflicts after the end o f the Cold War; 
however within the context of Caucasian region there has been three major of conflicts 
that has caused a great deal of concern for the region. Especially within the context of a 
globalized world and the rise of international institutions dealing with such issues, the 
conflicts in the Caucasian region became a global issue. As the world community paid 
more and more attention to the issues of human rights and gross human rights violations, 
protection of the rights of individuals, minorities and refugees, the extend of the regional 
conflicts reached to the other parts of the world.
Another factor that put the regional conflicts in the Transcaucasian region to 
International scene is the oil reserves in the Caspian region. As the major oil companies 
planned to get a share of the Caspian oil, the western states including the United States 
had to pay more attention to the issues of the Caspian region. The conflict between
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Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, the Chechen-Russian conflict and the 
internal conflicts in Georgia constituted the main sources of instability in the region. 
Despite the fact that some of these conflicts were domestic in nature, the possibility of the 
spread of these conflicts and the geopolitical importance o f the region internationalized 
the problem. Another aspect of the ethnic strife in the transcaucasia is that the violence 
between different parties carried a potential for vast migration to neighbor countries 
which eventually necessitated the involvement of the other states.
Conflict and cooperation is an important area of study for international relations 
theories. In my examination of the impact of these conflicts on the cooperative/non­
cooperative behavior of the regional states, I will be referring to the approaches from 
international relations theory. What causes cooperation or defection is an important 
question and under what conditions do states choose to cooperate? Within the context of 
the Caspian region, the choices of the states in terms of resorting to military options will 
be examined.
The main issue that all these come down to is the achievement of cooperation 
among the major actors over the issues related to the development of Caspian oil and its 
transportation to world oil markets. Among the conflicts that had the greatest potential to 
spread to the region is the conflict between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh 
Autonomous region (NK).3 It has also been the main source of instability that affected 
the oil business in the Caspian region. When it comes to the development of economy, 
industry and foreign investment, existence of stability becomes a very important issue.
3 A utonom y in a political and legal context refers to the pow er o f  social institutions to “regulate their own  
affairs by enacting legal rules.” In international law, autonom y is taken to mean that “parts o f  the state’s 
territory are authorized to govern them selves in certain matters by enacting laws and statutes, but without 
constituting a state o f  their ow n.” Svante E. Cornell, “A utonom y as a Source o f  Conflict: Caucasian  
C onflicts in Theoretical Perspective,” W orld P o litics  54, no. 2 (January 2002): 245.
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Business follows secure and stable areas. In the Caspian context the question we ask is 
how has the business of oil development been affected by the conflicts between different 
groups. After examining the military conflicts and wars in the Caucasus region, I will 
move onto the investigation of the impact of these wars on the interstate relationship and 
cooperation on the issue of oil development in the Caspian region.
OIL DEVELOPMENT AND CONFLICT IN THE CASPIAN REGION: AZERBAIJAN, 
ARMENIA & NAGORNO-KARABAKH
The roots of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the Nagorno- 
Karabakh Autonomous region goes back to the eighteenth century where Armenians had 
the idea of establishing a great Armenian Empire comprising of the areas of Armenian 
population in the Caucasian region. Throughout the history, the area that is populated by 
many ethnic groups including Armenians has been controlled by Muslim Turks and 
Persians.4 Russians took control of the region, including Nagorno-Karabakh, after 
defeating Persians in 1828 which resulted in the treaty of Turkmenchai that marked the 
beginning of Russian rule in the region. Despite the Ottoman and the British presence in 
the region for some time, the end of World War I and the subsequent Bolshevik 
revolution and the rise of the Soviet Empire, the region has been put back under Soviet 
control.5 During the Persian, Ottoman and British times, the status of the Nagorno- 
Karabakh changed hands but mostly remained under Azeri control. Nagorno-Karabakh 
has been inhabited by the Armenians in majority and Azeri population remained as a
4 For details o f  early history see George A. Bournoutian, Two C hronicles on the H istory o f  K arabagh: 
M irza Jam al Javanshir's Tarikh-e K arabagh  an d  M irza A d igdza l B eg's K arabagh-N am e  (Costa M esa, CA: 
M azda Publishers, 2004).
5 Edgar O'Ballance, Wars in the Caucasus, 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 5  (N ew  York: N ew  York U niversity Press, 1997), 3 -  
22 .
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minority in the region throughout the history with varying degree of proportion 
depending on the mass movements and the policies o f controlling states in terms of the 
settlement of their subjects.6
The Azeri and Armenian historians tend to view the history of Nagorno-Karabakh 
from their own perspectives and lay claims on the region.7 The differences between the 
two nations have been one of the causes for conflict throughout all history. Azeris and 
Armenians fought over Nagorno-Karabakh region for long time. As long as the area was 
controlled by outside powers, the issue remained dormant. As soon as the external control 
loosened, violence erupted between two nations.8
The issue of borders on the southern Soviet flank was determined by the Treaty of 
Moscow between Turkey and the Soviet Empire in 1921. Soviet Russia had to favor 
Turkish opinions in the Caucasus region because of the fact that, SSSR needed good 
relations with Turkey at a time when the communist Russia needed allies and saw Turkey 
as a potential ally against the western block. With this treaty, Nakchivan was given a 
status of Autonomous Soviet Republic where as Nagorno-Karabakh was given to Azeri 
control and became an oblast,9 Although Azeris were happy about the Soviet’s decision, 
the Armenians objected to this division but returned no result. Despite the fact that 
Soviets favored a Turkish approach over the division of the Caucasus states and
6 “Nagorno-Karabakh is a de facto independent republic in the South Caucasus, o ffic ia lly  part o f  the 
Republic o f  Azerbaijan, about 270  kilometers (170 m iles) w est o f  the Azerbaijani capital o f  Baku, and very 
close to the border with A rm enia.” “Nagorno-Karabakh,” A vailable [Online]: 
< http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nagorno-Karabakh> [27 A ugust 2006].
7 For Armenian v iew s see L evon Chorbajian, ed., The M aking o f  N agorno-K arabakh: From  Secession  to 
Republic, (Palgrave M acm illan, 2001 ) and Richard G. Hovannisian, “Historical M em ory and Foreign  
Relations: The Armenian Perspective,” in The L egacy  o f  H istory in Russia an d  the N ew  S ta tes o f  Eurasia, 
ed. S. Frederick Starr (N ew  York: M .E. Sharpe, 1994), 2 4 9 -5 0 .
8 Tadeusz Sw ietochow ski, “The Problem o f  Nagorno-Karabakh: Geography versus Dem ography under 
C olonization and D ecolon ization ,” in C entra l A sia: Its S trategic Im portance an d  Future P rospects, ed, 
H afeez M alik (Basingstoke: M acmillan, 1994), 143-58 .
9 Pustilnik Marina, “Caucasus Stresses,” Transition  15 (March 1995): 16-18 .
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autonomous regions, the old Soviet divide and conquer rule remained in place. By 
favoring Turkish approach, Soviets achieved both a Turkish sympathy at that time and at 
the same time they had a good system of control over the region. Alexei Zverev suggests 
that the Soviet decision to accommodate Turkey “reflects wider Bolshevik concerns to 
appease Kemal Ataturk and placate the restive Moslem population which was being 
subdued by Soviet Russia.”10 Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous region became a trouble 
spot for both Azeris and Armenians that Soviets could use whenever the occasion 
called.11 This increased the dependence of Azeris on the Soviet army to maintain control 
over the region. Regardless of the past and the present, the Karabakh Armenians tried to 
gain their independence and/or unification with Armenia throughout the Soviet era. With 
glasnost and perestroika, a window of opportunity was open to Armenians. Karabakh 
Armenians demanded unification with Armenia in 1988 and this was quickly rejected by 
the Azerbaijani government. During the same year, the Supreme Soviet of USSR 
discussed the issue and decided to keep Nagorno-Karabakh under Azerbaijani control. 
This was met by heavy protest by the Armenians and marked the start of violence 
between the two communities.
The following days, months and years, the violence escalated between the 
Armenians and the Azeris. It started out as an internal problem of Azerbaijan but quickly 
involved Armenia as well. As soon as the social unrest erupted, mass migrations followed 
suit. The following years witnessed a huge number of people being forced out of their
10 A lexei Zverev “Ethnic C onflicts in the Caucasus 1 9 8 8 -1 9 9 4 ,” in C on tested  B orders in the Caucasus, ed. 
Bruno Coppieters (Pleinlaan Brussels: V U B  U niversity Press, 1996).
11 Svante Cornell argues that “the provision o f  institutionalized, territorial autonom y for an ethnic minority 
may cause the opposite o f  its intended effect -  it m ay augment rather than reduce the potential for conflict 
between a minority and central governm ent.... A utonom y is neither a sufficient nor a necessary cause o f  
conflict. Y et, it has a strong causal relationship with both a m inority’s w illingness and especially  its 
capacity to revolt. It is reasonably clear that within the Caucasian context, autonom y has been a source o f  
conflict and not a solution to it.” Cornell, “A utonom y as a Source o f  C onflict,” 275.
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homes and moved towards safe territories. Because of the ethnic structure of the region 
and the historical mixture of different populations, the transcaucasia represents a land of 
multiple nationalities; Armenians living in Azerbaijan, Georgia and elsewhere in the 
region while Azeris inhabited parts of Armenia and Georgia as well. Under volatile 
conditions, ethnic minorities suffered the most. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict; as soon as the violence started, ethnic minorities became the victim of heavy 
harassment by the local people as a response to the ongoing political rivalries. Hundreds 
of thousands of Azeris had to move out of Armenia and the Azeri villages in Nagorno- 
Karabakh with en estimated figure around 200,000-250,000 people. An approximate 
number of (200,000) Armenians fled Azerbaijan towards Armenia for the same reason as 
the harassment and threat increased.12
In 1988, the events that started in Sumghait marked another cornerstone of the 
inter-ethnic conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The killing of two Azeris by 
Armenians caused a public fervor in Azerbaijan and led to the killing and throwing out of 
Armenians in Azerbaijan. A total of 32-36 people have been killed in the events while
i  'i
the local authorities did little to stop the riot. In response to the Azeri outrage in 
Sumghait, Azeris in some villages have been pushed out and their homes were burnt in 
Armenia. As a matter of fact, each event led to another which in the end worsened the 
conditions. Angry crowds in the streets of Azerbaijan and Armenia demanded revenge 
for those who has fallen victim to ethnic violence. Governments had hard time trying to 
control their own people. As the social unrest grew, the dissent with governments caused
12 Edmund Herzig, The N ew  C aucasus: Armenia, A zerbaijan  an d  G eorgia  (London: Royal Institute o f  
International Affairs, 1999), 66.
13 Armenian sources reported these numbers by ten tim es higher compared to other sources w hich indicates 
the tendency o f  each side to use the incidents in their ow n policies. Svante E. Cornell, Sm all N ations an d  
G rea t P ow ers: A S tudy o f  E thnopolitical C onflict in the C aucasus (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001), 82.
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the rise of popular fronts. In Azerbaijan, APF (Azerbaijan Popular Front) and in Armenia, 
ANM (Armenian National Movement) gained popular support. With their nationalist 
rhetoric and severe criticism of current socialist governments, the political situation in the 
two republics became more fragile. The rise of APF was viewed in suspicion by Moscow 
which culminated in the events of Black January. The invasion of Baku in 1990 by the 
Soviet troops to root out the APF leaders and supporters increased anti-Moscow 
sentiments in Azerbaijan, contrary to the Soviet policies.14 The nationalistic fervor did 
not stop but gained momentum in both Azerbaijan and Armenia. The Soviet troops 
stationed in Baku, protecting the Soviet regime in Azerbaijan was also seen as a threat to 
Armenia in the sense that Soviet military did not do much about the ethnic conflicts that 
had been going on.15
Another turning point in the history of communal violence is the start of 
Operation Ring by the Soviet forces in Azerbaijan and Azeri Police in 1991. The main 
purpose of the operation was to search for illegal weapons in the Armenian provinces to 
prevent the formation of guerilla warfare by the Armenians. At the same time, the 
Soviets planned to teach a lesson to Armenian state for their demand for independence 
from the Soviet Union. However, the whole operation alienated the Armenians from 
Soviets and increased the solidarity to defend themselves against the Russians and the
14 “What cam e to be known as B lack January in Azerbaijan— the bloody takeover and occupation o f  Baku  
by Soviet troops on 20th January 1990— w as the culm ination o f  heightening nationalist fervor in Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, and grow ing inter-communal v iolence in the Azerbaijan capital itself. M oreover, Black  
January had brought inter-ethnic tensions and anti-M oscow  feelings to a new  level in both republics, 
propelling A rm enia and Azerbaijan further dow n the road toward open warfare. B lack January had a 
m om entous impact on the parties involved in the conflict. The brutal use o f  Soviet troops in Baku and the 
repression o f  the APF (Azerbaijan Popular Front), did not root out the Azerbaijani nationalist m ovem ent, or 
prevent re-establishing strong links w ith the centre.” “The R ole o f  Caspian O il in M aintaining Stability in 
the Caucasus Region: In the Case o f  M ountainous Karabakh C onflict,” Chapter 1, A vailable [Online]: 
< http://www.zerbaiian.com /azeri/dadash2.htm > [23 August 2006],
15 For more on the details o f  the human rights violations by both sides, see R achel Denber, B loodsh ed  in the 
C aucasus: E scalation  o f  the A rm ed  C onflict in N agorno-K arabakh  (N ew  York: H elsinki W atch, 1992).
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Azeris.16 Operation Ring carried a different character from the previous violence 
between Azerbaijan and Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh. For the first time, the Soviet 
troops actively supported Azeri side against Armenians. The Azeri government in Baku 
(Ayaz Muttalibov, pro-Soviet) depended on Moscow in their battle against Armenians.
On the other hand the Armenians had to rely on their own resources in their struggle for 
independence and started forming armed units. It is around this time that the nature of 
the conflict changed to direct military confrontation between the Azeri military and the 
Armenian militias. The end of the Soviet Empire weakened the Azeri position as the 
Azeri resistance to Armenian drive for independence and unification with Armenia 
depended highly on Soviet military units. The nature of the conflict has also changed to 
interstate conflict soon after the Armenian and the Azeri government declared 
independence from Soviet Empire. Followed by the Azeri declaration of independence, 
NK Republic in September 1991 declared itself as an independent unit with the borders 
of NK Autonomous Oblast. Azerbaijan Republic reacted harshly to this and abolished 
the status of NKAO and reduced it to a region. Elowever, this did not mean much to the 
either side since the NK territory was well controlled by the Armenians where Azeri 
military had little control and was quickly loosing the region.
The years following 1992-94 have shown a different character as the nature of the 
conflict turned into a direct military confrontation. After three years of struggle and 
ethnic violence and irregular clashes, starting with 1992, the issue of NK turned out to be 
a full scale war between NK Armenians and Azeris. NK Armenians has been supported 
by Armenia financially and militarily. The Armenian Diaspora has provided a great deal 
of financial support for the Armenian cause in NK. On the other hand, Azerbaijan for
16 Cornell, Sm all N ations a n d  G rea t Pow ers, 90.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
14 2
long depended on Soviet military to suppress demands for independence. Turkey as an 
ally for Azerbaijan also provided help for Azerbaijan. Because of the fragile balance in
• 1 7 *the region, Turkey’s options have been limited during the times of full scale war. Still 
there are numerous sources that acknowledge that Turkey provided arms and other
1 o t '
contribution to Azerbaijan underhand. Armenia as an ally o f NK refrained from 
recognizing the independence of NK as it may have caused complications for Armenia at 
international level. Despite the fact that Armenia does not recognize NK’s independence, 
it is generally accepted as a political move. Armenia has involved in every step of the 
way as a guarantor for the NK Armenians.
Starting with 1992, Armenian offensive began to move towards the Azeri 
populated villages in NK region. Having prepared itself for military confrontation, 
Armenians successfully defeated Azeri military and advanced towards Azerbaijan. In 
addition to the forced migration of the inhabitants of the Azeri villages, the Armenian 
army committed gross human rights violations. Khojaly19 represents the peak of 
Armenian atrocities towards Azeris where the town has been burnt and the remaining 
people fled to Azerbaijan.20 According to some independent resources, the Armenians 
have killed and mutilated 600-1000 people.21 The Khojali massacre created a fear in the 
remaining villages that the Azeri people fled their homes before the arrival of Armenian
17 This is partly due to the fear o f  Russian involvem ent on the Armenian side and also the existing  
comm ercial links between Russia and Turkey. Kamer Kasim, “Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict, Caspian Oil 
and R egional Pow ers,” 191.
18 A y in Tarihi, 12 February 1992. A lso  A vailable [Online]:
.http://w w w .bvegm .gov.tr/Y A Y lN L A R lM lZ/A vinT arihi/A vintarihi.htm > [29 October 2006]
19 For a narrated coverage o f  Khojaly massacre and N K  conflict, see Thomas Goltz, A zerbaijan  D iary: A 
R ogue R eporter's A dven tures in an Oil-Rich, War-Torn, P ost-S ovie t R epublic  (Armonk, NY: M .E. Sharpe, 
1998), 17 -131 .
20 Araz A slanli, “Tarihten Gunumuze Karabag Sorunu,” A vrasya  D osyasi 7, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 404.
21 Flugh Pope says that “600 Azerbaijanis Slain at K hojali,” L os A ngeles Times, 12 June 1992, A 6.
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army. The capture o f the Lachin corridor that connects NK to Armenia provided a direct 
link to Armenia which eventually made the Armenian contribution to war easier.
The Azeri offensive at different times produced no tangible results and eventually 
was pushed back. The initial loss of war caused an internal political instability in 
Azerbaijan. The last pro-Soviet government had to resign (Ayaz Muttalibov) and
99Elchibey Government (APF) assumed control. Elchibey promised victory in two 
months. In 1992 Azeris carried out successful operations and pushed back Armenian 
military in many of the areas, however, the Lachin corridor remained under Armenian 
control. Although the balance shifted towards Azeris in 1992, the Armenians regrouped 
and took control of strategic areas including Kelbajar in 1993. Starting with the fall of 
Kelbajar, Armenian government gained upper hand and further advanced into Azeri 
territories. The fall o f Kelbajar sparked a new wave of political discussion in Turkey.
The President of Turkish Republic argued that the advance of the Armenian army into 
Azeri territories should be viewed from the perspective of the establishment of Great 
Armenia which may involve Turkish territories in the future therefore Turkey needs to be 
involved in the conflict to put a stop to Armenian advances. On the other hand Turkish 
Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel insisted on the necessity to maintain a neutral status or 
at least avoid a direct military confrontation, referring to the fragility of the situation as it 
may have repercussions for Turkey if Russia reacts to Turkish moves.23 The losses on 
battleground diminished Elchibey’s popularity and created splits in Azeri army. Elchibey
22 Faruk Arslan states that pro-Turkish, anti-Russian E lch ibey’s rise to power made the Russian  
administration very anxious. E specially  E lch ibey’s plans to go into oil business with Turkey and 
construction o f  pipelines resulted in the overthrow o f  APF w ith Russian support. Arslan, H azarin  K urtlar  
Vadisi, 128.
23 A y in Tarihi, 7, 3 April 1993.
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had to leave Baku against the popular dissent and the pressure from Army.24 Heidar 
Aliyev replaced Elchibey and stabilized the internal politics in the coming years.25 
However, the following offensives under Aliyev’s government’s directives did not 
produce expected results and Azerbaijan lost around 20-25 percent o f its territory to NK 
Armenians.
One of the reasons for the failure of Azeri army against NK Armenians was the 
continuing internal political clashes that paralyzed a systematic warfare by Azeri military. 
Another factor that contributed to Azeri failure in the battlefield was the Russian support 
for Armenia. According to several sources, Russians provided military equipment 
around a value of 1 billion dollar. One of the reasons that shifted Russian focus
towards Armenian side was the rising anti-Russia, pro-Turkish Elchibey government and 
its respective policies. In addition to this was the Azeri intransigence in participating in
9 7  • 98the CIS and station of Russian troops on Azeri soil. As Azeris rejected the Russian 
demands, Russia sided with Armenia to pressure Azerbaijan.
24 “In June 1993, Surat H usseinov, a renegade colonel who had comm anded a m ilitia brigade that w as 
loosely  incorporated into the new ly-created Azerbaijani army, overthrew the Azerbaijani Popular Front 
(A PF) governm ent led by President A bulfaz Elchibey. The APF had com e to power in M ay 1992, and by 
the time o f  H usseinov's revolt was besieged over losses in Nagorno-Karabakh. H usseinov's revolt paved the 
w ay for the rise to power o f  Azerbaijan's current president, Heydar A liyev, w ho first had h im self installed  
as chair o f  the parliament. On October 3, 1993, A liyev  w as elected to the presidency in an improbable 
Soviet-style election in w hich he received 98.8 percent o f  the vote. A n inexplicably high 96 percent o f  
eligible voters w ere reported to have participated. President A liyev  named Surat H usseinov prime 
m inister.” Human Rights W atch on Azerbaijan, “Political Turmoil: Background,"Available [Online]: 
< http://hrw.org/reports/1999/azerbaiian/Azer0799-02.htm > [10 Sep 2006],
25 Heydar A liyev  (M ay 10, 1923-D ecem ber 12, 2003) served as president o f  Azerbaijan for the N ew  
Azerbaijan Party from June 1993 to October 2003.
26 This has not been acknow ledged by Russians. Russians denied their assistance to Armenia and the 
transfer o f  large military equipment. In doing so, Russians tried to force A zeri towards Russian demands 
on CIS and also remain as a neutral actor in the developm ent o f  peace process. For Russian policies in the 
conflict, see Thom as D e W all, B lack Garden, A rm enia a n d  A zerbaijan  through P eace  an d  War (N ew  
York: N ew  York U niversity Press, 2003), 170.
27 A liyev  in 1993 joined  CIS and estimated that by jo in ing the CIS and signing a bilateral security 
agreement with M oscow , he w ould secure Russia's neutrality in the Karabakh conflict. A liyev  on National 
television  in June 2000  said that “the key to settling regional conflicts such as the Karabakh conflict is, in 
M oscow .” D ina M alysheva, “The C onflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: Its Impact on Security in the Caspian
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Under the circumstances, the NK Armenians captured a massive Azeri territory 
without much resistance.29 Since Azerbaijan had no hope at that time for another 
successful military operation and the Armenians captured Lachin corridor and established 
a buffer zone between Azerbaijan and Armenian settlements, a Russian brokered 
ceasefire agreement has been signed by both sides on May 16 1994. This ceasefire has 
been in place since then despite the occasional shootouts on both sides.
The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan ended with the victory of Armenians 
and a humiliating defeat for Azerbaijan against smaller number of former subject. The 
total death toll is estimated to be around 20,000-30,000 people whereas a 1.5 million 
people have been moved out of their homes. Azerbaijan is burdened with a huge number 
of refugees (around 1 million) compared to a 6.5 million population.
NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT AND PEACE PROCESS: A DIFFICULT 
ROAD AHEAD
The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh started as an internal problem. During the 
Soviet period international community had little chance of involving in the settlement of
R egion,” in The S ecurity o f  the C aspian  R egion , ed. Gennady Chuff in (N ew  York: Oxford U niversity  
Press, 2001), 260.
28 “Geidar A liyev  talks about the conflict betw een Armenia and the role Russia can play in resolving the 
conflict. Armenian armed forces continue to attack, and several districts o f  Azerbaijan such as Zangelan, 
Kubatly and Fizuli have been occupied by them. M easures are being taken to im prove the relations between  
Russia and Azerbaijan as the former has the potential to help end the conflict.” Source Citation: Bangersky, 
Aleksandr. Geidar A liyev  is counting on Russia. “CIS Summit: Som e Gains, N ew  Snag on Karabakh,” 
Interview with Geidar A liyev, leader o f  Azerbaijan. The C urren t D ig es t o f  the P ost-S ovie t P ress  45 , no. 52 
(January 1994): 17. InfoTrac OneFile. Thom son Gale. Old D om inion U niversity Library. 20 Sep. 2006. 
A vailable [Online]:
< http://fm d.galegroup.com /itx/infom ark.do?& contentSet=lAC-
Docum ents& tvpe=retrieve& tabID=T002& prodId=lTO F& docId=A15223468& source=gale& srcprod=ITO F  
& userGroupNam e=viva odu& version=l ,0>  [3 M ay 2006]
29 W hen Armenians m ove along line towards 10 kilom eters to Nakhchivan, Turkish ministers had a 
m eeting with a decision to inform Armenia on the determination o f  Turkish governm ent on the territorial 
integrity o f  N akhchivan w hich have been guaranteed by treaties between M oscow  and Turkey in 1921 
(Treaty o f  Kars in 1921). A yin Tarihi, 18 March 1992.
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disputes. It was up to the Soviet Union to mediate the differences among the conflicting 
parties. The continuation of the war between Azerbaijan and NK Armenians severely 
hampered the prospects for oil development. Under those conditions, Azerbaijan had no 
way of focusing its attention to oil industry and oil extraction.
The eruption of the conflict into a full scale war coincided with the break-up of 
the Soviet Union and the declaration of independence of the two states. As the intensity 
of violence increased the international community started to pay more attention. 
Especially the Khojali massacre by Armenians sparked a new wave of international 
involvement in the conflict. Russia has been one of the main actors in the peace 
process; however the Russian policies in the region have been met with great suspicion 
and distrust. The Russian involvement on the Armenian side discredited Russia as an 
impartial arbiter in the eyes of the Azeris; while the same could be said for Turkey as 
well. Turkish support for Azeri cause and the blockade of Armenia has also
-1 o
hampered Turkish mediation efforts for the conflict. While Russia and Turkey initially 
have not been effective in brokering a solution to the conflict, the mediation efforts have
30 “On the night o f  February 2 5 -2 6 , 1992, the gruesom e statistics indicate that 613 people had been killed, 
o f  which 106 were w om en and 83 were children; 1275 taken hostage, 150 went m issing; 487  people  
becam e disabled and invalid, 76 o f  whom  are teenage boys and girls; 8 fam ilies had been com pletely  
destroyed; 25 children had lost both o f  their parents, 130 children had lost one o f  their parents; and 56  
people had been killed with extreme cruelty and torture. Sharing the fate o f  its population, the tow n o f  
Khojaly had been com pletely destroyed as w ell.” K hojaly M assacre Com m em oration Site, A vailable  
[Online] : <http://w w w .com e.to/khoialv>
[11 September 2006],
31 A lthough R ussia tried to avoid a direct involvem ent in the conflicts in the Caucasus region, the Russian 
support for Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been quite visible. Thomas D e W all says that 
Russian soldiers actively participated in the war on the Armenian side. D e W all, B lack  G arden, A rm enia  
an d  A zerbaijan  through P eace  a n d  War, 170.
32 The idea w as put forth by the President o f  Turkish R epublic Turgut Ozal in an interview given to British  
Financial Tim es. A yin Tarihi, 7 March 1992.
33 Turkey tried to bring the United States into the scene and Turkish Prime m inister Suleym an D em irel 
called President Bush to get the United States involved in the resolution o f  the conflict. Cornell, Sm all 
N ations an d  G rea t P ow ers, 109.
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been taken up by the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe).34 
United Nations for its part could not actively involve in the peace process other than 
passing several resolutions for the cessation of hostilities.35 In fact the UN was already 
burdened with other peace keeping activities in other parts of the world; therefore 
delegated the issue to the CSCE.36 In March 1991, the CSCE established a group to 
handle the peace efforts for NK conflict.37 The eleven member community planned an 
eventual peace conference to be held in Minsk and therefore named after this conference 
and became known as Minsk Group. Minsk Group assumed the role of establishing 
peace in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. CSCE as an organization was in a phase of 
transition at that time just after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. In the wake of a 
unipolar world, CSCE was also looking for a new role as a security organization in the 
new world. Conflict resolution, however, was new to CSCE and the structure of the 
organization was weak. Each member had equal vote in the decision making process.
34 Later changed to OSCE.
35 1 993 U N  Security C ouncil R esolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh RESO LUTION 822 (1993)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3205th m eeting, on 30 April 1993
Concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Expressing its serious concern at the deterioration o f  the 
relations betw een the Republic o f  Armenia and the Republic o f  Azerbaijan, N oting w ith alarm the 
escalation in armed hostilities and, in particular, the latest invasion o f  the Kelbadjar district o f  the Republic 
o f  Azerbaijan by local Armenian forces, Concerned that this situation endangers peace and security in the 
region, Expressing grave concern at the displacem ent o f  a large number o f  civilians and the humanitarian 
em ergency in the region, in particular in the Kelbadjar district, Reaffirm ing the respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity o f  all States in the reg ion ... Expressing its support for the peace process being pursued 
within the framework o f  the C onference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and deeply concerned at 
the disruptive effect that the escalation in armed hostilities can have on that process, D em ands the 
immediate cessation o f  all hostilities and hostile acts with a v iew  to establishing a durable cease-fire, as 
w ell as im mediate withdrawal o f  all occupying forces from the Kelbadjar district and other recently  
occupied areas o f  A zerbaijan... Extracted from the w ebsite o f  U .S . Department o f  State, “ 1993 U N  
Security Council R esolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh,” A vailable [Online]:
< http://ww w.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/l 35Q8.htm> [16 April 2006]. U N  also issued the fo llow ing resolution in 
the sam e line asking for the cessation o f  hostilities: Resolution 853 (29 July 1993), 874 (14 October 1993) 
and 884 (12 N ovem ber 1993).
36 For detailed analysis o f  O SC E ’s and U N ’s activities and peace efforts in Caucasus, see Oliver Paye and 
Eric R em ade, “U N  and CSCE P olicies in Transcaucasia,” in C on tested  B orders in the C aucasus, ed. Bruno 
Coppieters (Pleinlaan Brussels: V U B  U niversity Press, 1996), 103-137 .
37 The M insk Group is headed by a Co-Chairmanship o f  France, the Russian Federation and the United  
States. The M insk Group includes the fo llow ing participating states: Belarus, Germany, Italy, Portugal, 
Netherlands, Sw eden, Finland, Turkey, A rm enia and Azerbaijan.
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Apart from the structural weaknesses, the CSCE did not have an enforcing mechanism. 
The function o f the Minsk Group therefore was reduced to mediation and bringing the
• • 3 8  •parties to conflict to table. CSCE has spent tremendous effort in bringing a ceasefire in 
the region, despite the fact that it suffered from organizational restraints and from the 
policies of the members. Especially the Russian proposal under CSCE undermined the 
efforts of Minsk Group. Russia in 1993 demanded to deploy only Russian peacekeeping 
forces in the region under CSCE mandate; however this was not accepted by the member 
states. The United States and Turkey particularly objected to the Russian proposal.
Under all these demands, Russia still wanted to maintain a special sphere of influence in 
the region. On the other hand, despite the efforts of CSCE members and Minsk Group, 
the warring parties did not feel the need to listen to what CSCE members asked for.39 
Despite numerous temporary ceasefires, the Armenians engaged in new attacks on Azeri 
territory. Beyond all these was the fact that none of the parties to the conflict really 
wanted a ceasefire. They have moved forward with aggression whenever they saw a 
window of opportunity. The ceasefires and negotiations have been utilized as a time for 
regrouping and consolidating their bases. One thing that explains this type of behavior is
38 The Personal Representative's mandate from the Chairman-in-Office is to:
Represent the OSCE Chairm an-in-O ffice in issues related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, assist 
the CiO in achieving an agreement on the cessation o f  the armed conflict and in creating 
conditions for the deploym ent o f  an OSCE peace-keeping operation, in order to facilitate a lasting 
com prehensive political settlem ent o f  the conflict in all its aspects...
A ssist the parties in im plem enting and developing confidence-building, humanitarian and other 
measures facilitating the peace process, in particular by encouraging direct contacts; co-operate, as 
appropriate, with representatives o f  the United Nations and other international organizations 
operating in the area o f  conflict.
(Extracted from official OSCE W ebsite, The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(O SCE), “CiO Representative on M insk C onference,” A vailable [Online]: 
< http://w w w .osce.org/item /13668.htm l>
[21 A ugust 2006].
39 R ecalling the previous disregard for OSCE and U N  demand for the cessation o f  hostilities and respecting  
human rights and other issues pertinent to warfare, The N K  Armenians and A zeris have seen no com pelling  
reason for com plying with International Institutions.
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the lack of an enforcing mechanism. Beside these shortcomings, Russian initiatives in 
the region further undermined CSCE’s role as a mediator.
First of all, Russia did not want the Minsk Group to be successful in mediation 
efforts which would decrease Russia’s role in the region. Therefore, in many occasions 
Russia tried to bring the Armenians and Azeris together for a final ceasefire agreement. 
As it became clear that parallel efforts did not quite produce positive outcomes, in 1994 
the OSCE had to accommodate Russia in its peace efforts and Russia was made the 
permanent co-chairman of the Minsk Group.40 With the signing of the ceasefire 
agreement brokered by Russia in May 1994, the conflict between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan has been put in a frozen state. This agreement in fact did not provide a final 
solution to the disagreements between warring parties but only provided a temporary 
ceasefire. The attempts at finding a permanent solution acceptable to both parties 
continued under OSCE’s umbrella in the following years after 1994.
However the ceasefire gave the NK Armenians a good chance for consolidating 
its position as an entity closely imbedded in Armenia as an independent unit. Each year 
passing without a final agreement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the current status 
quo is being further consolidated.41 The following years after 1994, the OSCE tried the 
resolve the main issues of disagreement between the conflicting parties. However the 
efforts produced no promising results. First of all, the Armenians are insisting on their 
right for self-determination and Azerbaijan is considering the territorial integrity as a
40 Kenneth W eisbrode, C entra l Eurasia: P rize  o r  Q uicksand?: C ontending Views o f  Instab ility  in 
K arabakh, F erghana an d  A fghanistan  (Oxford, N ew  York: Oxford U niversity Press for the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2001), 31.
41 Herzig, The N ew  C aucasus, 68.
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precondition for settlement. The return of the occupied territories and the repatriation of 
the forced refugees remain as difficult issues for future negotiations.
The main dilemma lies in the bringing of the concept of self-determination and 
territorial integrity together. None of the states want to make a sacrifice on their 
priorities. On the other hand, the leaders of the two nations are under great pressure from 
their people on any kind of compromise. Any compromise in these issues is equated with 
being defeatist or being treacherous.42 Despite the fact that under OSCE’s umbrella the 
parties had engaged in diplomatic negotiations43during 1996-98, the irreconcilable 
policies of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and insistence of Azerbaijan on the 
preservation of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity precluded the achievement of a final 
resolution 44
Under current conditions NK Armenians insist on the resolution of the status of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh as a precondition for the return of the occupied territories. Beside 
these, the NK Armenians insists on maintaining a territorial link to Armenia as a corridor 
that complicates the Azeri demand for the return o f the occupied territories and Lachin 
corridor.45 As long as the Azeris prioritizes the territorial integrity and the Armenians 
insist on their right to self-determination a final resolution that could bring a permanent
42 Armenian president Ter-Petrosyan inclined towards som e o f  the proposals made by M insk group and 
appeared to be a soft-liner. H is po licies regarding Nagorno-Karabakh created internal political crises w hich  
he eventually had to resign. This has given  a strong m essage to the leaders o f  both countries that the Azeri 
and Armenian people are not ready to make com prom ises.
43 M any proposals have been laid by M insk group including the one that proposed phased negotiations 
w hich offers the negotiation o f  the issues separately. This w as rejected by N K  Armenians on the ground 
that they do not want to settle any issue as long as the issue o f  status o f  the Republic is not resolved.
44 A li M assoud Ansari, “The M ilitary Balance in the Caspian R egion,” in The C aspian  R egion a t a  
C rossroad: C hallenges o f  a  N ew  F rontier o f  E nergy an d  D evelopm ent, ed. Hooshang Amirahmadi 
(Palgrave M acm illan, 2000), 214.
45 A  Karabakh officia l said that “w e w ill never be an enclave again.” Cornell, Sm all N ations an d  G rea t 
Powers, 123.
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peace does not seem to be likely.46 The status quo is likely to continue as long as the 
current balance of power is preserved. Although no one is satisfied with the status quo, 
each side fears that a compromise might put the adversary in an advantageous position 
which may lead to shift in the balance of power against them. Fear of survival is a major 
issue that impedes cooperation.47 This is apparent in the case of Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
The immensity of mistrust among the two rivals is one of the main causes of the failure 
of the mediation attempts. Armenians maintain the idea that Armenians historically have 
been persecuted by Ottoman Turks and Azeris as well during the events in Sumgait and 
Baku in 1988. This line of thinking has motivated the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh 
to establish a buffer zone in their military campaign against Azerbaijan. In return, 
Armenian drive toward Azeri territories has caused great anger and distrust among Azeris 
and strengthened the negative image of Armenians as a savage people.49 Azeris very 
much rely on the revenues that they expect to get from oil development in the Caspian 
region in the coming years. Many people indicate that this might reverse the current 
balance between Azeris and Armenians in favor of Azerbaijan economically and 
militarily.50
46 The bilateral m eetings under the auspices o f  OSCE continued up to our day. Zam an G aze tes i reports that 
the parties to conflict m et in Paris and discussed the issues face to face. A lthough this sum mit have not 
produced a tangible progress, French Prime M inister Chirac, said that they were hopeful about the future o f  
A zeri-Arm enian talks. Zam an G azetesi, 11 February 2006.
47 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits o f  Cooperation: A  Realist Critique o f  the N ew est Liberal 
Institutionalism ,” in C ontroversies in In ternational Theories: R ealism  a n d  the N eo libera l C hallenge, ed. 
Charles W. K egley, Jr. (N ew  York: The M acm illan Press Ltd,. 1995), 152.
48 The Turkish Azeri alliance rejects the Armenian claim s on the ground that Armenian claim s lack 
acceptable evidence but m erely remains as a propaganda.
49 Christian Tolstrup, “The C ollapse o f  D ialogue,” in C ontrasts an d  Solutions in the Caucasus,, ed. Ole 
Hoiris and Sefa Martin Yurukel (Aarhus, O akville, CT: Aarhus Univ. Press, 1998), 2 3 6 -4 5 .
50 Ansari, “The M ilitary Balance in the Caspian R egion ,” 2 1 9 -2 1 ; M evlut Katik, “M ilitarisation o f  the 
Caspian Sea,” in The C aspian: Politics, E nergy an d  Security, ed. Shirin Akiner (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon-Taylor Francis Group, 2004), 3 0 2 -303 ; M alysheva, “The C onflict in N agorno- 
Karabakh,” 2 7 5 -7 7 . See also “President A liyev: Azerbaijan N ever to A gree to Nagorno-Karabakh 
Separation,” Interfax T14:49:16Z , 31 July 2006.
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THE CHECHEN CONFLICT
Another conflict in the region that had an impact on the stability o f the region for 
investment and economic activities and on the development of oil industry in the Caspian 
region is the Russian-Chechen conflict that has caused a great level of devastation in 
Chechnya and proved to be the most destructive war in the territory of the former Soviet 
Union. Although the conflict took place within the borders of the Russian Federation, the 
Chechen conflict had a great potential to spread to neighbor states. The intensity of the 
violence and the rate o f human suffering turned the world’s attention to the Chechen 
conflict.
Although the roots of the conflict between Russia and Chechnya goes back to 
early times in history, we will be looking at the most recent developments that has started 
just after the end of the Soviet Empire. As in the other former soviet Republics, the end 
of the Soviet Union sparked a wave of independence movements in Chechen Republic as 
well. The events that led to the faithful confrontation between Russia and Chechnya 
started when the National Guard of Chechnya captured the Supreme Soviet headquarters 
in Groznyy in September 1991. The following events in the capital culminated in the 
election of Johar Dudayev as the President of Chechen Republic.51 Dudayev came to 
power On 27 October of the same year with an overwhelming majority (90 percent). 
Under Dudayev’s leadership Chechnya declared its independence from the Soviet Union 
on November 22, 1991. The Soviet administration responded with a declaration of state 
of emergency in Chechnya and also threatened the parliament with use of military to
c'y
bring the Chechen state under Soviet control. Unsuccessful military move towards
51 The first president o f  the Chechen Republic o f  Ichkeria (Chechnya), in the North Caucasus.
52 Later the deceleration o f  state o f  em ergency w as annulled by Supreme Soviet o f  Russian Federation.
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Chechnya was pushed back by Dudayev’s National Guard and this has strengthened 
Dudayev’s government in Chechnya.53 Although Dudayev was an experienced army 
leader, he did not have any background in economy and in other social matters. With the 
stoppage of economic aid from Soviet Union and the leaving of the Russian elite form 
Chechnya, the internal situation in the country degenerated into a chaotic situation.54 The 
coming years did not bring a desired level of stability in the region. Internal power 
struggle continued as the economy and social life worsened in Chechnya. During the 
years of 1992-94, Russia tried to bring Dudayev’s regime down through different tactics 
which none of them had actually produced any positive results for Russia. Other than the 
thereat to use of force, Russian administration supported other opposition groups in 
Chechnya. “As the initial attempts failed, Russia increased its role in the secret 
operations and began to deploy Russian servicemen and mercenaries and supply heavy 
equipment to the opposition force in an effort to shift the balance in Republic. Altogether 
five covert operations against Dudayev’s regime were orchestrated by the Federal 
Counter Intelligence Service. The battle for Groznyy was the unintended consequence of 
one such operation.55
One of the things that prevented productive talks and negotiation between Russia 
and Chechnya was the personal animosity between Russian president Boris Yeltsin and 
Johar Dudayev.56 The use of insulting language in many occasions prevented the start of
53 The National Guard w as com prised o f  irregular personnel and the prisoners.
54 “A  deteriorating econom y, a standard o f  living; collapsing state services, m assive corruption and 
crippling ‘m afiaisation’ o f  large political, econom ic and social sectors, an influx o f  C hechens from other 
parts o f  the FSU  and emigration o f  Russians; political pow er struggle to shape the new  regime; the clim ax  
o f  w hich was the confrontation betw een the parliament and president.” M oshe Gammer, The Lone W olf an d  
the Bear: Three C enturies o f  Chechen D efiance o f  Russian R ule  (Pittsburg: U niversity o f  Pittsburg Press, 
2006), 205.
55 Quoted in Gammer, The Lone W olf an d  the Bear, 2006.
56 See Richard Sakwa, ed., Chechnya: From  P a s t to Future (London: Anthem Press, 2005).
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peace talks between two leaders. This may have forced Russian administration to resort 
to extreme violence in Chechen issue. Dudayev’s posture as a strict leader and lack of 
experience in diplomacy and politics alienated Russia and damaged the countries’ hope 
for a peaceful transition.
The state of unrest in Russia just after the break up of the Union and the confusion 
that accompanied the dissolution prevented a firm and clear cut Russian approach to the 
Chechen issue. During the years o f 1992-94, Russia itself was in a phase o f transition 
from communist regime and looking for a new definition of Russia in the post-Soviet 
world. The state of confusion and internal crises prevented Russia from approaching to 
Chechen issue in a steady way. Three years after Chechen declaration of independence, 
Russia decided to take control. Traditionally Russia assigned a strategic importance to 
Chechnya as a buffer zone and also because of the fact that Chechnya is located on the 
way to Caucasia. Losing control of Chechnya might very well have been resulted in the 
worsening of the conditions for Russia over the control of transcaucasia. It has also been 
said that Chechnya’s independence may set an example to other republics under Russian 
control which eventually may further shrink Russian Federation. Having already lost a 
number of former dominions, Russia could not let any other go out of its hand. As Peter 
Shearman and Matthew Sussex suggest, “Chechen rebels have prompted fears of conflict 
spillover to the neighboring republic of Dagestan, and possibility of new independence 
claims from republics in the economically vital South Caucasus. The loss of Chechnya 
would also seriously dent Russian prestige at a time when policy makers have come to
en
regard maintaining the trappings of great power status as a vital Russian interest.”
57 Peter Shearman and M atthew Sussex, “Globalization, N ew  Wars and the War in C hechnya,” in Richard 
Sakwa, ed., Chechnya: From  P a s t to Future (London: A nthem  Press, 2005), 203.
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Other than the factors stated above, Chechnya is located on a very strategic 
geographic location for the transportation of Caspian oil to the Black Sea port of 
Novorossiysk. For Russia to remain as an influential actor in the Caspian Sea oil 
development, the northern route that goes through Chechnya had to be under Russian 
control. It is interesting here to note that, the major Russian offensive on Chechnya came 
after there years of Chechen declaration of independence which also coincides with the 
signing of the contract of the century by Azerbaijan in 1994.58 Svante E. Cornell argues 
that “a direct reason for the war to erupt suddenly in the end of 1994 might have been the 
signing in autumn of 1994 of the Baku oil consortium, heavily contested by Russia, 
whereby the Azerbaijani state signed an agreement with Western oil companies on 
extracting large quantities of oil from the Caspian Sea shelf.”59 If Russia were to impose 
the northern route for the transportation of Caspian oil towards the Russian port of 
Novorossiysk at Black Sea, it was imperative for Russia to be in full control of the 
pipelines including Chechnya. Chechen conflict stood in the way of Russian control of 
its neighborhood as a big trouble spot that needed to be removed for further Russian 
control of the region.
For whatever the reasons, the Russian invasion of Chechnya started on 11 
December 1994. Despite the optimistic expectations, the war turned out to be disastrous 
for both Russia and Chechnya. First, the Russian army has been stopped by Chechen 
militias on many occasions. Only after the use of heavy artillery and the destruction of 
capital Groznyy could the Russians enter the city. Russians have been harassed by small
58 For more on the Caspian oil as an important m otive for Russian offensive on Chechnya, see Andrew  
Towner, “The Russians, Chechens and the B lack Gold: A  G eo-Econom ic Explanation for the Chechen  
War,” in The P o litics o f  C aspian  O il, ed. Bttlent G okay (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 199-215 .
59 Cornell, Sm all N ations an d  G rea t P ow ers, 223.
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groups of Chechen fighters and gave heavy casualties. Still, Chechen people suffered the 
most out of this war as it has caused the death of 45,000-60,000 people in three years.
The level of atrocities committed by Russian army and the killing of civilians to root out 
Chechen resistance alarmed international community. After the killing of the Chechen 
leader Johar Dudayev in 1996 by an attempted strike at his life, Russians gradually took 
control of the Capital through establishing friendly government. Despite the continuation 
of fighting ands skirmishes, both parties signed the Khasav Yurt Agreement on 31 
August 1996 and Moscow Peace Accord on 12 May 1997.60 Both sides has agreed to a 
ceasefire and the status o f the Chechen Republic left to future negotiations; expected to 
be concluded within five years by 2001.
The years between 1997 and 1999 left Chechnya in a complete chaotic 
environment. The rise o f crime and terrorism crippled a functional social life. Apart from 
the apparent consequences of the war, the Russian offensive increased the Islamization of 
the Chechen people.61 While people fought for their country during the 1994-96 war, 
now most of the Chechens turned towards religion and started fighting for their religion. 
Nevertheless, the lawlessness in Chechnya and the attack on Dagestan spurred a new 
wave of Russian offensive coupled with Russian anger towards terrorist activities 
directed against Russian civilians.62 Despite the official rhetoric to suppress terrorist
60 A  ceasefire agreem ent that marked the end o f  the First Chechen War w as signed in Khasav-Yurt on 
A ugust 31, 1996 between A lexander Lebed and A slan M askhadov. The agreement was broken after the 
Raid on Dagestan and Russian Apartment B om bings follow ed by the Second C hechen War. M oscow  
Accord w as signed by Russian President Boris Y eltsin and M askhadov and m ainly focused on peace and 
the principles o f  bilateral relations.
61 Anna Zelkina, “The W ahhabi’s o f  the Northern Caucasus vis-a-vis State and Society: The Case o f  
D aghestan,” in The C aspian  R egion  Vol II: The C aucasus, ed. M oshe Gammer (London: R outledge, 2004).
62 The Russian people did not fu lly  support the war in Chechnya before the start o f  terrorist activities in 
Russia but after the attacks on civilian targets the support for Russian military operations increased. See 
M ike Bowker, “W estern V iew s o f  the Chechen C onflict” in Richard Sakwa, ed., C hechnya: From  P a st to  
Future  (London: Anthem Press, 2005), 2 2 3 -3 8 .
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activities and eliminate their establishments in Chechnya, a vast majority of Western 
media reported the Russian offensive as a political move by Vilademir Putin to 
consolidate his place as a candidate for Russian presidency after Yeltsin. The brutality of 
Russian military again surfaced in this attacks and gross human right violations and war 
crimes criticized by Western states.
The war left Chechnya in ruins resembling villages after World War II. The new 
governments after Russian invasion had no real hope about the reconstruction of the 
cities destroyed by Russian attacks. Out of a million people in the whole republic a 300- 
400 thousand people became refugees.64 The impact of the war was also felt on the 
Russian side as their losses totaled up to 25,000 deaths of varieties o f servicemen. The 
stability in the region was very much shaken by the Chechen conflict in the region. It has 
also caused Russia a reputation as the Russian army had to fall back against Chechen 
pressure in capturing the capital. This might explains the brutality of Russian forces to 
conquer the Chechen territory to save face at both home and at the international level.
Normalization
Under heavy pressure from Western world and the United States, the Russian 
administration has made certain efforts to normalize the internal political situation in 
Chechnya. In a referendum in 2003 a new constitution was accepted by Chechen 
people.65 The constitution gives Chechnya a wide autonomy but the Republic remains an 
integral part of the Russian Federation.
63 Ibid., 232.
64 For more information on the casualties o f  Chechen War, see Shearman and Sussex, “Globalization, N ew  
Wars and the War in C hechnya,” 203, 2 0 1 -2 0 6  and Cornell, Sm all N ations an d  G rea t Powers, 2 2 0 -3 8 .
65 96 percent o f  the Chechen people approved o f  the new  constitution.
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ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN GEORGIA AND THE STABILITY IN CAUCASUS
Another trouble spot in the post-Soviet World was Georgia which has been hit 
worst by internal conflicts. Georgia is located on the transit routes of Caspian oil. Major 
oil pipelines proposed to be built passes through the territories of Georgia. Therefore, 
instability in the region directly affects the oil development projects and the 
transportation of Caspian oil. Georgia has experienced three major struggles starting 
with 1988 to 1993. Georgia has fought two bloody ethnic wars and tom with internal 
power struggle after the end of the Soviet Union. One of the main reasons for the rise of 
ethnic strife in Georgia is related to the old Russian divide and rule system. As we have 
indicated in the previous sections, the Caucasus region has a highly complex ethnic 
structure with numerous ethnic groups spread across the territories of many nationalities. 
The Soviet system allowed the allocation of ethnicities under the rule of Caucasian states. 
In Georgia, the Abkhaz and the Ossets are the largest group of ethnic minorities. The 
Soviets established Abkhazia as an autonomous republic under Georgia while South 
Ossetia was made a region under Georgian rule. As it stands from this hierarchical 
structure, the Soviets stands at the top of the political pyramid, where Georgia follows the 
ladder of hierarchy after Soviets and then the autonomous republics and regions take 
their place.
The general impact of Gorbachev’s perestroika was also felt hard in Georgia 
where the autonomous republic of Abkhazia and autonomous region of South Ossetia 
moved for either independence or unification with North Ossetia under Soviet Union, 
breaking away from Georgian rule. The early stages of the Abkhaz and Osset movement 
was met by rejection by the Georgian authorities and mainly remained at the level of
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verbal confrontation through decreeing political statements and laws. However, as the 
Georgian nationality started to rise in Georgia, the other ethnicities followed suit. The 
heavy rhetoric of the Georgian National Movement alerted the ethnicities in Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia forcing them to introduce countermeasures against rising Georgian 
nationalism.66
Abkhazia
On the border of Russia Abkhazia is located on a strategic gateway to Russia.67 A 
total of half a million population, Abkhazia enjoyed a high level of standards compared 
to the rest of the country. The rich mineral resources and tourist sites and their 
relationship with Russia advantaged Abkhazians over the other nationalities in Georgia. 
Despite the fact that the Abkhazia constituted an average 18 percent of the Abkhazian 
territory68 they dominated the economic and political life mainly because of their close 
relationship with the Soviet Union and constant demand for cessation from Georgia.69 
Soviet leadership increased their share each time they demanded unification with Soviet 
Union as an autonomous republic.70
This has actually caused grievances on the other side where Georgians constituted 
the majority of the population (45 percent) but were treated like a small minority. And
66 M onica D uffy  Toft, “T w o-W ay Mirror Nationalism : The Case o f  Ajaria,” in The C aspian  R egion Vol II: 
The C aucasus, ed. M oshe Gammer (London: R outledge, 2004).
67 The R epublic o f  Abkhazia covers 3 ,300 square m iles betw een the eastern shores o f  the B lack Sea and the 
crest line o f  the main Caucasus range; from the rivers Psou (in the North) and Ingur (In the south). To the 
north, Abkhazia is bordered by Russia and to the south by the Georgian provinces o f  Svanetia and 
M ingrelia. Around 74 percent o f  the territory is mountains or mountain approaches.
68 Total population o f  Abkhazia was around h alf a m illion during 1990s o f  w hich only 93 ,000  o f  them were 
Abkhaz. Georgians constituted 45 percent o f  the population w hile Armenians and A zeris accounted for the 
30 percent o f  the R epublic. Herzig, The N ew  Caucasus, 76.
69 Bruno Coppieters and Robert L egvold, eds., S ta teh ood  an d  Security: G eorg ia  after the R ose R evolution  
(Cambridge, MA: A m erican A cadem y o f  Arts and Sciences: M IT Press, 2005), 88.
70 M oscow  allocated tw o third o f  party and governm ent positions within the Republic to them, though they  
accounted for only about one sixth o f  its population. H erzig, The N ew  C aucasus, 77.
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yet, the Abkhazian administration constantly complained about the movement of 
Georgian nationalities to Abkhazia to reduce the proportion of Abkhazian population. In 
March 1990, the Georgian state declared independence from Soviet Union that initiated a 
serious of political and military confrontation within the country.
Following the Georgian declaration of independence, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet 
unilaterally declared itself as a sovereign republic and asked for Moscow to be integrated 
into the Soviet Union as a Union Republic. Although the Georgian authorities declared 
this step invalid at that time, due to the internal situation, Georgian response to Abkhazia 
remained at political level.71 After two years of internal political struggle, Georgian 
authorities managed to bring the ends together. Only after that the Georgian government 
took the issue at hand seriously to find a solution. With Shevardnadze strengthening his 
position in the capital, the nature of the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia started to 
change.72 In August 1991, the Georgian National Guard moved onto the Abkhaz capital. 
One of the events that ignited the start of a military conflict is the kidnapping of two 
Georgian high level politicians by the Gamsakhurdia troops to a town in Abkhazia. The 
war broke out between the Georgian and the Abkhaz military units and the national guard 
of Georgia entered the capital of Abkhazia and plundered the city. Despite the fact that 
the Georgian army had the upper hand at the beginning, the tide of the war shifted as the
71 The only measure taken by Gamsakhurdia administration was a power sharing agreement with  
Abkhazians. A ccording to that agreement, “electoral districts w ould be demarcated according to ethnic 
lines effectively  giving each group a quota o f  seats in the new  65-seat Abkhazian parliament. Thus the 
Georgian population representing (45.7  percent o f  the population o f  Abkhazia in 1989) w ould receive 26  
seats, the Abkhazians (representing 17.8 percent) w ould receive 28 seats, w hile the other groups (primarily 
Armenians [14.6 percent] and Russians [14.3 percent] w ould receive the remaining 11 seats).” Coppieters 
and L egvold, S ta teh ood  a n d  Security, 95.
72 O'Ballance, Wars in the Caucasus, 1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 5 , 112-132 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
161
Abkhaz army started receiving reinforcements from the Northern Caucasus region.73 
With the involvement of Russia on the side of Abkhazia, the Georgians had to pull back 
with a humiliating defeat. The war ended in 1993 with Abkhaz victory. Georgia and 
Abkhazia signed a ceasefire agreement in September 1993 leaving the status of the 
Republic to future negotiations. With an agreement signed in 1994, Russian 
peacekeeping forces were deployed on the borders to prevent further escalation of 
violence. The war had devastating effects for both Abkhazia and Georgia apart from the 
casualties reported to be around 4-8 thousand. The war especially damaged the Abkhaz 
economy that very much depended on the stability of the region. The war also created 
further problems for both parties on the settlement of the issue of the repatriation of a 
200,000-250,000 Georgian in Abkhazia who had to flee their homes in fear of violence 
and harassment after the Georgian attack on Abkhaz capital.74
The ceasefire agreement has been brokered by Russia in return for Georgia’s 
acceptance to join in the CIS. In fact the rejection of Georgian government to join in the 
CIS has proved to be deadly for Georgia, since Russia in both the Abkhaz and the Osset 
conflict actively supported the irredentist movements. The Shevardnadze government had 
to bow to the Russian pressure to join in the CIS which eventually made it possible for 
Georgians to reach to a ceasefire agreement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
73 “The North Caucasus (som etim es referred to as C iscaucasia or C iscaucasus) is the northern part o f  the 
Caucasus region between Europe and Asia. The term is also used as a synonym  for the North Caucasus 
Econom ical R egion o f  Russia. Politically, the Northern Caucasus (territory north o f  the Greater Caucasus 
Range) includes the Russian Republics o f  the North Caucasus as w ell as several regions o f  Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. A s part o f  the Russian Federation, the Northern Caucasus R egion is included in the Southern 
Federal District and consists o f  Krasnodar Krai, Stavropol Krai and the autonom ous republics: Karachay- 
Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria, A dygea, North O ssetia, Ingushetia, Chechnya, and Dagestan. In Georgia, 
the North Caucasus includes the regions o f  Tusheti, K hevsureti, and K hevi.” “North Caucasus,” A vailable 
[Online]: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern Caucasus>  \ \ 2  September 20061.
74 Konstantin Ozgan, “A bkhazia— Problems and the Paths to their R esolution,” in C ontrasts a n d  Solutions  
in the Caucasus, ed. Ole Hoiris and Sefa Martin Yuriikel (Aarhus, O akville, CT: Aarhus U niv. Press, 
1998), 196.
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United Nations involved in the peace process and supported Russian mediation
'T f
and deployment of peacekeeping forces in May 1994. Although the military conflict 
ended between Abkhazia and Georgia, the main issue of the status of the Abkhaz 
Republic remains unresolved alongside with the return of a 200-250,000 Georgian 
refugees settled in Tbilisi. The refugee problem has been one of the most serious 
problems that placed a pressure on the Georgian governments as the Abkhazians are not 
in favor o f allowing a huge number of Georgians in Abkhazia in fear o f returning to be a 
small minority in their own territory.
South Ossetia
The conflict between South Ossetia and Georgia dates back to the times when 
South Ossetia was made an autonomous region under Georgia by the Soviet
7 f\Administration in Moscow. Ossets considered this as a part of a Russian strategy of 
divide and rule which separated the South Ossetians from the North Ossetians.77 As it is 
the case with Abkhaz people, the South Osset administration wanted to take advantage of 
loosing Soviet grip on the republics and petitioned for unification with North Ossetia as
75 2500  Russian PKF deployed along with a 150 U N  observers patrolling security zone. See ibid., 192.
76 A s o f  1989, the autonom ous oblast o f  South O ssetia within Georgia had a population o f  nearly 100,000, 
o f  whom  66.2 percent were O ssetes and 29 percent Georgians. A long with them in South O ssetia reside 
Russians, Georgians, Armenians, Greeks— a total o f  40 nationalities. H alf o f  the fam ilies in the region were 
o f  m ixed G eorgian-O ssetian descent. The O ssetes are descendants o f  the ancient A lan tribes o f  Iranian 
stock. Som e o f  them are Orthodox Christians and som e (in certain regions o f  North O ssetia) are M uslim s. 
“South O ssetia,” A vailable [Online]: <http://ww w.policv.hu/~gom elauri/south ossetia.htm l> [12 
September 2006].
77 North O ssetia-A lania is one o f  the sovereign republics o f  Russian Federation. It is situated on the 
northern slopes o f  the central Caucasus between tw o o f  the highest mountain peaks in Europe, Elbrous 
(5613m ) and K azbeck (5047m ). North O ssetia-A lania is one o f  the sm allest, m ost densely populated and 
multi-cultural republics in Russian Federation. The findings o f  the last census o f  1989 show  that the 
population o f  646 ,000  inhabitants represents about 100 nationalities living on an area o f  8 ,000 sq.km. (81 
people to every sq.km .). V ladikavkaz is the capital o f  North Ossetia-Alania. “The R epublic o f  North  
O ssetia,’’A vailable [Online]:
< http://www.friends-partners.org/oldfriends/ossetia/index.htm l>  [21 August 2006],
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an autonomous republic in 1990. In 1992 South Ossetia held a referendum and with a 99 
percent of support from its people; the South Osset administration demanded unification 
with North Ossetia under Russian Federation as an autonomous republic. The Osset 
demands were rejected by the Georgians and occasional fighting broke out as early as 
1990 and intensified in 1991 and 1992.
Georgia was caught between a series of ethnic troubles and internal power 
struggles at a time of transition form Soviet rule to a sovereign independent state. 
Especially the internal power struggle hampered Georgian efforts to deal with these 
issues effectively. After the removal of Gamsakhurdia regime in 1991 by a violent coup 
d'etat, Edward Shevardnadze, an experienced and respected Georgian leader took control 
o f the Georgian government.78 It was up until 1995 that Shevardnadze had to deal with 
serious internal opposition which he skillfully eliminated one by one. Even after the 
removal of Gamsakhurdia, he continued to pose a threat to Tbilisi, as he organized 
military factions in exile. Caught in the middle, the Georgian government had to deal 
with these two sources of conflicts at the same time which left the country in political and 
economical turmoil. Coupled with Russian involvement, Georgia had hard times in 
resolving ethnic issues. In the case o f South Ossetia, military confrontation took place in 
South Osset capital and elsewhere in the Osset territory between Osset militias and the 
Georgian army. As the Ossets received considerable support from North Ossetia and 
Russia, the Georgian army got defeated once again and had to agree on a ceasefire 
brokered by Russia. The agreement became possible after Georgia accepted Russian
78 For more on the details o f  the internal struggle and chaotic environm ent during Gamsakhurdia regim e, 
see Ghia N odia, “Political Turmoil in Georgia and the Ethnic P olicies o f  Zviad Gamsakhurdia,” in 
C on tested  B orders in the Caucasus, ed. Bruno Coppieters (Pleinlaan Brussels: V U B  U niversity Press, 
1996), 7 3 -9 1 .
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troops on Georgia and in South Ossetia. A joint coalition was established to manage the 
ceasefire and the Georgian, Russian and Osset peacekeeping forces.
The war between Georgia and South Ossetia resulted in the death of 500-600 
people. Around 12,000 Georgians (out of approximately 30,000 living in South Ossetia) 
left the region in several waves between 1990 and 1992. At the same time, 
approximately 30,000 Ossets living in Georgia left for North Ossetia in response to
70Gamsakhurdia’s nationalist outburst.
In this crisis and ceasefire, international organizations did not play a considerable 
role other than an OSCE representative being present in the negotiations. The South 
Osset conflict ended in a more peaceful manner than other conflicts we have seen in 
Caucasus after the end of the cold war. With Russian involvement and OSCE’s support 
the parties agreed to stop to use to threat to use military force in resolving the existing 
disagreements. A series of negotiations took place starting with 1992 towards 1996. 
However the talks between two sides have not produced outcome that is conducive to a 
permanent peace in the region. The issue of the status of South Ossetia remains to be an 
obstacle for a final resolution of the crises between two parties. As long as the issue 
remains unresolved, the Osset problem will continue to be a concern for instability for 
both Georgia and Caucasus. Torn between ethnic conflicts and internal power struggle, 
Georgia suffered badly in the phase of transition after independence.80 The conflicts and 
human suffering in Georgia and in other parts of the Transcaucasus region created a zone
79 Coppieters and L egvold, S ta teh ood  an d  Security, 107.
80 Zam an G azetesi report that the internal conflicts in Georgia although at a smaller level still poses a threat 
to the stability o f  the region. Zam an G azetesi, 19 March 2004.
http://w w w .zam an.com .tr/7bEdishaberler& alt=& trh=20040319& hn=27908 (A ccessed  on March 19 2004)
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of instability.81 The extent of the wars and the damage inflicted on the economic and 
social lives of the people in the Transcaucasus area heavily affected the future prospects 
for prosperity and transition to democracy in the whole region.
Having examined the extent of the military conflicts and wars in Caucasus region, 
we may move onto the investigation of the impact of these wars on the interstate 
relationship and cooperation on the issue of oil development in the Caspian region.
MILITARY CONFLICTS IN THE CAUCASUS AND THE CASPIAN OIL 
DEVELOPMENT
The intensity and the extent of the violence in the region gathered international 
attention due to the spread of gross human right violations. Coupled with the 
geostrategic importance of the region for external powers and the existence of rich oil 
resources, transcaucasian region and the military conflicts in the former Soviet Union 
dominated the political agenda of major external powers alongside with international 
institutions. Despite the fact that powerful states in the region tried to play a role in the 
settlement of the disputes, the initiatives by these states and the international institutions 
did not produce a considerable positive outcome in terms of the achievement of a 
permanent peace in the region. Apart from the devastation of the cities and nation states, 
the wars in Transcaucasia region crippled the possibility of economic development 
considering the already existing difficulties that are accompanied with the transition from 
communist economic system to market economy. The states, directly or indirectly 
involved in the conflict, could not achieve a level of cooperation that would create an
81 For more information on the atrocities against civilians and ethnic groups in Georgia, see Denber,
B loodsh ed  in the C aucasus.
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environment for economic development through internal and external investments. In 
this part of the chapter, I would like to focus on the reasons behind the failure for 
cooperation for the settlement of armed conflicts and their direct or indirect impacts on 
the development of oil industry in the Caspian region.
PEACE PROCESS IN CAUCASIA AND INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
As soon as the armed conflict started between Azerbaijan and Armenians of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, international institutions and regional actors offered their assistance. 
However, despite the long and persistent efforts of Minsk Group under OSCE, the peace 
process failed utterly. In fact OSCE was the only international organization in the region 
to provide any sort of mediation between conflicting parties.
The role of international institutions in preventing armed conflict is one of the 
issues that has been extensively discussed in international relations theory. Scholars of 
neoliberal thought asserted the usefulness of international organizations (10) in the 
settlement of the disputes among states.82 According to neoliberals, institutions can 
“provide information, reduce transaction costs, make commitment more credible, 
establish focal points for coordination and in general facilitate the operation of
82 The literature on the issue is huge and expanding as new  studies add up. For more details on the neo­
liberal perspective see Robert 0 .  K eohane and Joseph S. N ye, P ow er an d  In terdependence  (N ew  York: 
Harper Collins, 1989); Oran R. Y oung, “International Regim es: Toward a N ew  Theory o f  Institutions,” 
W orld P o litics  39, no. 1 (October 1986); Oran R. Y oung “The E ffectiveness o f  International Institutions: 
Hard Cases and Critical Variables,” in G overnance w ithout Governm ent, ed. James M. R osenau and Ernst- 
Otto C zem piel (Cambridge: Cambridge U niversity Press, 1992); John Gerard R uggie, “Continuity and 
Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a N eorealist Synthesis,” W orld P o litics  35, no. 2 (January 
1983); A lexander W endt, “Constructing International P olitics,” In ternational Security  20, no. 1 (1995); 
Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan “The Promise o f  C ollective Security,” In ternational Security  
20, no. 1 (Sum mer 1995); John Gerard R uggie, “The False Premise o f  R ealism ,” In ternational Security  20, 
no. 1 (Sum mer 1995); Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, “The Promise o f  Institutionalist Theory,” 
In ternational Security  20 , no. 1 (Sum mer 1995).
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• 83reciprocity.” On the other hand, the neo-realist theory claims that IOs do not play a 
major role in international relations that the role of IOs in affecting the state behavior in 
international arena is limited. Neorealists focus on the role of state as an actor in an 
anarchic international system where each individual actor pursues their own interest.84 
According to the realists, cooperation among states is only possible if it is meaningful in 
terms of their national interests. Relative gain considerations jeopardize international 
cooperation. Additionally, fear o f being cheated in cooperation drives states away from 
cooperation. It is because that, in absolute gain, states focus only on their gain but in real 
world states pursue relative gain that calculates its sheer gain on the basis of other’s gain 
and loss.85 For realists, institutions reflect state calculations of self-interest based 
primarily on concerns about relative power; therefore Institutions do not have significant 
effects on state behavior.
In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the other conflicts that have taken 
place in the region, the role of international institutions remained very limited. In terms 
of the explanatory power o f the IR theories, neo-realist school of thought could be 
applied to the events that that have taken place in the region. Policies of the states in 
conflict and also the external powers that were involved in the peace process could better 
be explained through neo-realist explanation of interstate interaction. First of all, despite 
the mediation efforts by IOs and the neighbor countries, the conflicting parties did not
83 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “ The Promise o f  Institutionalist Theory: R esponse to John J. 
M earsheim er,” Journal o f  International Security  20, no. 1 (Sum mer 1995): 42.
84 The literature on the issue is quite extensive. The fo llow ing articles and books touches upon the 
realist/neo-realist perspectives on the issue stated above: John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise o f  
International Institutions”; L isa L. Martin and Beth A . Sim m ons, “Theories and Empirical Studies o f  
International Organizations, ” In ternational O rganization  52, no. 4 (1998); Randall L. Schw eller and David  
Preiss, “A  Tale o f  Two Realism s: Expanding the Institutions D ebate,” M ershon In ternational S tudies 
R eview  41, no. 1 (M ay 1997).
85 For more on the realist v iew s, see Morgenthau, P olitics am ong Nations', W altz, Theory o f  In ternational 
Politics', and Keohane, ed., N eorealism  an d  its C ritics.
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consider ending the armed conflict as a viable option. This is particularly related to the 
nature of the issue at stake. Armenians and other ethnicities considered their 
independence and sovereignty as an issue of utmost importance (high politics). As neo­
realists would suggest the likelihood of regimes and international institutions to play an 
important role in high politics is very low.86 In light of the rising nationalism on the host 
nations, the ethnicities deemed it an issue of life and death to protect their borders and 
identities. “Rivalries, such as those in Nagorno-Karabakh, are not disposed to local 
solutions because the rivals tend to view their security relations as a zero-sum game in 
which the perceived gain of one side is considered a loss for the other. In such cases 
there is little room for bargaining or negotiations between rivals, or among factions, 
within a group or state. The Karabakh Armenians and the Azerbaijanis see the very 
survival and legitimacy of their states at stake.”87 Under these circumstances and this 
line of thought, the conflicting parties did not pay much attention to the mediation efforts. 
As in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan, temporary cooperation on peace 
issues has been used to regroup their forces to launch fresh attacks on adversaries.
Another factor that contributed to the failure of interstate cooperation is the zero-
sum thinking of the parties in conflict. A gain by one side is considered as a loss for
88other party. P. Terrence Hopmann suggests that, “third parties can be especially helpful 
in directing negotiations away from a zero-sum conflict model toward a more problem
86 M earsheimer suggests that “Liberal institutionalism is generally thought to be o f  limited utility in the 
security realm, because fear o f  cheating is considered a much greater obstacle to cooperation when military 
issues are at stake.” M earsheimer, “The False Prom ise o f  International Institutions.”
87 W endy Betts, “Third Party Mediation: A n O bstacle to Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh,” Sais R eview  19, no. 
2 (1999): 167.
88 “Armenia: Ex-Speaker Says Authorities Lack Political W ill for Karabakh Settlem ent,” M EDIAM AX, 12 
M ay 2004. See also “M inister Says Nagorno-Karabakh M ust B ecom e Party to Peace Talks,” N O YA N  
TAP A N , 6 M ay 2002 , FBIS-SOV— 0510, 2002.
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solving orientation.”89 Another factor that stalled the negations and rendered the efforts 
of OSCE’s Minsk Group is the deeply ingrained disputes between the Azeri and 
Armenian nationalists. The historical factors and current developments draw each party 
to extreme distrust and a dehumanization of enemy which eventually made it difficult to 
come to compromise despite the intense efforts spent by the members of Minsk Group 
This again coincides with the neo-realist approach which suggests that states in 
international arena cannot trust adversaries and has to rely on their own resources for 
survival. The prevalent distrust and suspicion against adversaries in the regional conflicts 
may prolong the security dilemma and is already leading to arm procurement.90 As Katik 
suggests, “the strengthening of naval forces and border troops would serve only to 
increase the insecurity of the each o f the littoral states at this stage.”91
Most of the points stated above could also be applied to the conflicts in Georgia 
and Chechnya as well. The Abkhaz and South Osset conflicts developed in the same line 
with Azerbaijan and Armenia. Ethnic groups had to resort to military means under the 
perception that the Georgian pressure is directed at their very own survival as an entity. 
John Mearsheimer suggests that combatants are motivated by a security dilemma relating 
to power politics, prompting wars of territorial expansion.92 The international institutions 
again proved to be useless in bringing a final solution to those conflicts considering the 
fact that the ceasefires that stopped these conflicts were brokered by Russia and yet no 
final solution has emerged. OSCE’s attempt can be categorized under different phases.
89 Quoted in Betts, “Third Party M ediation,” 5, see also P. Terrence Hopmann, The N egotia tion  P rocess  
a n d  the R esolution o f  In ternational C onflicts  (Columbia: U niversity o f  South Carolina Press, 1998), 242.
90 Security D ilem m a exists when many o f  the means by w hich a state tries to increase its security decrease 
the security o f  others. Charles L. Glasier, “The Security D ilem m a R evisited,” W orld P o litics  50, no. 1 
(1997): 171. For more details on Security D ilem m a, see Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security D ilem m a,” 
167 -214 .
91 Katik, “M ilitarisation o f  the Caspian Sea,” 308.
92 John M earsheimer, The Tragedy o f  G rea t P o w er P o litics  (N ew  York: W .W . Norton, 2001).
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The initial years of OSCE’s involvement in the conflict was dominated by small 
countries of Europe with less interest in the region. The initial years also coincides with 
less Russian resistance within OSCE. As the Armenians continued to push towards 
Azerbaijani territories and captured many of the strategic cities, the concerns over the 
conflict increased especially when it became a threat to regional countries. In the second 
phase of the mediation efforts, OSCE has been strengthened by the support of the United 
States, France and Turkey. In 1993, Minsk Group proposed an agreement for ceasefire 
and asked Armenians to evacuate Kelbajar. The Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians rejected 
the proposal on the ground that controlling the Kelbajar area provides them a security and 
a lifeline to Armenia. The very next month they started a new series of attacks on 
Azerbaijan and the OSCE’s proposal has been rejected. Despite the internal disturbances 
created by Russia within OSCE roof, the Minsk Group continued to work on the issue. A 
draft proposal was accepted by all the OSCE members including Azerbaijan in Lisbon 
Summit in December 1996. The document called for a settlement between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia based on Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and highest form of self- 
government for Nagorno-Karabakh and protection for Armenian people. Despite the 
unanimity of the OSCE members, Armenia vetoed the proposal on the ground that it does 
not accommodate Armenian needs and requests. After the inclusion of France and the 
United States in the administrative chambers of Minsk Group, in 1997 the three chairman 
of the Minsk Group proposed a phased settlement to the dispute. The proposal asked for 
the return of the occupied territories to Azerbaijan and settlement of the issue of refuges 
by allowing them to return their homes. These were expected to be followed by the 
lifting of the Turkish-Azeri blockade on Armenia and deployment of Peacekeeping
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forces. The issue of the statues of Nagorno-Karabakh was to be settlement in the second 
stage. Azeris accepted the plan but the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians again rejected the 
plan immediately on the ground that it does not provide Armenians sufficient guarantees. 
In the coming years, the OSCE members continued their efforts and tried to react to an 
acceptable settlement through direct negotiations starting with 1999. The presidents of 
Armenia and Azerbaijan met in Washington in 1999 but the meeting was not particularly 
productive in terms of improving the conditions. The same pattern of mediation efforts 
and bilateral talks continued up to our day without much improvement. The OSCE as an 
institution failed in attempts at bringing a final resolution to the conflict.
One of the main reasons behind the ineffectiveness of International Institutions is 
the defection of the major actor; namely Russia to involve in joint decision making. The 
unilateral initiatives of Russia raises the question about the effectiveness o f IOs in 
conflict resolution and providing a cooperative environment. The attitude of Russia in 
NK peace process and ineffectiveness of OSCE and UN makes the neorealist claim more 
applicable in such circumstances; as Menzel puts it, “Contrary to the institutionalist 
desire that regimes makes a difference, neorealist criticism of regime is applicable: 
cooperation via regime is a matter of convenience easily cast away if unilateralism 
promises better results from the perspective o f national interest”93 The problem here is 
that, OSCE does not possess troops and military assets to deploy or to intervene in case 
of an emergency conflict. OSCE needs the facilities of NATO or WEU to engage in the 
crises.94 But, taking into consideration of the decision-making procedures both in OSCE
93 M enzel, D oom ed  to C oopera te , 141.
94 At June 1992, foreign ministers conferences in OSLO , N A T O  pledged to support on a case by case basis 
in accordance with its ow n procedures, peace keeping activities, under the responsibility o f  the OSCE, 
including by m aking available A lliances forces and expertise. Charles Krupnick, “Europe’s
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and in NATO, it becomes obvious that a decision to intervene militarily in a conflict is 
very difficult therefore makes OSCE useless and ineffective in providing an enforcement 
mechanism in the events of mediation.
Displacement of more than a million Azeri and Armenians forced the 
involvement of the regional countries of Iran and Turkey. Due to the precarious ethnic 
situation in Iran, Iran had to involve in the process to control the passage of the refugees 
and also to stop them on the border to prevent a complication in the Azeri populated 
Northern Iran.95 Iran offered its assistance on several occasions to control the situation 
and the armed conflict. First, all of the countries involved in the process hoped to be in a 
leading position in the settlement of disputes which is expected to bring a some sort of a 
reputation in the region. This type of consideration and thinking created lots of problems 
in the peace process and mediation efforts. As each actor came up with its own proposal 
for the settlement of the issues, it created confusion for the parties in conflict. All of a 
sudden, they found themselves in a position to choose among the best offer and support 
certain proposals over others. “The intervention of mediators is legitimized by the goal of 
conflict reduction, which they typically proclaim. Their desire to mediate is, however, 
intertwined with other motives best described within the context o f power politics ... 
mediators are players in the plot of relations around the conflict, with some interest in its 
outcome; otherwise they would not mediate.”96 The proposal brought up by Turkey, Iran 
and Russia reflected their own version of a solution that conflicted with each other. In
Intergovernmental NGO: The OSCE in Europe’s Emerging Security Structure,” E uropean Security  7, no. 2 
(Sum mer 1998): 34.
95 Abdollah Ramazanzadeh, “Iran’s R ole as Mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh C rises,” in C on tested  
B orders in the Caucasus, ed. Bruno Coppieters (Pleinlaan Brussels: V UB U niversity Press, 1996).
96 Saadia Touval and I. W illiam  Zartman, “M ediation in International C onflicts,” in M ediation  R esearch , 
ed. Kenneth K ressel and Dean G. Pruitt (San Francisco: Jossey-B ass Publishers, 1989), 117.
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other words, the conflict has been transferred to the mediators.97 Nevertheless, the 
attempts made by these states carried the goal o f achieving a solution brought by them as 
this would increase their status in the region. As we have indicated in the previous 
chapters, Russia, Turkey and Iran compete for influence in the region. That competition 
also took place in the mediation efforts; which resulted in confusion and delay and also 
limited their ability to act as a neutral agent in the process. “The existence of parallel 
mediation tracks led to the parties’ attempts to play one mediation off against the other, to
Q O
shop around for more advantageous terms.” Dina Malysheva argues that “attempts to 
normalize the situation in the South Caucasus by reaching a consensus on the principles 
of peaceful coexistence in the region are impeded by the great divergence of interests of 
the regional countries and deeply affected by the attitudes of the principal actors... .at this 
point, Armenia and Azerbaijan are unable to agree on any of these issues including the 
prospects for settling Karabakh conflict and achievement of regional security. Far from 
helping to phase out the current confrontation in the Caucasus, this serves to enhance the 
trend towards polarization, with Armenia, Iran and Russia facing Azerbaijan, Georgia 
and Turkey backed by the USA and NATO.”99
The parties to the conflict rejected the participation of some mediators because of 
their involvement in the conflict on the side of their adversaries. The Armenian 
opposition to Turkey and Azeri suspicion towards Russia could be considered as an
97 A  quotation by in M ay 1993 explains the situation in a very succinct w ay. “To m y great regret, the war 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan long ceased to be a war betw een tw o rivals from the Caucasus. This is a 
war in w hich the com bating peoples have becom e the pawns o f  the mightier pow ers.” “The R ole o f  
Caspian Oil in M aintaining Stability in the Caucasus Region: In the Case o f  M ountainous Karabakh 
C onflict,” Chapter 1, A vailable [Online]: < http://www.zerbaiian.com /azeri/dadash2.htm > [9 September 
2006].
98 Cornell, Sm all N ations an d  G rea t P ow ers, 113.
99 M alysheva, “The C onflict in Nagorno-Karabakh,” 280.
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example to these. As the efforts of the regional powers have been seen biased by the 
warring factions, the mediation attempts failed in many instances.
The role of Russia however should be discussed in detail here since the 
development of the armed conflicts and the ceasefire agreements has a lot to do with 
Russian policies and its involvement. A general Russian policy to reestablish a certain 
level of control in the region played a big role in the development of the aforementioned 
crises and armed conflicts.100
In that line o f thinking, Russian policy was concentrated around establishment of 
a military presence in Azerbaijan and Armenia. The shift in Russian policies towards 
ethnicities and Caspian states coincides with their choices to allow Russian forces on 
their territory.101 Although Russia sided with Azerbaijan for a long time, after the rise of 
nationalist movements and anti-Soviet sentiments in Azerbaijan, Russia provided full 
support to Armenia and transferred large amounts of weaponry. Soon after the Azeri 
government joined in the CIS, Russia started to back Azerbaijan and in 1994 a ceasefire 
was brokered by Russia.102 The same attitude was also visible in the Georgian 
conflicts.103 Only after the Georgian government allowed Russian troops on Georgian 
soil, the ceasefire entered into force through Russian mediation.104
Despite the fact that the OSCE and in some cases UN involved in the peace 
process in Transcaucasia region, the ceasefire agreements have been reached through
100 Suzanne Crow, “Russia Seeks Leadership in Regional P eacekeeping,” RFE/RL R esearch  R eport, 9 April 
1 9 9 3 ,2 8 .
101 Betts, “Third Party M ediation,” 171-73 .
102 A ydin B alayev and A liaga M em edov, “The Karabakh C onflict and Present D ay Situation,” 3 4 5 -5 5 .
103 Although Russia involved in peacekeeping activities som e state that Russia is interested in keeping the 
region destabilized. On the other hand som e argues that rather than instability, “the contemporary status 
quo lacking a full solution therefore seem s to suit Russian objectives best.” M enzel, D o o m ed  to C oopera te , 
129.
104 For more details on the Russian activities to maintain its influence in the region, see Arslan,
“Azerbaycan Ekonom isinde G ecis D onem i,” 125 -253 .
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Russian initiatives leaving no ground o f success for international institutions. After years 
of armed conflict and negotiations, the transcaucasia region remains to be an area of 
potential violence since no permanent solution to the disputes have been reached. For the 
time being, parties to conflict see it in their interest to avoid another military 
confrontation as it has proved to be very costly in terms of lives that perished and the 
devastation that it left behind
CONCLUSIONS: INSTABILITY AND OIL DEVELOPMENT
The instability caused by the wars in Azerbaijan, Armenia, Chechnya and 
Georgia affected the development of oil industry in the Caspian region. First of all, up 
until the signing of the ceasefires agreements, there has been no serious development in 
the Caspian region. The countries of the Caspian states and especially Azerbaijan as an 
oil producing country had to use their national resources for the compensation of the war 
and reconstruction of the country. If anything that the conflicts caused in the Caspian 
region is the use of national resources for war and after war reconstruction. However, 
these resources could have been effectively used for the early development of oil reserves 
which would have opened way for an earlier development in the export of oil from 
Caspian to other countries. President Ilham Aliyev confirmed this that “the absence o f a 
solution to this problem represents a constant source of considerable danger for the 
region. And my opinion is that the sooner this conflict is settled, the quicker peace and 
prosperity come to the region and the risks are reduced,”105 The signing of the Contract
105 “Azerbaijan President Calls Karabakh C onflict Source o f  Danger for R egion ,” Interfax T 08:52:47Z , 
Tuesday, 29 A ugust 2006.
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of the Century became possible after the end of the conflict between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia in 1994.106
The Caspian oil reserves are located mostly offshore and require a high tech 
drilling equipments which are not available to Caspian states. The old Soviet oil industry 
and equipment no longer effectively served the purpose. Depended on the oil reserves, 
Caspian states were in need of serious foreign involvement in the oil industry. However, 
the political instability in the region and wars prevented the flow of foreign investment in 
the Caspian Sea. Investment in oil industry requires huge commitments and a large 
amount of money which makes the oil companies very sensitive to the present and future 
stability o f the region.107 Having seen this necessity and the need for foreign direct 
investment (FDI), Azerbaijan accepted the ceasefire agreement and focused on more on 
the oil industry and export.
However, a permanent stability in the region is far from complete as the 
fundamental issues between states remain to be resolved and potential for an escalation of
armed conflict is possible in the future depending on the course of developments and
108interstate relationships. The involvement of the United States in the peace process in 
the region could be considered form this perspective, with the arrival American oil 
companies and the rising investment, the U.S. government started to pay more attention
106 W e may suggest that the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia at least slow ed dow n A zeri o il industry 
and export by four years considering the start and end o f  the conflict between tw o rivals. One may also  
suggest that the war has slow ed dow n the developm ents by more than 4 years considering the fact that 
Azerbaijan had to spend som e o f  its national resources and efforts for after war reconstruction and 
rehabilitation.
107 See Steve A . Y etiv, “Peace, Interdependence, and the M iddle East, P o litica l Science Q uarterly  12, no. 1 
(1997): 36.
108 I f  either country (G eorgia and/or Azerbaijan) were affected by internal turmoil due to unsettled  
succession problems, popular discontent might w ell be directed against the political establishment. This in 
turn w ould trigger the flight o f  international investment. Urs Gerber, “Whither South Caucasus: To 
Prosperity or to Conflict?” in The Caspian: Politics, E nergy an d  Security, ed. Shirin Akiner (London: 
R outledgeCurzon-Taylor Francis Group, 2004), 326.
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to the Caspian affairs.109 As Kenneth Weisbrode confirms, “The incentive o f the U.S. 
and Turkey to control any renewed conflict has increased with growing commercial 
investment in the region.”110 In 1997, alongside with France, the United States joined in 
the Minsk Group as a co-chair to promote peace talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan. 
For United States, “conflict resolution efforts are motivated by the underlying strategic 
objective of realizing an east-west corridor. This implies that as Washington became 
more interested in the Caspian Sea’s energy resources, the interest in the solution of 
Karabakh conflict grew, precisely because the potential for conflict poses risk for 
investors. Yet, if this conflict is resolved, further opportunities for regional cooperation 
will emerge.”111
Yet, the instability in the region and the conflicts between different groups 
continued to pose problems for the development o f oil business in the Caspian region. 
Especially within the discussions of pipelines and possible routes towards open seas, the 
existing conflicts and potential for escalation posed serious threats.112 As the proposed 
pipelines had to go through certain areas in the region, where the security of the pipelines 
could not be guaranteed because of the potential for wars and trouble spots, the
109 A lthough the United States supported the territorial integrity o f  Azerbaijan, a powerful Armenian lobby 
in the United States affected U .S . involvem ent in the region and precluded Azerbaijan from receiving U .S . 
aid through Section 907 o f  the Freedom Support Act; despite the fact that A rm enia currently occupies a 20  
percent o f  A zeri territory. A s the United States got involved in the Caspian Sea oil developm ent process, 
the impact o f  Armenian lobby is doom ed to fade because o f  the vast influence o f  oil lobby in the United  
States. (For more on the Armenian Lobby and changing balance in W ashington see Chorbajian, The 
M aking o f  N agorno-K arabakh, 2 0 -2 2 .)
110 W eisbrode, C en tra l E urasia: P rize  or Quicksand?, 32.
111 M enzel, D oom ed  to C oopera te , 126.
112 “N ot one drop o f  A zeri oil w ill flow  from the Caspian to international markets.” R. Kocharyan, the 
president o f  Armenia. “The R ole o f  Caspian Oil in M aintaining Stability in the Caucasus Region: In the 
Case o f  M ountainous Karabakh C onflict,” Chapter 2, A vailable [Online]: 
<http://www.zerbaiian.com /azeri/dadash3.htm > [2 D ecem ber 2004].
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development of pipeline projects have been delayed for some time.113 Because of the 
Azeri Armenian conflict, the proposed Baku-Ceyhan pipeline had to be extended towards 
Georgian territory, despite the fact that route towards Armenia to Turkey could have been 
a lot easier and cheaper.114 Yet any proposal of such nature has been immediately 
rejected by Azeris. The same is true for an Iranian option that has been fiercely opposed 
by the United States because of the conflict between Iran and the United States. The 
conflicts and wars in the region reduced the possible options for the development o f oil 
industry and the pipeline proposals; as it is also true for Russia that the Chechen crises in 
the region diminished the potential for Northern route as a viable option for the 
transportation of the Caspian oil. Although the conflicts in the region have been frozen, 
it still poses a threat to the development of oil industry in the Caspian region and also for 
smooth functioning of the economies of the regional states.
Apart from the human sufferings and the devastation that the armed conflicts have 
left behind, the development of oil industry in the Caspian Sea region has also been 
affected. Although these conflicts did not stop the eventual start of the improvements 
and investments in the oil industry, they have certainly slowed down the progress and 
prevented an effective and a steady development in the Caspian Sea region. For the 
future of the region and development of oil reserves in the Caspian Sea, it is important to 
note that “the necessary investments will only flow if investors can be assured of
113 Azerbaijan and International oil com panies have alw ays had great concerns on the security o f  the Baku- 
N ovorossiysk  pipeline over its security and viability as a stable option. During the fight betw een Chechnya 
and Russia, the pipeline has been damaged and sabotaged by the Chechen insurgents. They have also used  
the pipeline to threaten the Russian military operations in the region. Additionally, the local people  
developed a habit o f  breaking into the pipeline to steal oil. D espite the fact that R ussia insisted on the 
B aku-N ovorossiysk as MEP for A zeri oil, it could not provide a safe and a secure passage for the 
transportation o f  Azeri oil.
114 D espite the signing o f  the ceasefire agreements betw een G eorgia and South O ssetia, the Baku-Ceyhan  
pipeline’s security has been questioned on the ground that it passes through som e o f  the areas that has 
w itnessed ethnic conflicts in Georgia.
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adequate profits, this will require stability, the rule of law, a basic perception of 
prosperity and some degree of democracy in the region. Hence, the future prosperity o 
the region will depend in large measures on issues of stability and security.”115
115 Gerber, “Whither South Caucasus?” 3 2 2 -2 3 .
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CHAPTER VI
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE CASPIAN SEA REGION
The oil and gas reserves of the Caspian states are still underdeveloped more than a 
decade and a half after their independence. After the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, 
there was a wide consensus among energy economists and experts that the countries of 
the Caspian region would become important players in international oil markets. The 
disappointing level of developments should not be attributed to the absence of an interest 
and/or enthusiasm in these countries. In contrast, the countries of the Caspian Sea have 
been quite enthusiastic about the development of their oil industry and the potential for 
their economies. A bleak picture of the economies of the Caspian states and the fading 
expectations about the future prosperity that is expected to come with oil exports raises 
questions about the future prospects for the development of Caspian oil resources. The 
question here is not about the potential of the oil resources to provide wealth and 
economic opportunities for the Caspian states, but about the issue of the slow 
developments of the oil industry, contrary to the expectations and the desires of these 
states as well as international oil companies which has so far invested millions of dollars.
In this chapter, I will focus on the role of international institutions in resolving the 
interstate conflicts and issues in the Caspian region. By doing so, I intend to explore the 
role of IOs in the achievement of cooperation among states on the development of the 
Caspian Sea oil reserves. As we have argued in the previous chapters, cooperation 
among the states in the Caspian region over the development of Caspian Sea oil reserves 
has been quite slow and/or absent in some instances. If International Organizations are
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said to be an important mechanism through which states achieve cooperation on varieties 
of issues in different realms, we should be looking at the Caspian environment and try to 
find out why IOs in the Caspian region proved to be ineffective in the achievement of 
interstate cooperation, especially over the development of Caspian oil industry.
The Caspian region has been under Soviet rule for the last seventy years. The 
issues in the region have been dealt with under the terms of the Soviet rule. The countries 
of the Caspian Sea did not have chance to establish interstate institutions to deal with 
economic and political issues. As it is the case for the Central Asian countries, the 
transition period has proved itself to be very painful for the Caspian states as they have 
found themselves in an environment surrounded with, political, economic, social and 
ecological issues some o f which are deeply rooted in the legacy of Soviet Union to 
establish a firm control over the region.
Nonetheless, the former Soviet Republics struggled to find their way onto a 
straight path on their own with limited success. A region of high geopolitical value and 
rich oil reserves was not expected to be left alone. The involvement o f the external 
powers and the competition for influence in the region complicated the efforts of the 
Caspian States to consolidate themselves as stable political entities. Alongside with the 
Central Asian states and other former Soviet republics, the Caspian states were pressured 
into working their issues through establishment of international institutions with the 
initiation of the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) by Russia, an international 
organization emerged in the region and established itself as an important body in the 
regional affairs o f the Caspian and the Central Asian states. Along with the CIS as an 
international organization, some other institutions played important role in the Caspian
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region. The establishment of GUAM by Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova and 
the involvement of OSCE in the economic, political and security realms provided 
multiple venues for interstate cooperation and resolution of issues among regional 
countries. Despite the availability of International Organizations (IOs or IGOs), the 
resolution of regional issues under organizational structure has not been quite effective. 
The role of IOs in resolving issues among states and increasing the possibility of 
interstate cooperation has been recognized by the neoliberal school in International 
Relations Theory. The success of the International Organizations in Europe to bring the 
European States together and provide a forum for the discussion of the deep rooted 
conflicts has been given as an example for the potential o f IOs to provide peace and 
resolution to conflicts. The neorealist school on the other hand, disregards the potential 
for a great success under 10 roof and considers the possibility of conflict resolution and 
peace very limited.
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE CASPIAN CONTEXT
Before going through the examination of particular international and regional 
organizations that existed in the Caspian region, some of the basic discussions in 
International Relations Theory over the role of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) 
in international relations will be covered.1
1 This is not intended to be a com prehensive analysis o f  the current debate betw een neorealists and 
neoliberal schools. For more information on the details o f  liberal perspective, see K eohane and N ye, P ow er  
an d  In terdependence ; Oran R. Y oung, “International Regim es: Toward a N ew  Theory o f  Institutions,” 
W orld P o litics  39 (October 1986); Y oung, “The E ffectiveness o f  International Institutions”; R uggie, 
“Continuity and Transformation in the W orld Polity”; Wendt, “Constructing International P olitics” ; 
Kupchan and Kupchan “The Promise o f  C ollective Security”; R uggie, “The False Prem ise o f  R ealism ”; 
Keohane and Martin, “The Prom ise o f  Institutionalist Theory” ; Keohane and Martin, “The Promise o f  
Institutionalist Theory: R esponse to John J. M earsheimer,” 42; Martin and Sim m ons, “Theories and 
Empirical Studies o f  International Organizations”; Schw eller and Preiss, “A  Tale o f  Two R ealism s” ;
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An institution is defined as a “set of rules that stipulate the ways in which state 
should cooperate and compete with each other.”2 The differences between realists and 
liberal thinkers in their perception of states in international arena as an actor give rise to 
the differences in their approach to international institutions.
The realist paradigm assumes that there is a power struggle between states. Their 
aim is to be the dominant actor in international arena as well as preventing the other 
states from gaining power. In this setting, the struggle is continuous and the space for 
cooperation is very limited that makes global peace impossible. The ordering principle in 
international politics is anarchy and each state has to rely on its military capabilities.
Since no state can be sure about the others’ intention, competition is continuous. The
•5
basic motive for the state is survival and they need military power for potential threats.
In doing so, they want to maximize their relative gain. According to the realists, 
cooperation among states is only possible if  it is meaningful in terms of their national 
interests. An important point here is the analysis of relative/absolute gain that jeopardizes 
international cooperation. Additionally, fear of being cheated in cooperation drives states 
away from cooperation. It is because that, in absolute gain, states focus only on their 
gain but in real world states pursue relative gain that calculates its sheer gain on the basis 
of other’s gain and loss.4
Baldwin, N eorealism  a n d  Neoliberalism ', M ilner, “International Theories o f  Cooperation A m ong Nations: 
A  R eview  E ssay,” 4 6 6 -9 6 . For the details o f  the neoliberal approach to the ongoing debate see  
Mearsheimer, “The False Prom ise o f  International Institutions”; Martin and Sim m ons, “Theories and 
Empirical Studies o f  International Organizations.”
2 Mearsheimer, “The False Promise o f  International Institutions,” 8. In clarifying the definition, 
M earsheimer says that institutions include the description o f  the norms that regulates state behavior and 
proscription o f  unacceptable kinds o f  behavior. He also argues that realism sees institutions as the 
reflection o f  the distribution o f  power in the world.
3 Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits o f  Cooperation, 4 8 5 -5 0 7 .
4 For more on the realist v iew s, see Morgenthau, P o litics  am ong Nations', Kenneth N . W altz, Theory o f  
In ternational P o litics  (Reading, MA: A ddison-W esley, 1979); Kenneth W altz, “Anarchic Orders and
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For realists, institutions reflect state calculations of self-interest based primarily 
on concerns about relative power; as a result, institutional outcomes invariably reflect the 
balance o f power. Institutions, realists maintain, do not have significant independent 
effects on state behavior. However, realists recognize that great powers sometimes find 
institutions— especially alliances—useful for maintaining or even increasing their share 
o f world power. For example, it was more efficient for the United States and its allies to 
balance against the Soviets through NATO than through a less formal and more ad hoc 
alliance. But NATO did not force its member states to behave contrary to balance-of- 
power logic.5
Neoliberals criticize neorealist approach on the bases of the lack o f any sort of 
approach that under what circumstances realist paradigms operates. They, thereby assert 
that, institutionalizm as theory offers the explanation of the conditions under which it 
operates and plays its role. Liberals claims that “scientific theories should specify the 
conditions under which the theory is expected to hold a priori.”6 By the same token, 
institutionalists explain the benefits of institutions that help the states to cooperate if  they 
really wish to cooperate. According to Keohane and Martin, institutions can “provide 
information, reduce transaction costs, make commitment more credible, establish focal 
points for coordination and in general facilitate the operation of reciprocity.”7 
In Triangulating Peace, Russett and. Oneal find positive correlation between the number 
of membership o f a state’s in International Organization and the likelihood of conflict.
Balance o f  Pow er,” in N eorealism  an d  its C ritics, ed. Robert O. Keohane (N ew  York: Colum bia U niversity  
Press, 1986); Baldw in, N eorealism  an d  Neoliberalism ', Keohane, ed., N eorealism  a n d  its C ritics.
5 M earsheimer, “The False Prom ise o f  International Institutions.”
6 Keohane and Martin, “The Promise o f  Institutionalist Theory: R esponse to John J. M earsheim er,” 41.
7 Ibid., 42.
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According to Russett and Oneal, states with high number of 10 membership are less
• 8likely to involve in armed conflicts.
Neoliberalists strongly oppose to the realist claim that the institutionalists can 
only explain the issues in economy but in the field of security it simply does not apply. 
They assert that, institutionalizm does not ignore an important area that states are 
continuously interacting. Institutions can provide information that can also lead 
cooperation in security fields. This can eliminate the basic issue of worst-case 
assumptions of the states about each other’s intentions. According to Mearsheimer, when 
states cooperate with each other, the major concern is not absolute gain but relative gain. 
Therefore Mearsheimer concludes that “institutions have minimal influence on states’ 
behavior and thus hold little promise for promoting the stability in the post-Cold War.”9 
The institutional theory contends that relative gain concern is conditional and is 
not valid at all time. Thus, Liberal Institutionalists try to determine the conditions under 
which relative/absolute gain does or does not constitute a problem for states, and the role 
of institutions when distributional issues are at stake. They assert that, institutions can be 
helpful in the bargaining process by providing information thereby creating a transparent 
environment for states to negotiate their issues. Keohane and Martin emphasize on the 
creation of the institutions by states. If they are created by states, we can ask why states 
would create such institutions if they did not trust and expect them to play a role. If the 
institutions are not going to be helpful anyway, why states devote such amount of
8 Bruce Russet and John R. Oneal, T riangulating P eace: D em ocracy, Interdependence, an d  In ternational 
O rganizations  (N ew  York: Norton, 2001), 157-96 .
9 Mearsheimer, “The False Prom ise o f  International Institutions,” 7.
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resources for them?10 Keohane and Martin argues that “the necessity for institutions does 
not mean that they are always valuable, much less they operate without respect to power 
and interests, constitute a panacea for violent conflicts or always reduce the likelihood of 
war. Claiming too much for international institutions would indeed be a ‘false promise.’ 
But in a world politics constrained by state power and divergent interests, and unlikely to 
experience effective hierarchical governance, international institutions operating on the 
basis of reciprocity will be components of any lasting peace.”11
COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS) AND REGIONAL 
COOPERATION
CIS has been one of the institutions that served as an important forum for the 
republics of the former Soviet Union. It has also been an arena where member states 
voiced their criticisms and concerns against each other. It is important in the sense that 
development of CIS as an institution and the developments within the CIS reflect the 
general trends in the region and the nature of the interstate relationship. For this reason, 
in this chapter I will look at the major developments within the CISto identify the impact 
of this institutional structure on the interstate cooperation in the Caspian region and on 
the development of the Caspian oil.
In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev and Yeltsin 
were in search o f another entity to replace Soviet Union. At a time of confusion and
10 K eohane and Martin g ive som e exam ples that show  how  institutions worked in regulating interstate 
behaviors. The first exam ple is the European Court o f  Justice that had an impact on “European integration 
transforming political into legal issues with he aid o f  transnational lawyers and judges.” 
Keohane and Martin, “The Prom ise o f  Institutionalist Theory: R esponse to John J. M earsheimer,” 48. The 
second exam ple is the role o f  EC in reducing the doubts among European states. They say that, EC has 
done a lot in preventing cheating and facilitating cooperation and coordinating sanctions.
11 Ibid., 50. See also Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A . Kupchan, “Concerts, C ollective Security, and the 
Future o f  Europe,” In ternational Security  16, no. 1 (Sum mer 1991): 114-61 .
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chaos, everyone had a different view about the future of the Soviet Union. While 
Gorbachev favored a more centralized union with the former Soviet Republics, Yeltsin 
sought for a loose and a decentralized system of unity that would give the central 
government only the powers that the participating republics were willing to cede.12 On 
the other hand, the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union were not in a 
position to join in an organization that would jeopardize their sovereignty. Ukraine, as an 
important part of the Slavic world, enthusiastically favored independence and rejected 
Russian plans to establish a new form of supranational entity. Appalled with the 
Ukrainian move, Russian Federation quickly moved and in December 1991 established 
Commonwealth of Slavic States (CSS). This was a loose organization in which member
* 13 •States enjoyed full sovereignty. Only with this condition Ukrainian president Leonid 
Kravchuk agreed to sign the Union. The establishment of a Slavic block alarmed some of 
the former republics in Central Asia. Being left out of the new establishment, the Central 
Asian states especially Kazakhstan wanted to participate in the CSS. Under the new 
conditions the new organization renamed to Commonwealth of Independent States with 
an open membership to all former Soviet Republics. With the signing of Alma-Ata 
protocol, other Central Asian and Caucasus states joined the Union along with Moldova. 
Only the Baltic States rejected from the very beginning to be a part of any other 
establishment that would involve a level of integration with Russia.
During the first years of the establishment of the CIS, the Union had no clear 
vision or a policy regarding the management of the issues among the members and the
12 John B. Dunlop, The R ise o f  R ussia an d  the F a ll o f  S ovie t E m pire  (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U niversity  
Press, 1993), 2 6 6 -6 7 .
13 Robert H. D onaldson and Joseph L. N ogee, The F oreign  P o licy  o f  Russia: C hanging Systems, E nduring  
Interests, 2nd ed. (Armonk, NY: M .E. Sharpe, 2005), 181.
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future projects related to integration. The evolution of the CIS as a regional organization
coincides with the developments in Russian domestic politics. Just after the
independence a liberal trend dominated the Russian political thinking. Within the
framework of westward policies, market economy and democratization of Russian
institutions, the Russian approach to CIS and its policies have been quite constructive.14
As the priority was given to integration with West and modernization of the country to
western standards, the countries of the former Soviet Union enjoyed a great level of
independence.15 During the first years of the CIS’s establishment, the response of the
countries of the former Soviet Union differed from each other owing to geography,
economic interdependence and the legacy of the past.
The Central Asian countries surprisingly are the ones that enthusiastically
supported the consolidation of CIS as a regional organization to manage, economic,
political and security issues. The level of economic dependence played a big role in the
Central Asian countries’ decision to work within an institutional framework. As Odom
and Dujarric explains the reaction of the Central Asian states:
The old com m unist rulers w ho remained in power in all states but Kyrgyzstan were 
reluctant to  break fu lly  w ith the Russian-dom inated organization. T hey were not anxious 
to see the old command econom ic arrangements o f  the soviet system  collapse. N or did 
they want to see the expansion o f  popular participation in their own countries. Like their 
conservative counterparts in M oscow , they sought to slow  down even stop the transition 
to liberal dem ocracy and market econ om ies.16
14 A lex  Pravda, “R ussia and the Near Abroad,” in D evelopm ents in Russian P o litics, eds. A lex  Pravda and 
Z vi Gitelman (Durham, NC: D uke U niversity Press, 2001), 215; N ico le  J. Jackson, Russian F oreign  P o licy  
a n d  the CIS: Theories, D eba tes an d  A ctions  (London, N ew  York: R outledge, 2003), 5 1 -5 4 .
15 Russian Foreign M inister visited the Central A sian countries in April 1992 but by that tim e American  
counterpart had already paid three visitis to the region. Dincer Tascikar, “Orta A syadaki Ekonom ik  
Reformlar ve Y eni Buyuk O yun,” in Turk C um huriyetleri ve P etro l Born H atlari, ed. A llaeddin Y alcinkaya  
(Ankara: Baglam  Y ayincilik, 1998), 236.
16 W illiam  E. Odom  and Robert Dujarric, C om m onwealth  o r  E m pire?: Russia, C en tra l A sia  an d  the 
Transcaucasus (Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 1995), 12.
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The economies of the former Soviet Union are strongly linked to each other. An 
old Soviet policy to maintain control and dependence was the distribution of economic 
sectors to different countries. While Central Asian countries produced cotton, they had to 
send it to Russia for processing. Likewise, other sectors in the industry were also closely 
interlinked among the former Soviet Republics.17 Caught in a complex web of economic 
and political issues, the Central Asian countries strongly opted for an institution like CIS 
and adamantly supported Russia throughout the 1990s in its quest to strengthen the CIS 
as an effective mechanism in the management o f regional and interstate affairs.
Contrary to the policies of the Central Asian states, Azerbaijan and Georgia 
maintained a distance from any type of organization that might eventually lead to Russian 
domination of its members. The historical experiences and the Russian brutality in 
suppressing the independence movements in these two countries (1989-Georgia, and 
Black Friday in 1991 in Azerbaijan) mainly forced these countries to abstain from joining 
in the CIS. Armenia, on the other hand, as a Caucasus state preferred to be a part o f this
organization as it saw the possibility of Russian alliance in Armenian war against
1 8Azerbaijan. Moldova followed Azerbaijan and Georgia in its decision not to be an 
integral part of this establishment because of the same types of concerns and the role of 
Russia in an internal crisis in Moldova erupted in 1992. As we can see from the different 
reactions of the former Soviet Republics towards CIS, the nature of the new organization 
was not known to its members and each country had their own considerations and 
expectations. The absence of a clear vision and policies governing the interstate 
relationship under CIS roof continued up until the time Russia started to place a certain
17 Tascikar, “Orta A syadaki Ekonom ik Reformlar ve Y eni Buyuk Oyun,” 2 3 5 -3 6 .
18 Henry E. H ale, “Independence and Integration in the Caspian B asin ,” Sais R eview  19, no. 1 (1999): 169.
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level of importance to its relationship with its Near Abroad.19 The rise of concerns over 
Near Abroad is related to the insurgence o f nationalism within Russian domestic circles. 
As the liberal policies of Yeltsin administration produced no promising results and the 
internal economy worsened in the light of new market policies, Russian nationalism and 
the critique of Yeltsin’s western policies gained momentum. Yeltsin administration did 
not just ignore the domestic trends in favor of the establishment of Russian sphere of 
influence in the Near Abroad but followed a moderate path to accommodate the domestic 
constituency. Internal pressure within Russia increased to establish integration with the 
CIS countries and the Russian government stepped up to develop integration with CIS 
countries under CIS roof.20
This move was welcomed by some Central Asian states while the governments of 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Ukraine strictly opposed to a process of integration 
with Russian Federation under CIS. They have seen it as a way of Russian policy to 
maintain control over the former Soviet Union states which Central Asian countries saw 
as an opportunity to guarantee Russian support in economic, political and security 
areas.21 Russia took certain steps to develop CIS into a fully fledged regional 
organization which is able to provide security guarantees to its members at the same time 
serve the purpose of integration. The Russian policy to create a common CIS military 
represents a classical example of institutional dilemma in the post-Soviet world. The 
differences among the member states became apparent as the Russian government
19 The countries o f  former Soviet U nion that were once part o f  the U S SR  have been labeled as N ear Abroad  
by Russians.
20 For more on the details o f  the link betw een Russian dom estic politics and o f  the gradual shift in the 
Russian foreign policies towards CIS and the, see Jackson, R ussian F oreign  P o licy  an d  the CIS, 6 0 -6 6 .
21 Hale, “Independence and Integration in the Caspian B asin,” 165.
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insisted on joint military space under CIS.22 It was clear from the very beginning that the 
command of the CIS army was to be given to Russian commanders. Some of the 
member states stated their desire to establish their own military structure and opposed 
Russian proposal for a CIS army to protect the joint military space. Opponents of 
integration perceived this as a clear threat to their independence and cast their veto in the 
negotiations. In the end, the idea for a joint army had to be abandoned but member states 
agreed to establish a Council of Defense Ministers based in Moscow.23
CIS integration of the member states under a joint military or a common 
economic zone encountered numerous problems. First of all, decisions taken by the 
member states of the CIS were not compulsory and there has not been a mechanism to 
enforce the CIS directives and policies. Member states were free to join in certain 
agreements and they were also free to apply or ignore the provisions set forth in the 
treaties and agreements. “Decisions require the unanimous consent all those voting. As a 
mater o f practice, most o f the decisions reached have not been put into effect. Not 
infrequently, several members failed to appear in scheduled summit meetings. By failing 
to participate in a CIS decision, a member is free to opt out of compliance, but even those 
members participating in decisions and agreeing with them are not obliged to comply and 
often do not. President Nur Sultan Nazarbayev o f Kazakhstan, one o f the most ardent 
supporters of integration, complained in 1994 that of 452 agreements signed within the 
CIS framework most were never implemented.” 24 Most of the important agreements had
22 It took years for Russia and other member states to com e to realize that the idea o f  a jo in t military space 
cannot be applied across a large geography with different security concerns and alliances. For more on the 
details o f  the debate among the members o f  CIS see Odom and Dujarric, Com m onw ealth  o r  Em pire?, 1 5 -  
30.
23 B y m id-1993, all support for a unified CIS comm and has dissipated and on June 15, its abolition was 
announced in M oscow . D onaldson and N ogee, The F oreign  P o licy  o f  Russia, 184.
24 Ibid., 182.
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to be ratified by the parliaments of the member states before entering into force. The 
loose decision making and enforcing mechanism seriously harmed the effectiveness of 
the CIS as a regional institution. Another factor that discredited the CIS from the very 
beginning is the suspicion towards Russia and its assertiveness within CIS for integration. 
Some of the member states considered this as a direct infringement upon their survival as 
a sovereign and independent entity.25 Despite the fact that CIS has been developed by 
Russia to promote integration, in the following years, member states turned CIS into a 
forum to discuss post-Soviet transition process and problems and cast their complaints 
towards Russia. The extent of the criticisms and pressure from member states 
occasionally left Russia in a difficult situation; such that even Russia had to abstain from 
signing of many treaties and protocols developed under CIS roof.26
Another aspect of integration under CIS is the establishment of free economic 
zone and the linking of the economies of the member states. Starting with 1992, the 
differences in economies and future prospects and domestic remedies taken to improve 
economic structure created confusion and disagreement. Economic integration has been 
seen as an integral part o f integration under the CIS and member states signed numerous 
treaties and agreements regarding the management of economic policies of the CIS states 
and the increasing of the trade relations. The difficulties attached to the transition from 
command economy to market economy greatly circumvented the efforts of member states
25 Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko said that Ukraine is “against the creation o f  supranational bodies 
within the framework o f  the CIS. I f  we discuss the econom ic part o f  our relations, w e cannot support those 
principles in line with w hich w e can build relations within the framework o f  the Single E conom ic Space (o f  
Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan) if, for exam ple, these principles end up dam aging our integration 
into Europe. Rationalization o f  relations within the framework o f  the CIS should take place in the interests 
o f  countries, at the technological and econom ic level, where w e can know  o f  the rational benefits for 
participant states.” “Ukrainian, Georgian Presidents N ote N eed For 'Econom ic Rationale' in C IS,” K IE V  
INTERFAX-U KRAIN E-T18:01:46Z, 25 March 2005.
26 “Russia W on't Take Part in Som e CIS A greem ents,” INTERFAX-T11:29:01Z, 26 July 2005.
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to manage their economies under CIS terms. A search for a better and more effective 
economic management is also directly related to the development of oil in the Caspian 
Sea region. That is why the economic developments in Russia and elsewhere in the CIS 
forced the Caspian states to develop their own economies within the context of available 
resources. Therefore the trend towards the development of oil resources is directly 
related to the economic environment that the Caspian states found themselves in after the 
dissolution of Soviet Empire and Russian unilateral policies to secure its economic 
future.
The Russian unilateral policies towards liberalization of its economy and the 
drastic measures taken by Russia to stabilize its monetary polices had negative impacts 
on the former Soviet Republics which were very much depended on the stability of the 
Russian currency “ruble” as they had not established their own currency. In 1992, the 
Russian Federation introduced price control at domestic level and adapted new 
regulations concerning the monetary transactions with Banks outside the federation.27
Caught in the tide of Russian liberalization of its economy, the ruble zone had 
great difficulties in the management of their economies. The unilateral policies of
Russian Federation forced the CIS states to develop their own economic policies and
• 28  •projects. Dependence on Russian economic system have had dramatic affects and after
1993 Russian decision to impose restrictions on the use of ruble in Russia printed before
291993. Member states adapted new polices and introduced their own currencies against 
the Russian unilateral approach. The gap between rhetoric and reality grew bigger in the
27 Donaldson and N ogee, The F oreign  P o licy  o f  Russia, 193.
28 Pravda, “Russia and the Near Abroad,” 2 1 5 -2 4 .
29 Nozar A laolm olki, Life after S ovie t Union, the N ew ly Independent R epublics o f  Transcaucasus an d  
C entra l A sia  (Albany: State U niversity o f  N ew  York Press, 2001), 2 7 -2 9 .
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coming years within CIS. The concept o f economic integration have proved to be false 
especially after the signing of many agreements on the establishment of Unified 
Monetary System in 1992, Common Market 1993 and Single Economic Space intended 
to integrate the economies of CIS states but have never been materialized in the absence 
of a clear compliance problem by member states.30
The failure o f the Joint Military Force under CIS and the establishment of a 
Unified Economic Space made the organization ineffective in those realms. But Russian 
insistence on the creation of a sphere of influence over CIS continued throughout the 
decade. In fact, Russian persistence increased as the domestic pressure intensified in the 
light of the external developments that have been perceived as a threat to Russian 
influence in the region. The enlargement of NATO towards Russia and the extension of 
Peace for Partnership Program agitated the extremists in Russia and provoked the 
Russian government. In a speech delivered to Federation Council, Russian foreign 
minister Andrei Kozyrev announced that “Russia is making every effort to combat the 
drive for some CIS states to join NATO. At the time, the official Russian attitude towards 
NATO was becoming increasingly negative. NATO was accused o f being wedded to the 
stereotypes of bloc thinking and Russia was indecisive about the extent to which it would 
participate in the Peace for Partnership Program.”31 Especially the developments that 
have taken place in the area of oil development in the Caspian region and the 
involvement of western oil companies and the United States forced Russia to take 
countermeasures to maintain an exclusive Russian sphere of influence in the Near
30 Ukraine did not put its signature on the establishm ent o f  a free trade zone w hich has been seen as an 
important cornerstone in the developm ent o f  CIS. “B D T ’nin Serbest Ticaret Giri§imi Ukrayna’ya Takildi,” 
Zam an G azetesi, 6  April 2005.
31 Jackson, R ussian F oreign  P o licy  an d  the CIS, 74.
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Abroad. This gave rise to Russian efforts to consolidate its presence in the countries of 
Central Asia and Transcaucasia. The events that followed the rejection of the Georgian 
and Azeri government to join in the CIS should be viewed within this framework. Russia 
has actively followed policies that could pressure these states into joining CIS. The 
ethnic conflicts in Georgia, Moldova and Azerbaijan provided a golden opportunity for 
Russia to convince these states into joining the CIS. After a few years of conflict and 
negotiation, Azeri, Georgian and Moldovan governments revised their polices and
T9reluctantly joined in the CIS. This has given Russia the opportunity to deploy Russian 
troops to maintain stability in the conflict zones also the ability to influence local 
governments into Russian objectives. The Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security signed 
on May 1992 could also be considered as a Russian move to increase its military 
presence in the territories of member states. Bilateral agreements on the joint protection 
of the borders and the establishment of a Common Air Defense System under CIS were 
intended to serve Russian domination of its Near Abroad. However, the responses of the 
member states and the following developments limited the effectiveness o f the Russian 
maneuvers. First of all, Moldova and Ukraine never joined in Tashkent Collective 
Security Treaty leaving the initiative less than a common objective within CIS. 
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Georgia withdrew from treaty in 1999 on the ground that it 
did not serve their interests and the treaty only aimed at the extension of Russian 
domination of CIS.33
32 The fo llow ing are the dates that CIS mem bers joined in the organization: R ussia 1991, Belarus 1991, 
Ukraine 1991, M oldova 1991, Kazakhstan 1991, Azerbaijan 1991, Armenia 1991, Kyrgyzstan 1991, 
U zbekistan 1991, Tajikistan 1991, Georgia 1993; in Feb 2006 , withdrew from the C ouncil o f  D efense  
M inisters, Turkmenistan 1991; withdrew 2005 , associate member since then.
33 Georgian President Shevardnadze said that “once a treaty o f  cooperation in the sphere o f  defense is 
signed, w e w ill continue cooperation with Russia, the scale o f  w hich w ill depend on various circum stances. 
The fact that not all countries have extended the CIS collective security treaty, w hich has not been working
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Russia demanded a special recognition in many occasions from the UN in the 
Near Abroad as a privileged actor including the recognition o f rights to deploy Russian 
forces if  the developments posed a threat to regional stability and to Russian interests. 
These have been rejected by the UN and the OSCE and been opposed by major regional 
powers34 as well as some CIS members; especially the states of the Caucasus region.35 In 
an address to UN General Assembly in September 1993, Andrei Kozyrev “defended a 
special peacekeeping role for Russia in the CIS states and demanded that Russian 
peacekeeping forces be given the status of UN peacekeepers.”36
The deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces throughout the CIS coincides 
with Russian imperialistic policies.37 Russian policymakers claim that Russia is affected 
by the developments in the CIS and has to involve in order to maintain stability in the 
region on the following grounds:
• Russia has a responsibility to protect Russian minorities in the territories of 
the former Soviet Republics
• Any conflict in the region carries a potential to spread Russia
• Need for control of the Islamic Fundamentalism as it may spread to Russian 
Federation
anyway, should not be over dramatized. Our refusal to extend it does not sign ify  that w e have withdrawn 
from it.” “Shevardnadze Talks o f  N eed  to Transform G U A M  Grouping,” M oscow  Interfax, reported in 
F BIS-SO V-1999 -0 4 1 9 , 19 April 1999.
34 Turkey for its part tried to keep a balanced distance to the developm ents in the former Soviet U nion pot 
to alarm Russia. For more information on the Turkish approach to CIS, see A. Suat B ilge, “Com m onwealth  
o f  Independent States and Turkey,” Eurasian S tudies  1, no. 4 (1995): 6 3 -1 0 0 .
35 Russian Foreign M inister also sought legitim acy for Russian peacekeeping rights within CIS through 
OSCE, EU and Arab States. RFE/RL D a ily  R eport, no. 147, 4 A ugust 1993.
36 Odom and Dujarric, C om m onwealth  or Em pire?, 31.
37 For more on the Russian im perialistic po licies see Dimitri K. Sim es, A fter the C ollapse: R ussia  Seeks its 
P lace  as a  G rea t P ow er  (N ew  York, N Y: Sim on & Schuster, 1999).
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• Separatist movements outside of Russian Federation might encourage 
separatist movements in Russia 
The idea of peacekeeping within CIS was first brought up by the president of 
Kazakhstan in 1992 and approved by the ten o f the fourteen states. Initially the nature of 
these operations were formulated after the general UN principles; such as, mutual consent 
of the parties in conflict to accept peacekeeping forces, voluntary participation, joint 
command.. .etc. However, within the CIS context, the deployment of peacekeeping forces 
carried different patterns in each of the five major armed conflicts that broke out within 
the territories of the member states. (Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova)
We may argue that the CIS has been in a steady decline considering the fall in its 
effectiveness as an instrument in providing cooperation on political, economic and 
security issues. It has actually become a tradition within CIS that member states put 
their signatures on treaties and agreements without much consideration and expectation. 
Implementation of these treaties and agreements has usually failed because of the absence 
of a sanctioning system and the reluctance of member states to comply with CIS norms. 
Meetings o f the CIS and its subunits are not attended by all of the member states and
o n
unanimity is hardly a case on many issues. Because of the ineffectiveness of CIS as an 
organization to enforce its rules and regulations over member states, CIS could not
38 Turkmenistan leader N iyazov  claim ed that CIS has becom e a political institution and therefore they see it 
is in their best interest to withdraw from the organization. The neutrality o f  Turkmenistan prevents it from  
becom ing a part o f  military alliances. “Ajkabat, B D T ’den K opuyor,” Zaman G azetesi, 28 A ugust 2005.
39 Zam an G azetesi reports that the member states o f  CIS can no longer com e together full cadre and 
Kremlin is getting used to the idea that CIS m ay d issolve in the future. “B D T  Zirvesi Son K ez mi 
Toplam yor?” Zam an G azetesi, 27  A ugust 2005.
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achieve an international recognition as a viable instrument in the territories o f the former 
Soviet Union.40
This is not to ignore the partial success of CIS in some areas such as the 
negotiation of the issues among member states arising from the independence from 
Soviet Union and sharing of the resources left on the territories of CIS members after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union.41 Immediate problems just after the independence have 
been dealt with under CIS roof and especially the Central Asian states found it useful to 
bring up their concerns and demands from Russia. Despite the fact that CIS has served 
some purpose but failed to develop into fully fledged regional organizations, no one is in 
favor of a policy to dissolve the establishment at a ll42
Unlike the CIS countries, Russia switched to making bilateral agreements with 
CIS states after it has become clear that Russia will not be able to pass its policies within 
CIS under a common ground where CIS states could oppose Russia altogether. The
40 After the withdrawal o f  G eorgia and Azerbaijan form Tashkent C ollective Security Treaty, Armenia 
seem s to be the only loyal member o f  the CIS in the Caucasus region. “G eriye bir Erivan Kaldi,” M illiyet 
G azetesi, 27 March 2005.
41 The countries o f  the former Soviet U nion inherited a large amount o f  military establishm ents and arms. 
The nuclear w eapons stationed in som e o f  these countries presented a great d ifficulty and a danger to 
Russia and later the United States. Som e o f  these issues were negotiated under CIS roo f but som e major 
problems needed to be resolved with the assistance from the United States.
42 CIS Foreign M inisters and other agencies continued to work on certain issues and aimed at reforming the 
CIS institutions. CIS has long been blamed to be an ineffective institution in addressing the regional issues. 
“CIS Foreign M inisters to D iscuss Reform ing CIS Institutions,” Interfax-T15:35:36Z, 17 April 2006.
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establishment of Air Defense System43 through bilateral talks with the member states 
produced positive outcomes for Russia except, Azerbaijan and Moldova.44
The effectiveness of CIS has been curbed by the lack of commitment from the 
member states. The lack of trust in the institution stems from the fact that some member 
states joined in the CIS reluctantly under Russian pressure. The Russian pressure on 
Azeri and Georgian governments is an indication of this nature and also an explanation 
for the commitment gap.45 In addition to this is also the widespread suspicion on the side 
of many CIS member states that CIS is intended to be a mechanism to promote Russian 
interests in the region. The Ukrainian opposition to CIS along with Azerbaijan and 
Georgia mainly concentrated on the possibility of integration under CIS to replace Soviet 
Union. Ukraine’s suspicion and resistance is considered to be one of the main obstacles 
for Russia to advance its interests and policies within CIS and prevented the development 
of CIS as a more viable regional organization. Compared to the other international 
organizations, the commitment gap and the involuntary membership present a big 
differentiation.
Another important difference between the CIS and other international 
organizations is the fact that CIS states and especially Russia failed to develop a
43 K yrgyz D efense M inister Ismail Isakov praises “T he Russian party's assistance in the framework o f  the 
CIS U nified Air D efense System  is o f  great importance for our republic. The K yrgyz Air D efense Forces 
have received m ilitary-technical assistance totaling 15 m illion rubles ($557 ,030) by now .” “Kyrgyzstani 
Minister Praises Air D efen se  Cooperation w ith R ussia,” A gen tstvo  Voyennykh N ovostey, Reported in 
Interfax-T08:46:05Z, 12 M ay 2006 . “A n agreem ent to set up a single regional air defense system  for 
Russia and Belarus w ill be signed late in 2006 , said the state secretary o f  the Belarusian Security Council, 
Viktor Sheim an.” (“Russia-Belarus Com m on Air D efense D eal to B e Signed Late 2 006 ,” Interfax- 
T13:44:29Z, 21 September 2006 . See also “R ussia C om pletes D elivery o f  S -300 Air D efense System s to 
Belarus,” Interfax, 29  M ay 2006.
44 “Crash o f  the Com m onw ealth B egins with Disintegration o f  D efense Structures: Russia's C losest 
M ilitary A llies Are L eaving,” FBIS T ransla ted  Text T14:42:05Z, N ezavisim aya G azeta , 31 A ugust 2005.
45 Speaking about the CIS, Y ushchenko said that today it is “a machine w hich was produced with such  
great effort, but it g ives so little steam. He said that its coefficient o f  beneficial action is significantly lower 
than the results w hich were expected. This is a fact w hich obviously every state is adm itting.” “Ukrainian, 
Georgian Presidents N ote N eed for 'Economic Rationale' in C IS.”
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comprehensive and universally recognizable set of rules and policies to govern the 
interstate relationship within the organization. The absence of a clear rules and 
regulations left the member states unchecked and each of the member states acted in line 
with their national interests. The reluctance to vest trust and sovereignty in CIS 
management rendered the institution powerless when it comes to the enforcement of the 
mutual agreements and treaties.46
A vast divergence in the policies and expectations of the CIS members also 
contributed to the failure of the organization while some Central Asian states inclined 
towards Russia, some other states perceived that it is in their best interest to align with 
Western states. For example, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko said “the 
pooling of efforts within the scope of the Commonwealth of Independent States is a 
movement in the right direction. The pooling of our efforts, resources and production 
capacities, the strengthening of cooperation in the international sphere benefits our 
peoples.47 The split has seriously affected the policies of the member states not to invest 
too much in the CIS but rather look towards the W est48 Russian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Grigory Karasin, in an interview with Rossiiskaya Gazeta, indicates this split within the
46 Existence o f  an enforcem ent mechanism  increases the chances o f  an organization to be much more 
effective. Compared to U N  and Security C ouncil for exam ple, the relevant article o f  the U N  Charter g ives  
to the Security C ouncil both conciliatory and coercive powers. The Security Council can try to settle the 
problems betw een the states by m eans o f  negotiation, enquiry, mediation, arbitration, judicial settlem ent or 
regional as w ell as other peaceful m eans o f  their choice. In case o f  a direct threat, to the peace, the Security  
Council m ay legally  take stronger action, but the prerequisite for a strong action is that all members should  
decide that the matter indeed threaten the peace (Article 39). The Security Council can also recomm end  
temporary measures or m ove directly to a call on members to apply diplomatic and econom ic sanctions 
(Article 40 , 41). The Security C ouncil has the right to use armed forces provided by the members o f  the U N  
(Article 42 , 43).
47 “Belarusian President Supports Pooling o f  CIS Efforts,” 1TAR-TASS-T13:40:30Z, 11 January 2006.
48 Georgian D efense M inister Giorgi Baramidze told reporters in Tbilisi that he w ould not be attending a 
session  o f  the council o f  Com m onwealth o f  Independent States’ (CIS) D efense M inisters scheduled for 
today in M oscow . Baramidze justified this decision by telling reporters on W ednesday that the CIS is 
“yesterday’s history,” and that G eorgia’s future was “in cooperation with N A T O  D efense M inisters.” 
“Georgian D efense M inister D efies CIS,” IS N SE C U R IT Y  WATC, 25  N ovem ber 2004. A vailable [Online]: 
<http://w w w .isn.ch/new s/sw /details.cfm ?ID =T 0230> [25 April 2006],
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organization. “Numerous media reports that predict the imminent collapse o f the CIS 
have appeared recently. Perhaps, I will disappoint you, but my first impressions regarding 
the situation in the Commonwealth are much more optimistic.”49 Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Ukraine and Moldova are prime examples for anti-Russian, pro-Western states within 
CIS.50 The extension of the Peace for Partnership to the Caucasus and the Caspian region 
could be viewed from this perspective. The desire of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia and 
Azerbaijan to be a part of NATO alliance in the future is a clear indication of the huge 
split between pro-Russian and pro-Western groups.51
GUAM AND THE REGIONAL COOPERATION IN THE CASPIAN SEA
The development of GUAM as an organization characterizes the major split 
within the CIS. GUAM is an acronym that stands for “Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and 
Moldova.” One thing that is common among these states is the opposition to Russian 
efforts for unification and integration under CIS to replace the former Soviet Union.52 It 
is also the fact that three of these four states are the victims of direct Russian involvement 
in their internal affairs and in the ethnic conflicts in their territories.
49 “Russia A gainst ‘Forced D em ocratization’ o f  CIS,” INTERFAX-T08:03:53Z, 16 A ugust 2005.
50 Belarusian president criticized the G U A M  countries’ m ove with regard to creating another unit that 
w ould undermine CIS. H e said that “the situation is different in Ukraine and Georgia. The leaders o f  som e 
countries go still farther in denying the positive role o f  the CIS. U sing the slogans on quitting the CIS, and 
setting up alternative associations, they are trying to w in points from their foreign patrons. “Belarusian  
President Supports P ooling o f  CIS Efforts,” ITAR-TASS-T13:40:30Z, 11 January 2006.
51 M oldovan President Vladim ir Voronin said on 19 September that he w as disappointed by the decision  
adopted by R ussia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus at the Yalta sum mit o f  the Com m onw ealth o f  
Independent States (CIS) to set up a Single E conom ic Space between the four countries, Flux and AFP  
reported. Voronin said the decision w ill without doubt lead to “a depreciation o f  the CIS stock” and, as a 
result, M oldova is likely to “step up our efforts to jo in  the E U .” In a statement released by the presidential 
office , Voronin said the four countries' decision show s “the possible modernization o f  the CIS has been  
abandoned for good .” RFE/RL N ew sline 7, no. 180, 22 September 2003 .
52 “G U A M  Countries United by Complaints against R ussia,” R ossiyskaya G azeta, 2 D ecem ber 1997, 7 
reported in F B IS-SO V -97-337, 3 D ecem ber 1997.
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The roots of the establishment of GUAM go back to 1996 where the leaders of 
Georgia, Azerbaijan and Ukraine came up with the idea to resist Russia and benefit from 
a possible oil boom in the Caspian Sea.53 Moldova joined in this group later in 1997. The 
main idea behind this new establishment was “to have a western oriented integration 
project of their own, built largely around efforts to create a ‘Eurasian Corridor’ of 
highways, railroads and pipelines running form China to Europe in circumventing 
Russia.”54
The members of GUAM have been careful in their policies not to antagonize 
Russia. From the very beginning they have stated that the GUAM is purely an economic 
union aimed at increasing trade relations and establishing areas of cooperation in 
transportation and commerce. They have also made it very clear that this initiative was 
not directed in anyway at Russia. Speaking at a joint news conference with Georgian 
President Mikheil Saakashvili in Kiev on Friday 25 March, Yushchenko said that “today 
we are saying this: we are not leaving the CIS. Ukraine is ready to support all the rational 
parts of this project.”55
In 1999, the member states of GUAM met in Washington DC to clarify their 
shared concerns and willingness to increase cooperation within GUAM. This has taken 
place in the United States at the NATO’s 50th anniversary summit. This has indicated a 
U.S. involvement in the process or at least an American support for the GUAM countries. 
This has caused grievances for Russia as the American involvement in the CIS region has
53 Hale, “Independence and Integration in the Caspian B asin,” 181.
54 Ibid..
55 “Ukrainian, Georgian Presidents N ote N eed for ‘Econom ic R ationale’ in C IS.”
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been perceived as a threat to Russian interests.56 GUAM Member states have sought 
some sort o f NATO link between NATO and GUAM in the areas of security.57 
However, the advancement of GUAM as an organization in the areas of security created 
some concerns on the Russian side. Michael Waller argues that, “the existence o f GUAM 
and the growing U.S. military presence in Central Asia after 11 September 2001 were 
instrumental in the creation of the Organization of the Agreement on Collective Security 
(ODKB) in Dushanbe in Tajikistan on 28 April 2003.”58
Uzbekistan also joined GUAM for a brief period and the name of the organization 
was changed to GUUAM. Because of the other issues of consideration Uzbekistan 
decided to leave the institution in June 2002 claiming that GUUAM has been ineffective 
as a security institution.59 “Less is better; yes, better, after Uzbekistan's departure, we will 
not become more passive” said the head of Georgia's Foreign Affairs Ministry, Irakli 
Menagarishvili. “But we consider Uzbekistan an important partner and hope for its 
return.”60 One of the key aspects of the GUAM is the bringing o f the Western countries 
and institutions into the region to counter the Russian power and influence.61 Azerbaijan
56 Aleksandr D ugin et al., “Growing, U nw elcom e U .S. Intrusion seen in C IS,” The C urren t D ig es t o f  the 
P ost-S ovie t P ress  57, no. 16 (M ay 2005): 1 -4 .
57 GUAM  countries also considering a G U A M  Peacekeeping force to be deployed within the territories o f  
G U A M  countries. “G U A M  C onsidering Creating a Peacekeeping Force— A zeri M inister,” Interfax- 
T13:01:07Z, 31 M ay 2006.
58 M ichael Waller, Russian P o litics Today: The Return o f  a  Tradition  (M anchester, N ew  York: M anchester 
U niversity Press, 2005 ), 259. The agreement revived a treaty dating from 1992 that involved Russia, 
Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (The C ollective Security Treaty). The new  
Organization had the sam e membership. In its new  form it has its own budget, secretariat, military staff 
and rapid deploym ent force. Its main military base is at the Kant airfield in Kyrgyzstan.
59 It is m ainly the Russian anger that the Central A sian states had to consider since their dependence on 
Russia far exceeds the Caucasus states.
60 “G UAM  M em ber Foreign M inisters M eet in Baku to R eview  Course after Karimov D ecision ,” Baku  
Zerkalo, 3 July 2002.
61 Russia is opposed to the idea o f  dem ocratizing CIS nations against their w ill and is concerned that such  
methods could lead to instability and a growth o f  extrem ism , D eputy Foreign M inister Grigory Karasin said 
in an interview with R ossiiskaya Gazeta published on Tuesday. “W e do not think that other international 
players cannot have their specific interests in CIS states, but w e cannot agree with any methods o f ‘forced
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has especially been very active in this realm and sought for direct support from the 
United States and NATO for the protection of the oil pipelines and the security of the 
region.63
With members continuing to improve relations with each other,64 GUAM 
continues to be an important institution for its members to cooperate on varieties of issue 
including the development and transportation o f Caspian oil.65 Azeri President Ilham 
Aliyev responded to questions about the organization saying that “the organization 
(GUAM) is assuming new forms. It is developing. We hope for fruitful work and expect 
the summit to give even stronger impetus to the development of our ties.”66 The desire of 
the member states to use GUAM actively stems from the fact that member states see it as 
a useful tool to counter Russian imperialistic policies in the territories of the former 
Soviet Union. Compared to CIS, GUAM enjoyed a high level of commitment by the
D em ocratization’ in the former Soviet republics— whether it be ‘colored revolutions’ or m edia and political 
pressure on those w ho rule those countries,” he said. “It w ill inevitably lead to destabilization in the region 
and a surge in extrem ism ,” Karasin said. R ussia has its ow n interests in former Soviet republics and w ill 
defend these interests, the deputy minister said “Russia A gainst ‘Forced D em ocratization’ o f  CIS— D eputy  
M inister.”
62 “Azerbaijan Wants M ore Cooperation Within G U A M — Foreign M inister,” Interfax-T14:48:47Z , 2 
D ecem ber 2005.
63 “M oldovan President: G U A M  M ust Draft Agreem ent on Cooperation with E U ,” Interfax-T14:48:47Z, 23 
M ay 2006.
64 Georgian President M ikhail Saakashvili said at a G U A M  sum mit in K yiv on Tuesday that “W e are 
creating an organization w hich w ill have viable m echanism s. Regrettably, the CIS has not accom plished its 
m ission. M oldova and Georgia are having d ifficulty transporting their cargoes. Cooperation in collective  
security has not taken place either. A ll G U A M  m em ber-states are prepared to cooperate in econom ic and 
security issues and in the fight against separatism and terrorism. W e need this project from a com m ercial 
standpoint. H ow ever, when it com es to politics, it is absolutely essential.” “G U A M  B ecom ing E ffective  
International O rganization-Saakashvili,” Interfax-T13:39:49Z, 23 M ay 2006.
65 “G U A M  Countries to D iscuss Energy Security,” ITAR-TASS-T17:23:07Z, 14 February 2006.
66 A sked about energy projects A liyev  said: “N o specific new  projects are in mind. W e are currently 
involved on ly  in research.” “G U A M  D evelop ing D ynam ically— A zeri President,” Interfax-2006  
T 12:40:48Z, 22 M ay 2006.
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member states but the availability of economic, political and military resources within the 
institutions hampered the effectiveness of the institution.67
On the other hand, the voluntary membership and the constructive efforts of the 
member states to improve GUAM increase the chances of this organization to be 
successful in its realm in the future. Although the potential for GUAM to expand is very 
limited, the institution may continue to play a limited role in the Caspian-Caucasus area. 
GUAM’s success will depend on its ability to bring external powers (United States and 
Western States) into the region.68
OSCE AND THE CASPIAN REGION
OSCE is one of the other organization that have been involved in the 
developments in the region starting with the break up of the Soviet Union and the 
acceleration of the ethnic conflicts.69 OSCE has actively been involved in the settlement 
of disputes among Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and pursued a policy of 
mediation in the armed conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia. With its organizational 
structure and membership, OSCE is different from CIS and GUAM. OSCE is comprised 
of a large membership across Europe, Russia, Caucasus and the Central Asia. OSCE 
enjoyed a high level of legitimacy and neutrality in its mediation efforts in the Caucasus
57 R ovsen Ibrahimov, “T RA CEC A  Programi ve Onun A zerbaycan Iqtisadiyyatinin Inkisafindaki R olu ,” 
Nasireddin T usi’nin 800 Y illik  Jubilesi icin D uzenlenm is Konferans, Azerbaycan B eynelxalkq Universiteti, 
Baki, 2 -3  N isan 2001.
68 G U A M  countries searching for options that w ould involve the W estern institutions to the region. “A  new  
militarized formation claim ing the role o f  ch ie f CIS peacekeeper w ill soon appear in the post-Soviet area. 
This was declared in T bilisi late last w eek at a m eeting held by representatives o f  military departments o f  
G U A M  (G eorgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and M oldova) member states. In this respect, the Georgian D efense  
M inistry noted that creation o f  an inter-state peacekeeping battalion stem s from the plans o f  G U A M  
countries to participate jo in tly  in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations conducted under the aegis o f  
the CIS, OSCE, N A T O , and the E U .” Svetlana Gam ova, “G U A M  States D iscuss CIS Peacekeeping Unit; 
U nrecognized R epublics O pposed,” Interfax-T14:56:37Z: N ezavisim aya  G azeta , 22 A ugust 2006 .
69 The details o f  O SC E ’s mediation efforts have been covered in the previous chapter. Here the focus w ill 
be more on its inability to contribute to interstate cooperation as an institution in the Transcaspian region.
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and in other areas that OSCE has involved. Compared to the advantageous position of 
OSCE and the relative availability of resources, its success has been limited in the 
Caucasus-Caspian region.
One o f the issue areas that OSCE has been put to test is the internal conflicts in 
the Transcaucasus region. OSCE pursued a policy of mediation in the conflict between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia and provided assistance to the settlement of the disputes within 
Georgia. OSCE’s failure in bringing a settlement among the parties to the conflict is 
related to varieties of reasons; some of which are directly or indirectly related to the 
structure of the OSCE itself. Despite the OSCE’s large membership and neutrality,
OSCE lacked a mechanism to enforce any kind of settlement on the conflicting parties. 
Unlike CIS where Russia enjoyed a great level of comfort in pressuring the opposing 
parties towards certain directions, OSCE had to rely on the goodwill of the warring 
factions to resolve their issues and come to a compromise. This has made OSCE nothing 
but an advisory mechanism such that Azeris and Armenians were in total freedom to 
listen or to ignore. Under these circumstances, Azerbaijan and the Armenians of 
Nagorno-Karabakh acted in line with their national interests and avoided making any 
kind of compromise that would open ways for the resolution of the conflict. In addition to 
the irreconcilable policies and attitudes of the parties in conflict, OSCE had hard time in 
controlling Russia in its pursuit of unilateral policies to find a solution to the issues at 
hand. The absence of congruity among the members of OSCE towards a solution to the 
conflict and the Russian efforts to remain as an influential power in the region by being 
the one who could broker a ceasefire prevented OSCE from achieving a settlement to the 
disputes and made OSCE ineffective in the affairs of the Caspian region. It would be an
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incomplete analysis to declare OSCE as an organization that has failed in Transcaucasus 
region without referring to the existence of interstate rivalry and competition for 
influence over the region and the active involvement of external powers to impose their 
orders that serve their interests best.
OSCE MINSK GROUP AND MEMBERS
In 1994, cease-fire between Azerbaijan and Armenia did not bring permanent 
solution to the crises in the region. The United States and some western countries favored 
a complete solution that would guarantee long-term stability in the region especially for 
oil business to function/move on smoothly. On the other hand, the Russian view of 
stability was different from that of United States and as long as Russia maintained strong 
foothold in the region, occasional disruptions of stability or conflicts did not constitute a 
big problem. This way Russia would always use these developments to consolidate its 
position in the Caspian Region. These fundamental differences in understanding and 
expectations gave rise to series of disagreements within OSCE Minsk Group’s effort to 
bring permanent peace to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Mediation attempts in 1997 and 
the developments have shown that the effectiveness of institutions or regimes depended 
on the willingness of the members to make certain compromises. Besides, the issue was 
not only to bring peace to warring parties but also who would bring it and under what 
conditions peace could be brokered. France in some occasions sided with Russia and 
without informing the United States; they invited Yerevan and Baku to Moscow to 
discuss the terms of a final resolution. In other occasions, members of the Minsk Group 
displayed different views/concerns about the peacekeeping forces that were to be
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deployed. In the end misunderstandings, security and relative gain concerns have 
precluded OSCE from becoming effective in the solution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
Continuation of the wars and conflicts directly prevented the development o f oil industry 
in the region by rendering the interstate cooperation less likely, leaving the regional 
stability in question. One of the reasons that the efforts of Minsk Group could not 
produce expected outcome is the existence of strong relative gain considiration between 
Azerbaijan and Armenia. Although no one was satisfied with the status quo, they did not 
want to deteriorate their position by making further compromises. Armenian main 
concern is the possibility that Azerbaijan would profit from oil business and start 
speaking from a military strength. Azerbaijan, on the other hand, felt itself as a victim of 
aggression and did not want to let go of the occupied territories that would weaken 
Azerbaijan. Therefore any compromise each side was offered to make was perceived as 
if  the other side would exploit a relative gain to its advantage. 70
Regardless of what had actually happened in the complex interstate rivalry in the 
Transcaucasus and the Caspian region, the OSCE could not help to the achievement of 
interstate cooperation in the Caspian region.71 The OSCE mission in the Caspian region 
in the areas of democracy humanitarian aid, human rights and displaced persons provided 
certain level of success but far from achieving a considerable level of change in the
79policies of regional states. The contribution of the OSCE to peace and interstate
70 N eorealist Grieco w ould suggest that fear o f  survival im peded the cooperation betw een tw o states and 
rendered the international initiative ineffective. A s neorealists w ould also suggest, the absence o f  
sanctioning m echanism  makes the international institutions ineffective, as in the case o f  OSCE M insk  
Group.
71 Emin Erturk, E konom ik E ntegrasyon Teorisi ve  Turkiyenin lc in d e  Bulundugu E ntegrasyon lar  (Bursa: 
Ezgi Kitabevi Yayinlari, 1993).
72 Details o f  OSCE m ission in the Transcaucasus region can be found Online at: The Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (O SCE), “R egions: Caucasus,”
< http://w w w .osce.org/regions/13001.htm l> [22 September 2006],
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cooperation in the region is yet to be seen but will largely depend on the willingness of 
the member states to comply with OSCE policies and proposals and the consolidation of 
OSCE’s hand by the major powers in the region.
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES AND OIL DEVELOPMENT IN THE CASPIAN SEA 
Development of oil resources in the Caspian region requires a certain level of 
interstate cooperation. We have considered varieties of factors that contributed or 
prevented the achievement of cooperation over the development of oil industry. Apart 
from the international institutions which have affected the courses o f the developments in 
the region, and in a very limited way, contributed to interstate cooperation, existence or 
absence o f international regimes may have affected the developments as well.
Regime analysis has been used for the last three decades to explore the patterns of 
state cooperation on different issue areas; ranging from aviation to environment and to 
security. The discussions centered on the role of the regimes to create a normative 
framework to deal with specific issues and to achieve cooperation. We define regimes as 
“set of implicit and explicit rules principles, rules and norms and decision making 
procedures around which actor’s expectation converge in a given area of international
73 «relations.” Since the international regimes can involve multiplicity of issues, actors, 
rules and decision-making procedures they can happen to be different from each other. It 
might be the reason that we have a wide range of arguments and point of views about 
international regimes. While most of the scholars, belonging to different schools, agree 
on the possibility of success and cooperation in environmental and economic realms, the
73 Stephen D . Krasner, “Structural Causes and R egim e C onsequences,” in In ternational R egim es, ed. 
Stephen D . Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell U niversity Press, 1983), 2.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
210
role of the regimes in security arena is quite controversial. The discussion is mainly 
between the scholars of Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism as to whether the regimes are 
autonomous actors in international politics or the extension and reflection of states’ 
policies. Since the initial premises take us to different ends, both schools happen to be 
advocating the extreme point of views, although they agree on the basic elements of 
international system, which are the existence of anarchy and the importance of states’ 
interaction at systemic level.
The supporters of the international regimes emphasize their roles as a mediator to 
achieve cooperation among states on different issue areas. Although it goes long to cover 
the whole dimensions of the discussions on the possibility of cooperation and the 
conditions under which it is more likely, we may give a short description of the role of 
international regimes in international politics to provide a preliminary insight into the 
discussions.
Scholars of international relations argue that regimes can serve many purposes to 
help to the achievement o f cooperation.74 The first one is the mitigation of the systemic 
effects of anarchy, which is accepted to be a constraint on state behavior.75 Existence of 
security dilemma and the relative/absolute gain analysis, which emerges out o f anarchy, 
hinders the attainment of international cooperation. Another factor is the absence of a 
world government to enforce the states to act according to certain rules and principles. 
Under these conditions, we might easily conclude that cooperation seems to be less likely
74 R egim es constrain and regularize the behavior o f  participants, affect w hich issues am ong protagonists 
m ove on and o f f  agendas, determine w hich activities are legitim ized or condem ned, influence whether 
w hen and how  conflicts are resolved. Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, “International Regim es: 
L essons from Inductive A nalysis” in In ternational R egim es, ed. Stephen D . Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell 
U niversity Press, 1983), 62.
75 Oye, ed., C oopera tion  under Anarchy, 11.
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under the systemic effects of security dilemma. The neo-liberal contention is that 
regimes can facilitate cooperation by ameliorating anarchy. It is generally accepted that, 
regimes provide transparency by increasing the availability of information and exchange 
of it through the mechanisms of the regime, which decreases the negative perceptions of
7  f tthe states against each other. The third element that is made possible by the 
establishment of the regimes is the decreasing transaction costs. Under normal 
conditions, it might take long to come together and create an environment for 
cooperation. What regimes do is to provide a forum where states can easily communicate 
with each other, which might increase the likelihood of cooperation.77 The last one is the 
possibility that regimes can provide issue linkage and can lengthen the shadow of 
future.78 As the functionalists argue, linking different issues with each other can create a 
spill over effect. Cooperation in one area can produce further cooperation on other areas. 
In this context, what regime can provide is to initiate a process of cooperation in some 
areas that would spread to other areas in the future. These are the basic assumptions 
about what regimes might provide to help to the attainment of a certain level of 
cooperation among the participating states.
The Realist argument contends that, cooperation through establishment of 
international regimes is not likely to be successful and last long. The main reason for this 
is the existence of relative gain concerns and possibility of cheating. Since states are 
taken to be autonomous actors making cost-benefit analysis and pursuing pure national 
interests, it is hard to bring them into a regime where they have to yield some 
sovereignty. States are quite sensitive about their sovereignty, preservation of their
76 Ibid., 20,
77 Keohane, A fter H egem ony.
78 M ilner, “International Theories o f  Cooperation A m ong Nations: A  R eview  E ssay,” 4 6 6 -9 6 .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
212
territorial integrity and assuring their security through acquisition of power. These lead 
them to be highly suspicious about the agreements and negotiations concerning these 
issues. Charles Lipson gives two reasons that why states are highly concerned about 
cooperating on security issues.
• The immediate and potentially grave losses to a player who attempts to 
cooperate without reciprocation; and
• The risks associated with inadequate monitoring o f other’s decisions and
70
actions.
The points stated above reflects the fact that, the distribution of power and the 
global hierarchy is an important element of regime creation and maintenance. As in the 
formation of regime, the maintenance o f the regime also presents same patterns of
o n
relationship. Most of the scholars of international relations consider the influence of 
hegemon as an important driving factor behind regimes. It both helps to the creation and
n i
the maintenance of the regime. Those other states whose interests are not in line with 
the basic principles of the regime might prefer to remain silent due to the fact that a short 
or long term benefit of compliance is more than non-compliance.
79 Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in E conom ic and Security A ffairs,” in N eorealism  an d  
N eoliberalism : The C ontem porary D ebate, ed. D avid A . B aldw in (N ew  York: Colum bia U niversity Press, 
1993).
80 A s Arthur A. Stein puts it, the sam e factors that explain regime formation also explain regim e 
maintenance change and dissolution. R egim es are maintained as long as the patterns o f  interest that gave  
rise to them remain. Artur A. Stein, “Coordination and Coordination: R egim es in an Anarchic W orld,” in 
In ternational Regim es, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell U niversity Press, 1983), 137.
81 A s Keohane explains, “the formation o f  international regim es normally depend on hegem ony and the 
maintenance o f  order requires continued hegem ony.” K eohane, A fter H egem ony, 31, 49.
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CASPIAN OIL AND REGIME FORMATION
Neoliberals argue that international regimes through several mechanisms increase 
the likelihood of cooperation. In the case of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, we have 
seen a clear absence of implicit or explicit rules or norms governing the state behavior.
As the parties involved in the game pursued their own interests without considering the 
other options that were less favorable to them, it has become more and more difficult to 
adhere to certain rules and norms. The only rule that has been said to exist in the Caspian 
oil was the upholding commercial rules. In many cases the United States and other states
affirm their adherence to commercial rules that they would pursue options that are
• 82commercially more sound. It could be the fact that zero-sum thinking prevented the 
adherence and further establishment of international regimes and norms. The OSCE 
summit in Istanbul in 1999 is an example to this. Although it was supposed to contribute 
to the establishment of more friendly relations among countries and to create an 
environment in which actors could negotiate their differences, it became an arena for 
direct confrontation between Washington and Moscow. The chances for international 
cooperation deteriorated and tension increased between opposing blocks. Under these 
conditions, states pursued their options and used available resources to bring other parties 
onboard. Turkish American front was able to get Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Georgian 
support while Moscow and Iran remained opposed to the U.S.-led coalition. These 
developments can easily be explained by the Neorealist approach as states in anarchic
82 The only norm that w as supposed to guide the oil business in the Caspian region was the adherence to 
com m ercial viability that som e statesmen from tim e to tim e referred to. H ow ever, as it has been seen in the 
policies and inclinations o f  the states, despite the com m ercial dictations, states pursued their own interests. 
A clear exam ple to this is the U .S. policy  towards Iran to exclude Iran from all oil deals despite the fact that 
som e projects could have been more profitable i f  they had been pursued as proposed by som e oil 
com panies and Iranian governments.
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environment pursue self-interest policies and conflict with each other. Our discussion on 
regimes, however, only represent the time around which the discussions on the legal 
status of the Caspian Sea took place. As the time passed, the geopolitical considerations 
and interstate relationships have also changed. The mistrust and competition that 
characterized these times did not prevail all along the other developments in the Caspian 
region. However, it would be safe to say that, up until the time o f the legal status issue no 
international regimes were in place.
One of the issues that is related to regime analysis is the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea and the conflict among the riparian states. The confusion over the status of 
the Caspian Sea hampered the development of oil industry for a long period of time.
After the break up of the Soviet Union, the number of the coastal states increased to five 
giving rise to the emergence of a new discussion regarding the use and management of 
the sea.83 The Caspian Sea has been used jointly between Iran and USSR for the last 
seventy years. No clear regime has ever existed nor the coastal states attempted to 
develop a common ground for the management and exploitation of the sea resources.
The arrival o f the new states and their enthusiasms about the use of oil resources under 
Caspian Sea sparked a long controversy among the riparian states. The main issue of 
contention centered on the legal status of the sea and the issue of delimitation versus 
condominium. While powerful states of Caspian Sea favored a regime of condominium,
• 84the newly independent states pushed for delimitation. Condominium is a system of 
management through which the issues in a particular area is governed by the participation
83 For more on the controversy among the riparian states, see D ekm ejian and Sim onian, T rou bled  W aters.
84 Cynthia M .Croissant and M ichael P. Croissant, “The Legal Status o f  the Caspian Sea: C onflict and 
C om prom ise,” in O il an d  G eopo litics in the C aspian  Sea Region, ed. M ichael P. Croissant and Billent Aras 
(W estport, CT: Praeger, 1999), 25.
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of each member state on an equal basis. Delimitation refers to the demarcation o f the 
borders among the coastal states where each state can enjoy complete freedom and
O /-
sovereignty over their shares. Initially, Russia and Iran favored condominium over 
delimitation since the regime of joint governance would provide them a better 
environment in which they can use their preponderance o f power over other states. The 
newly independent states of the Caspian Sea pushed for delimitation to escape Russian 
and Iranian domination and also to be able to develop their oil resources freely.87
In addition to the political choices of the coastal states, the economic benefits 
attached to the division of the sea also affected the developments and interstate 
relationships. The division of the sea, on the basis of a median line, would provide 
unequal percentage of the sea to the Caspian states, instead of an expected 20 percent 
share among five coastal states. As Geoffrey Kemp notes, Iran has a strong interest in 
claiming a share of the seabed beyond its own sector because the main oilfields lie in the 
middle of the Caspian Sea. The least promising waters are those off Iran.88
The main differences among the Caspian states continued to be a problem up to 
day with varying degrees of change in the attitudes of some of the member states. Due to 
the changes in the international and regional political and economic environment, the 
strong Russian behavior has changed and some bilateral agreements have been reached, 
especially in the northern part of the sea. The southern part of the sea remains to be an
85 Iran's long-recognized sector o f  the Caspian Sea covers 12 percent to 14 percent o f  its surface area. The 
collapse o f  the U S SR  has changed neither the size nor the status o f  the Iranian sector. H ow ever, Iran now  
demands either a condom inium  (or joint sovereignty) that w ould allow  it to claim  equal proceeds from all 
energy developed at the sea bed, regardless o f  its investm ent in that developm ent or the expansion o f  its 
sector to at least 20 percent o f  the surface area and seabed. That territory includes part o f  the oil-rich  
Azerbaijani sector. Ariel Cohen, “Iran's Claim over Caspian Sea Resources Threaten Energy Security.”
86 For details o f  the legal dispute, see Horton and M em edov, “Legal Status o f  the Caspian Sea.”
87 Osman Nuri Aras, A zeraycan  ’in H azar E konom isi ve  S tra tejisi (Istanbul Der Yayinlari, 2001 ), 175 -206 .
88 G eoffrey Kemp, “Iran and Caspian Energy,” 57.
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issue o f contention and Iran stands firm on its original position on the legal status of the 
Caspian Sea.89
As we have indicated above, the creation or development of regimes would have 
helped to the achievement of interstate cooperation on conflicting issues. In the case of 
Caspian Sea and the issue of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, no regime has been 
created by the coastal states. Therefore the inability of the Caspian states to create a 
viable regime in the Caspian Sea might have undermined cooperation on the regional 
issues including the development of the Caspian oil resources.
CONCLUSIONS
The success or failure of International Institutions in promoting peace and 
interstate cooperation is not universal. The experience of IOs in Europe is definitely 
different than in the Transcaucasian world. There are indeed vast differences between 
two regions. The political, economic, cultural and geographical differences may lead to 
different outcomes in terms of the success or failure of IOs.
The Caspian-Caucasian states have been under Russian control for centuries. Just 
after the dissolution of the Soviet Union these states started to interact within an 
international environment as an independent actor. Compared to the European countries, 
their experience in international politics and diplomacy is very limited. Only after two 
deadly world wars European countries started investing on international institutions as a 
guarantor of peace and security. Their experience with each other and the destructiveness 
of the wars in Europe have had dramatic impacts on the minds of the European leaders. 
The newly independent states of the Caspian and the transcaucasian states lack these
89 Aras, A zeraycan  'in H azar E konom isi ve  S tratejisi, 198.
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experiences and are not ready to rely on International Institutions for their security.
Apart from the other factors mentioned in this chapter, this has tremendously reduced the 
chances of IOs to become an effective instrument in the settlement of disputes.
In Triangulating Peace, Bruce Russet and John R. Oneal explain three important 
aspects of Kantian Peace; Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations 
all of which are available in the European context. The concept of democracy is very 
new to the countries o f Caspian Sea. Although we can observe a certain level of 
interdependent relationship among the countries of the Caspian Sea, it is far from being a 
factor contributing to peace and stability in the region. Russet and Oneal argue that three 
legs of Kantian peace, democracy, economic interdependence and international 
organizations generate virtuous cycles of peace as opposed to vicious cycles of war.
These three factors also positively affect each other. Existence of one of the legs 
positively contributes to the success o f other generating a virtuous cycle of peace.
Among the other factors that have been discussed above, the inability o f the 
international and regional institutions in the Transcaucasus to generate peace and 
contribute to the development of the Caspian oil resources might also be explained by the 
absence o f the three legs of Kantian Peace.




This chapter summarizes the major findings discussed throughout this 
dissertation. It also touches upon some of the issues raised in the previous chapters. This 
chapter also ties the major issues discussed in the Caspian region to the current 
developments in international arena where applicable.
This dissertation set out to establish a framework through which we would 
understand the major issues that affected states’ decision to cooperate or abstain from 
cooperation in the Caspian region over the issues related to the development of Caspian 
oil resources. This dissertation explores the underlying reasons behind the lack of 
cooperation among the regional and external powers in the Transcaspian region.
Although the extraction and the transportation of Caspian oil has the potential to provide 
economic development for the region as a whole and prosperity for the people of the 
Caspian states, Caspian governments have been unable to come up with a framework that 
would provide a viable physical and political environment for the development of the 
existing petroleum reserves.
Within the same context, this dissertation also sought to understand the main 
reasons behind the slow developments in the Caspian oil industry owing to lack of 
cooperation among the states and non-state actors. This is especially important 
considering the fact that it has been almost more than a decade and a half that the Caspian 
states and western oil companies started investing in the oil projects.
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IMPORTANCE OF CASPIAN OIL IN TODAY’S WORLD
Looking at the rate of current oil and gas production in the Caspian Sea region, 
one could assert that compared to Middle Eastern oil capacity or to the total oil 
production in the World, Caspian region could only contribute a small percentage.1 (See 
Table 6.1 and 6.2) It is true that Caspian oil would never be an alternative to Middle 
Eastern oil but as many people acknowledge, the Caspian reserves may help to reduce the 
dependence on Middle East.2 Diversification of energy resources is an important element 
of energy security for the whole world. Though a small percentage, Caspian oil could be 
a venue for energy diversification for some countries, especially the neighboring states; 
i.e. Turkey, China, Japan and Europe.
Apart from the implications of Caspian oil to the world, one of the things to 
consider is the contribution of Caspian oil to regional development. Most of the Caspian 
countries have been suffering from economic problems since their independence from the 
Soviet Union. As most of the governments of these Caspian states foresee, oil and gas is 
one of the biggest hope for these countries to fight poverty and underdevelopment. As 
the economical and political turmoil dominate the region from time to time with varying 
intensity, oil and gas export stands as the best possible option for improvement in all 
areas. There is no doubt that money made from oil and gas export play crucial role in the 
development o f the Caspian regional states. It could bring prosperity not only to the 
exporting states but also to the whole region if the petro-dollars were used for the
11.5 percent currently and 3.0 percent by 2010. B est scenarios predict that Caspian oil could only reach up 
to 5 percent o f  total w orld’s production by 2015 or 2020.
2 Gelb and Twym an, eds., The C aspian Sea R egion a n d  E nergy R esources, 20.
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development and improvement of the areas that need attention.3 In addition, the use of 
oil resources in the ex-soviet states of Caspian region is crucial for their economic 
survival and independence.4
Though it has been said that Caspian oil would not change the balances in world 
oil markets, in the light of the recent developments and the sharply rising oil prices, the 
Caspian oil would again prove to be very important. As the demand and the price of oil 
go up, the world is going to need to utilize every possible resource that can be put into the 
market. Despite the difficulties of extraction and transportation, and the political and 
security issues related to the Caspian region, we come to realize the fact that international 
cooperation is an important factor in realizing the use of Caspian oil. Although there are 
varieties of numerical figures and estimates about Caspian oil reserves, a steady 3 million 
barrel by 2010 would have tremendous impact in the oil market. (Although it is below the 
Saudi production, it is going to be more than the Kuwaiti production of oil.)5
Three variables have been explored to what extent they can explain the lack of 
cooperation. Almost all of the former Soviet Republics in the Caspian basin are heavily 
dependent on the revenues coming from oil exports. (Share of oil and gas in Azeri 
exports amounts to 90 percent while it is 80 percent in Turkmenistan and 65 percent in
3 One o f  the problem s that the Caspian states had with oil driven econom y is the expectation that oil 
revenues w ould resolve m ost o f  their econom ical problems. This expectation prevented them from making 
substantial reforms in the econom ic area.
4 Army M yers, Jaffe and Robert M anning, “The Shocks o f  a World Cheap o f  O il,” F oreign  A ffairs 79, no. 
1 (January/February 2000): 2 1 -2 2 .
5 “The Caspian is not and never has been a potential M iddle East,” Terry A dam s, a senior associate o f  
Cambridge Energy Research A ssociates told the Oil and M oney conference. But with proven remaining 
recoverable reserves o f  15 -20  b illion barrels, and a potential for 50 billion barrels— w hich w ould make it a 
"superior North Sea"— the region is a strategically important source o f  oil for the European Union. B y  
2020, crude production could reach 5 m illion barrels per day, w hich would equal only 3%-4% o f  world  
output. (A dam s is a former head o f  B P-led Azerbaijan International Operating Co. (A IO C ).) “Caspian Oil 
Remains Crucial to Energy Security for W est,” The O il D a ily  5, no. 2 (N ovem ber 2001): 11.
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Kazakhstan).6 Development of an independent and healthy national economy surely rests 
on their success to establish a functioning oil industry. In an attempt to answer the main 
question asked with reference to the lack of cooperation among major players in the 
Caspian Sea region over the development of the Caspian oil reserves, the following 
variables have been investigated:
• political rivalry among the regional actors as well as external players over 
regional influence and control of oil resources in the Caspian Sea region,
• armed conflicts and military confrontations that affected the interstate 
relations in transcaucasia,
• and the presence and effectiveness of international institutions in the Caspian 
Sea region.
Among the independent variables studied in this dissertation, geopolitical rivalry 
seems to have the highest relevance with respect to the main question asked.
Geopolitical rivalry in this dissertation refers to the establishment of a zone of economic, 
political and military influence/ control over the region. Political rivalry, on the other 
hand, refers to the disagreements among internal and external players over the 
development of the Caspian oil resources. Rivalry also differs from conflict in the sense 
that it does not involve military confrontation and armed conflict.
Actors inside and outside the region see the region as their sphere of influence 
which makes it hard to cooperate on issues such as oil. The study of the interstate 
relations among the Caspian states and external powers has shown that the policies and 
approaches adapted by the major actors in the great game of the twenty-first century was
6 Data gathered from W orld Bank Country B riefs and Azerbaijan M inistry o f  Finance Fact Sheet.
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mainly guided by relative gain calculations although other sources of concerns continued 
to affect their decisions and policies. This was actually very much consistent with the 
realist/neorealist perception of states as actors in international arena interacting with other 
states on the basis of national interests focusing more on possibility of change in the 
balance of power and relative gains.
There are numerous instances where states were more concerned with regional 
influence and geopolitical supremacy. On other occasions, some Caspian states were 
concerned more with economic and political independence from regional powers. If we 
were to categorize this in a general way, we could assert that:
• Great powers in the Caspian game pursued a policy of regional domination 
and influence, i.e., Russia, Turkey and Iran.
• Small states in the Caspian Sea region followed a policy promising a more 
independent future from regional powers.
This has become especially obvious in the study of the legal status of the Caspian Sea and 
the issue of pipelines which dominated the political agenda for almost more than a 
decade. The impact of national interest guided by relative gain consideration has also 
been visible in other areas of interstate relationship in the Caspian Sea as has been shown 
in the previous chapters which will also be given due consideration in the coming 
sections of the conclusion.
In the Caspian context, the sharing of the Caspian Sea among the bordering states 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union is among the first examples that clearly show the 
existence of national interest as an important impediment to the achievement of 
cooperation, which eventually affected the development of Caspian oil resources. On the
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legal status of the Caspian Sea as a lake or a sea which changes the rules determining the 
sharing of the sea, each littoral state pushed for an option that would serve their interests 
best. The establishment of an alliance between Russia and Iran against the former Soviet 
republics is also an indication of states pursuing self interest policies to maintain their 
superior status in the region. The sharing of the Caspian Sea surface and the seabed has 
long remained as an issue of contention; with each side pushing for their own options. 
Since the littoral state could not achieve a common solution regarding the use of mineral 
resources lying under the sea, the Caspian oil industry developed at a rather slow speed 
compared to the expectations and the potential that it had to offer to the people in the 
region.
Another issue area where pursuing policies to maintain supremacy and secure 
their national interests has constituted a great obstacle for the development of Caspian oil 
resources is the issue of pipelines. Since the Caspian Sea is landlocked, construction of 
pipelines to export Caspian oil is the only viable option among the others that proved to 
be costly and ineffective in the long run.7 Passing of the pipelines in certain direction is 
an issue of great concern for the littoral states as well as the neighboring countries. Apart 
from the economic benefits attached to the passing of the pipelines from certain 
territories, the issue of control and influence also dominated the thinking of the involved 
actors.
The Caspian pipeline construction has gone through two different phases. In the 
early years of oil production, the Caspian states produced limited amount of oil because 
of the capacity of the oil wells and the investment needed for the production and the
7 Swapping oil with other oil producers and transporting by railroad are among the available options for the 
Caspian oil producers.
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transportation of the oil extracted. The number of players in the first round of the 
negotiations were relatively small compared the second phase that involved a large 
number of state and non-state actors. This has contributed to the achievement of the 
cooperation among the actors positively as the stake at hand was not considered so high. 
Looking at the issue from a perspective of relative vs. absolute gain analysis, each party 
focused on what they get and not on what the others might, leaving the chances for 
compromise very high. The focus on absolute gain, in the early phases of negotiations 
helped to the continuation of promising future negotiations for the actors involved in the 
pipeline debate. Parties involved in these negotiations basically prepared themselves for 
the main export pipelines since the issue at hand was not considered very important. In 
fact this has been the focal point of early negotiations for pipelines that each state in the 
debate did not focus on relative gain calculations. Given the state of international 
relations and global anarchic environment, relative gain calculations at that time could 
have stalled and eventually killed the prospects for future cooperation on pipeline 
negotiations. According to Game Theory, cooperation occurs when the involved actors 
expect to retrieve higher gain from mutual then unilateral action. Therefore the benefits 
of mutual cooperation (CC) relative to mutual defection (DD) are expected to be higher. 
In fact, the capacity of states to cooperate under anarchy, to obligate themselves to 
mutually beneficial courses of action without resort to any ultimate central authority is 
essential to the realization of a common good. 8 In addition to these, under iterated 
conditions the magnitude of the differences among pay offs within a class of games can 
be an important determinant of cooperation. The more substantial the gains from mutual
8 O ye, “Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: H ypothesis and Strategies,” 1 -24 .
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cooperation (CC-DD), the less substantial the gains from unilateral defection (DC-CD), 
the greater the likelihood of cooperation.9
However, the negotiations for the main export pipelines were different in nature 
compared to the negotiations for the early oil pipelines. The stake at hand was 
considered high, so was the importance attached to the direction of the main export 
pipeline. Each party feared that a loss in this round would seriously damage their 
position in the great game of Caspian pipeline. Zero-sum thinking dominated the Main 
Export Pipeline (MEP) negotiations throughout most of the decade. In the negotiations 
for the MEP, relative gain considerations affected the policies of individual actors. As 
the number of actors in the MEP discussions increased, the chances for a common 
solution diminished. Existence of many of actors with different agenda and interests 
stalled the negotiations rendering the development of Caspian oil industry impossible in 
such an environment. Regarding the number of players in the region and especially in the 
MEP discussions, the existence of large number of players negatively affected the 
cooperation scenarios because of the vast varieties of interests that many of them were 
conflicting in nature. Considering the other examples of interstate cooperation in the 
Caspian Sea region on the issue of Caspian oil and related issues (i.e. Russia-Kazakhstan 
pipeline deal with Chevron oil, Russia-Turkmenistan gas deal, Turkmenistan-Iran oil 
swaps, Russia-Turkey Blue Stream Project), we could say that the large number of 
players did not contribute to cooperation rather it negatively affected the outcome and led 
to competition as it became more and more difficult to reach a compromise among so 
many divergent policies and interests especially over a single route pushed mainly by the 
US and Turkey.
9 Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security D ilem m a,” 167-214 .
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While Russia favored a northern route, Iran insisted on the profitability of the 
southern direction for the Caspian oil. Turkey and the United States, on the other hand, 
supported a western route, whereas the oil companies wanted to choose among the 
shortest and the cheapest option. In such an environment, where we have multiple actors 
interacting with fundamentally different and conflicting interests, the cooperation among 
the actors and development of the Caspian oil resources has been quite slow to emerge. 
Yet, considering the Russian and Iranian reservations, construction of Baku-Ceyhan years 
after its conception, we may conclude that the cooperation on the MEP has not been 
achieved the way it was planned. One of the issues that complicated the interstate 
relationship in the transcaspian region is the competition for political control and 
influence in the region. Regional and external powers have long been competing with 
each other over the control of the region and maintaining a sphere of influence.
Russia is one o f the countries that has viewed most of the issues in the region 
from a geopolitical perspective. Other than the economic gain and prosperity, 
maintaining a Russian control in the Caspian region has shaped the Russian policy 
formulations toward the affairs o f the Caspian region. Alongside with Russia, the US, 
Turkey and Iran also competed for geopolitical supremacy in the region. While small 
states of the Caspian littoral states mainly concerned about the economics of the oil 
development and independence for their underdeveloped economies, the regional and 
external powers focused on the geopolitical aspects of the regional issues.
Turkey, alongside with the US fought against an Iranian and also a Russian drive for 
domination in the region. The fight for regional supremacy has complicated the Caspian 
oil development in several ways.
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First, the geopolitical rivalry has made the resolution of the Caspian affairs much 
more difficult because the countries fighting for regional influence started viewing the 
Caspian affairs from a broader perspective rather than treating it merely an issue related 
to the development of oil reserves in the Caspian region. The clash between Iran and the 
United States is a great example to this. For the United States it was never about 
excluding Iran as a Caspian region country from the oil business but dealing with Iran 
from a broader historical perspective. The long-lasting animosity between Iran and the 
United States reflected itself in the affairs of the Caspian region. The persistent U.S. 
attitude towards Iran and the decision to exclude it from any oil business in the Caspian 
Sea is an indication of a broader controversy between these two nations, The U.S. policy 
of containment of Iran continued in the north and the United States pressured the former 
Soviet Republics not to consider Iran as a partner in the oil deals.
The Iranian moves in the Caspian Sea should also be viewed from that angle. Iran 
for long tried to break the alliance between the US, oil companies and the littoral states 
with different proposals for the transportation of Caspian oil through Iran. The Iranian 
policy in the legal status of the Caspian Sea also reflects a broader Iranian engagement in 
the region, as it is also true for the pipeline negotiations. Preventing the achievement o f a 
functioning oil industry in the Caspian Sea and also the establishment of friendly ties 
between the littoral states of the Caspian Sea and the United States has always been in 
Iranian interest. Iran already feels contained by its eternal enemy on many flanks. The 
United States has a strong hold in the Middle East, Turkey and Afghanistan. 
Establishment of a strong American, presence in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan was 
perceived as a big threat to Iran. Under these conditions, we may better understand the
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moves made by the Iranian governments to disrupt the development of a U.S. alliance in 
the Caspian Sea region. It may also shed light to the recent Iranian involvement in Iraq. 
Iran may resort to certain measures in Iraq to prevent the establishment of a strong US 
hold in the country.10
The U.S. and the Russian policies in the Caspian could also be viewed from the 
same perspective. Russia feels pressured by the advance of western powers in Europe.
The Expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe and the loosing of the old republics one by 
one on all sides puts Russia in a tough situation. Feeling that the United States is 
advancing on Russia on all sides, Russia tried to increase its presence in the Caspian 
region. It has never been all about pipelines or sharing of the Caspian Sea on certain 
criteria, but it had a lot to do with the maintenance of Russian influence in the region. 
Russia was not concerned too much about gaining more shares in the Caspian Sea but 
these issues have served as a tool for Russia to use against its rivals, the United States and 
against its close allies in the region.
The impact of the geopolitical rivalry in the region has been seen clearly over the 
negotiations for the construction of pipelines. The rise of competition for control and 
influence badly affected the development of Caspian oil reserves. It has especially slowed 
down the investments and mass production of oil as planned at the beginning.
The construction of Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is an example to this, that it took more then a 
decade to complete a project that has initially been planned to be finished within a few 
year.
Among the other factors that contributed to the slow development of oil industry 
in the Caspian region is the military conflicts and wars in the Caspian region. These wars
10 D avid Stout, “Pentagon B lam es Iran for B om bs U sed in Iraq A gainst U .S. T roops,” February 15, 2007 .
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directly in some occasions indirectly affected the Caspian Sea oil. There were three 
major military conflicts in the Caspian region. The war between Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) 
Armenians and Azerbaijan did the most damage to the Caspian Sea oil development 
projects.11 From the early days of the conflict, regional and external powers involved in 
the mediation efforts alongside with international institutions. The conflicts in the region 
had a potential to spread to the whole region with a massive refugee population that it 
created afterwards, leaving the war-torn countries in chaos.
As the people in the war zones fled to safe areas, the involvement of external 
powers became inevitable. The war between Azerbaijan and Armenia forced Russia, 
Turkey and Iran to involve in the settlement of disputes. Each party supporting another, 
finding a solution to the conflict took many years. The efforts of Minsk Group under 
OSCE have been rendered ineffective because of the Russian maneuvers. Russia, 
seeking to maintain a level of influence and control in the region, wanted to take the 
control of the issue at hand and at the same time to have a reputation in the region. 
External powers, including the United States, approached to the conflict from their own 
perspective. While it was a golden opportunity for Russia to establish further control in 
the region, the United States and Turkey favored the cessation o f hostilities in order to 
start oil projects in the region.
As the interest of western oil companies increased in the Caspian Sea region, the 
U.S involvement in the regional conflicts gained momentum. The conflict in Chechnya 
and civil unrests in Georgia are also among the factors that contributed to the instability 
of the Transcaucaus region. This has negatively affected the development of oil industry 
in the region. The Caspian states always needed western investment to start oil
11 The relevant details o f  these wars were covered in Chapter V.
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production in the offshore oil wells of the Caspian Sea. For the foreign investment to 
flow into the region, stability had to be established. The oil companies had to wait long 
enough for the establishment of a secure and a stable environment. Only after the signing 
of the agreement between Azerbaijan and NK Armenians, brokered by Russia, oil 
companies started to invest in the Caspian Sea oil projects.12
As we indicated earlier, these wars also indirectly affected the prospects for 
development in the Caspian region. Limited amount of resources have been used up to 
finance these costly wars. These wars also left these countries in ruins and produced 
thousands of refugees, which eventually placed further burden on the respective 
governments. In addition to these, the resources used for the wars and for the 
reconstruction after these wars could have been used for the oil projects or other areas 
that needed government support to develop national economies.
The last independent variable studied in this dissertation is the role of 
international/ regional organizations (IOs) and institutional establishments in promoting 
peace and cooperation in the Caspian Sea region. Examination of the IOs in the region 
reveals that success or failure of IOs in promoting peace and interstate cooperation under 
the institutional framework was affected from varieties of factors, including geography 
and past experiences of the countries.
Scholars who study the role of international organizations in international politics 
would agree on the fact that the arguments and the findings are extremely diverse and to 
some extent confusing. It is related to the dynamic nature of the issue and the enormity of 
its scope. Geographical differences and past experiences of the member states in
12 The famous Contract o f  the Century, a production sharing agreement between Azerbaijan and a 
consortium o f  international oil com panies 1994, signed after the agreement betw een Azerbaijan and 
Armenians to end the war.
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international institutions might lead to different outcomes in terms o f its success and 
failure in promoting peace and security.
Constructivists, Functionalists and Institutionalists argue that world politics is 
increasingly organized around international organizations and regimes. They also argue 
that these institutions foster interstate cooperation among the member states through 
providing a forum for discussion, increasing transparency and reducing transaction costs. 
The same theory also predicts a decline in the militarized conflicts with growing salience 
of non governmental organizations in international relations. While neoliberals subscribe 
to much of the arguments mentioned above, these claims have been contended by 
neorealist school. Unlike neoliberals, neorealists argue that international politics is still 
dominated by national interest considerations and the international institutions are the
1 Treflection of the world politics rather than being a decisive factor in it.
Recent studies in the area focus more on the differences of international 
institutions in terms of their structure, homogeneity, member structure, issue areas and 
geography. The differences in these areas may very well affect the effectiveness of that 
particular institution.14
In the Caspian context, the success and or failure of the international and regional 
organizations (CIS, GUAM and OSCE in some occasions) depended on varieties of 
factors and at the same time suffered from numerous setbacks. One o f the major issues 
that determined the final outcome with respect to the effectiveness of the international 
organizations in the Caspian region is the lack of commitment by the member states to 
the organizations. Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom argue that IOs “can promote peace
13 For more on the literature on the subject see Chapter VI.
14 Charles Boehm er, Eric Gartzke and Tim othy Nordstrom, “D o Intergovernmental Organizations Promote 
Peace?” W orld P o litics  57 (October 2004): 3 -7 .
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but success depends on attributes present in only the most cohesive and institutionalized 
organizations.”15
The establishment of Commonwealth of Independent States by Russia and few 
other Slavic states and its eventual growth into a regional organization is an example for 
the lack of commitment which rendered the organization almost useless in serving its 
main functions; providing a framework for regional cooperation.
Behind these is the fear of Russia to use the organization for the re-establishment of 
Russian hegemony. In contrasts, the CIS member states have long tried to gain a safe 
level of independence from Russia and acted very cautiously to common 
establishments.16
Apart from the lack of commitment, another reason that explains why 
institutionalization failed in the region and why existing institutions did not succeed in 
creating an environment conducive to cooperation is the inability o f the Caspian and the 
Central Asian states to come up with a comprehensive set of rules and norms that 
regional states would agree to abide by in managing their differences. The lack of a 
unified approach on the management of the regional affairs and the split among member 
states in terms of their inclination towards the West or Russia centered alliance impeded 
the establishment of a strategy that would bring the regional states together. Beside 
these, the nature of the domestic politics in the Caspian states and the historical 
experience of these countries with each other and especially with Russia have precluded 
the emergence of an effective organization that could contribute to regional cooperation, 
leading way to a better interstate relationship in terms of achieving cooperation on the
15 Ibid., 7.
16 For more details on how  CIS functioned and eventually failed see Chapter VI.
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development of Caspian oil industry. The success of IOs in promoting peace and friendly 
relations between Caspian states and external powers involved in the Caspian region have 
been very limited owing to varieties of factors indicated above. Compared to the areas 
where international institutions have produced positive outcomes in promoting interstate 
cooperation, the study of the Caspian region in terms of institutional structure reveals the 
existing differences that prevent the development of effective international institutions. 
Institutionlists argue that international institutions can lead to cooperation because:
• International institutions can mitigate the effects of international anarchy
• They may help to improve exchange of information/ transparency therefore 
reduce the probability and desirability of defection
• They can increase the likelihood of cooperation by decreasing the incentives 
for defection.
• They can create an environment that actors may fear reputational costs.
• They can link issues and increase the chances of cooperation.17
In the Caspian context, however, the number of institutions should be seen very 
small compared to the other regions where the number of institutions and membership is 
high. Russet and Oneal see a positive correlation between membership in international 
institutions and peace among the member states. 18 As Barnett and Finnemore argue, once 
the institutions are established, they would develop and gain a personality of their own 
becoming an important mechanism in world politics and contributing to peace and
17 For more details on how  these institutions help to the achievem ent o f  cooperation, see Keohane, A fter 
H egem ony.
18 For an analysis o f  Kantian Peace: D em ocracy, E conom ic Interdependence and International Institutions, 
see Russet and Oneal, Triangulating P eace , 157 -96 .
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security.19 Looking at the issue from this perspective, we could assert that the interstate 
relationship in the Caspian region could have been more peaceful if  the institutions in the 
region have had a chance to develop. This would have led to more cooperation among 
the Caspian states over the development of oil industry.
More than a decade after the investments started pouring into the Caspian region, 
little progress has been achieved compared to the expectations and proposals put forward 
by the governments o f the Caspian states. This is not to ignore the partial success made 
in certain areas, including the resolution of the discussions pertaining to the legal status 
of the Caspian Sea through bilateral agreements in the northern parts of the sea, 
excluding Iran, and the completion of the huge Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project and finally, 
the Caspian Pipeline Consortium that carries most of the Kazakh oil production to 
Novorossiysk; but to highlight the lack of cooperation among the regional and external 
powers in the Caspian Sea compared to what could have been achieved in such a long 
period of time. As it has been shown in this dissertation, the realist/neorealist paradigm 
proved to have more explanatory power in the Transcaucasus region while the neoliberal 
explanation of interstate relationship in the Caspian context remained very thin.
If history is any guide, the only thing that does not change is the change itself. This 
dissertation has covered the developments related to the nature of the interstate 
relationship in the Caspian Sea region up to date.20 What exactly will happen in the 
coming years remains to be seen. As we all accept, history is full of surprises for those 
who study and also for those who live in it.21
19 M ichael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, R ules fo r  the W orld: In ternational O rganizations in G loba l 
P olitics  (Ithaca: Cornell U niversity Press, 2004).
20 February 2007.
21 A s it is the case with the unexpected collapse o f  the Soviet Union.
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However, based on the studies of the past and the current developments, it is 
difficult to expect a dramatic change towards a more peaceful interstate relationship in 
the Caspian Sea region, as most of the dividing issues remain unresolved. Looking at the 
future of the oil developments in the region, it should be safe to say that, the progress in 
the oil industry will largely remain dependent on the quality of interstate relationship in 
the region, while the global trends in oil industry will certainly play a role in determining 
the direction of the developments in the Caspian Sea region.
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